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Problems of COMMUNISM

CUBA AND CASTROISM

Boris Goldenberg *Ernst Halperin*
Andres Suarez

HOW STRONG IS KHRUSHCHEV?

Carl Linden *Thomas Rigby*
Robert Conquest

BLOC REACTION TO THE COMMON MARKET

Marshall D. Shulman

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FOCUS ON CUBA

EDITORS' NOTE: The articles below discuss various internal and international implications of Fidel Castro's course in Cuba. While their primary topics differ, they touch on one point in common: each serves to illuminate the obstacles that frustrate Castro's desire to export his revolution to the rest of Latin America. In the first article, Mr. Goldenberg analyzes the nature of Castro's revolution, contending that its unique features have far outweighed its typicality as a "Leninist" revolution, and concluding on this basis that it is not apt to be duplicated on the continent. The second article, by Ernst Halperin, discusses the ideology of Castroism—particularly its advocacy of insurrection through guerrilla warfare, a concept that is heretical in the orthodox Communist view and is encountering stiff opposition from many Latin American party leaders. Andres Suárez, finally, examines Cuba's position vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking, showing how the Sino-Soviet schism places Castro in a dilemma vitally affecting his hemispheric political ambitions.

The Cuban Revolution: An Analysis

By Boris Goldenberg

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION has many unique aspects —as do all historical phenomena—but it also belongs to a class of happenings. Insofar as it is unique, it can be explained only by means of historical description. Insofar as it is one of a general type, it can be analyzed in sociological terms. Both kinds of investigation are necessary, but both have been difficult due to lack of factual knowledge, to political and emotional preconceptions, to the myths built up by the revolution's friends as well as its opponents, and finally to the impossibility of explaining it inside the framework of either liberal or Marxist concepts. What follows is a schematic outline of a thesis in keeping with the facts of the case.

Mr. Goldenberg lived for many years in Cuba and has written widely on Latin American affairs. The theme of his article is further developed in full-length study soon to be published in German and English.

Considered from the standpoint of political dynamics, the Cuban revolution is a "permanent" one. It began as the democratic revolution of one country, but it was transformed into a "socialist" revolution which has tried to overspill its national boundaries and which has established close relations with the Communist bloc. Referring to this transformation as Castro's "betrayal" of the revolution's original aims is not really very helpful, since most revolutions turn out to be quite different from what their original protagonists wanted and proclaimed.

The Revolution as a "Leninist" Type

In terms of its general type, the Cuban revolution can be classified as "Leninist" and belongs to a subclass of transformations distinctive in that they arose

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from inner developments and were not imposed by direct intervention of a foreign power. Russia, Yugoslavia, Albania, China, and perhaps North Vietnam are the other members of this sub-class.

All "Leninist" revolutions have claimed Marx as their inspiration, but have contradicted the main tenets of mature Marxism. All have been brought about by a radical elite in underdeveloped countries; in none has the purpose been to break the fetters which an overmature capitalism had imposed on further social progress; in none did the preconditions exist which Marx considered essential for the establishment of socialism; and in none did the revolution arise from the more or less conscious will of a popular majority composed of impoverished and embittered proletarians. Introduced with the object of furthering industrialization and modernization, this kind of "socialism" has been a substitute for rather than an heir to capitalism.

Because such revolutions have run counter to the spontaneous historical tendencies of the countries concerned, and because they have not been based on either the abilities or the desires of the population at large, the revolutionary elites have established a totalitarian system of rule. The term "totalitarianism" does not imply the total absence of consent on the part of the ruled. No man or group of men can rule for any length of time without the consent, freely given or induced, of a considerable part of the population. What is meant is a social and political system imposed, shaped and controlled by a revolutionary elite, which finds its legitimization in some ideology, monopolizes all power, prohibits all opposition, reduces the private sphere of men's lives, indoctrinates the population and maintains it in a state of constant mobilization.

Some Concepts That Don't Apply

According to liberal beliefs about the causes of Leninist revolutions—beliefs which underly the "Alliance for Progress"—such upheavals and transformations result from the activity of Communist parties which are able to exploit popular discontent caused mainly by poverty and by huge economic inequalities. They occur mainly in predominantly agrarian countries with archaic and semi-feudal structures, in which the middle class is weak and frustrated, in which representative democracy lacks popular appeal, and in which the impact of beginning industrialization causes severe disruption.

This explanation does not fit the Cuban revolution.

Cuba was certainly poor. But all economic and social indicators show that its population enjoyed a higher standard of living than that of southern Italy or Spain, and that in terms of per capita assets Cuba rated among the upper fifth of the Latin American countries.[1] This fact has occasionally been recognized by Cuban leaders:

Cuba was not one of the countries with the lowest standard of living of the masses in America, but, on the contrary, one of those with the highest standard of living.[2]

Although social and economic inequalities were very great, they were probably less pronounced than in most of Latin America, and had diminished rather than increased in the course of recent decades—as we are told by another revolutionary source:

Cuban distributive policy since 1933, with its higher salaries, eight-hour day, paid vacations, social security, etc., had produced a more just division of "national income." . . . Previously this income went into the hands of a few. . . .[3]

Only a minority of Cubans were engaged in agriculture, which could not be described as feudal. It was dominated by sugar-mills, and its latifundia (landed estates) had nothing in common with the haciendas of many Latin American countries. The majority of agriculturalists were not peasants but wage-earners—poor largely because of their underemployment due to the seasonal character of the sugar crop. The peasants, mostly tenants of various kinds, suffered from ignorance, from a lack of roads, credits, decent houses, and implements, and also from exploitation by commercial intermediaries and by local stores, often owned by big companies to which many peasants were chronically in debt. But their

[1] While per capita comparisons of the different countries are admittedly unreliable, they are useful as indicators. Recently it has been shown that even the rather high figures of per capita national product in Cuba had been seriously undervalued (see Harry T. Oshima, *The National Income and Product of Cuba*, 1953, Food Research Institute Studies, Stanford University, November 1961). One has to complement such data by other indicators—*e.g.*, the number of population employed in agriculture, energy consumption per head, the number of private cars, radio and television sets, the rate of illiteracy, etc.—factors which this writer examines in his book.

[2] Anibal Escalante in *Verde Olivo* (Havana), July 30, 1961. Escalante, it will be remembered, later became the key figure of a shake-up within the new "Marxist-Leninist" party amalgamating the PSP (Cuban Communist Party) with Castro's revolutionaries. Latent dissensions came to a head in March 1962, when Castro violently denounced Escalante, long a top PSP leader, and charged the "old" Communists with attempting to assume controlling power in the party and government. Escalante quickly left the country for Eastern Europe. By his actions, Castro made clear that he intended to remain in control of the "Marxist-Leninist" course in Cuba, and so far Moscow has given him complete backing.

[3] "Lex," Ed., *Political, Economic, and Social Thought of Fidel Castro*, Havana, 1959, p. 153.

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rents were not exorbitant and there was little land-hunger because most of them were protected by law and by custom against eviction—the main exception being those who lived in the remoter areas.

The "middle classes," insofar as such an ambiguous and confused term can be applied to Latin American realities, were rather numerous and were on the increase. While there are no reliable measures or statistics on their proportion in the population, evidence of a growing and more or less stable lower middle-class element was to be found in the mushrooming areas of urban and suburban dwellers holding steady jobs, leading relatively comfortable lives, buying their own homes, and so on. The higher strata, ranging from technicians and small businessmen through professionals, managers, bankers and bigger entrepreneurs, were of course much fewer in number but were also growing.

Representative democracy, as enshrined in the Constitution of 1940, had gained tremendous popularity in the Cuban nation. This constitution, virtually the Magna Carta for a Cuban "welfare-state democracy," had been the product of a freely-elected Constitutional Assembly in which all political parties were represented. In this period Fulgencio Batista, already the strong-man of Cuba, had seemed to be veering toward support of a democratic system; prior to the Assembly he had legalized the Communist Party and condoned legal activity by his major adversaries, the "Autenticos."[4] Under the new constitution he was elected president of Cuba, serving until 1944. After his illegal reseizure of power in 1952 the entire struggle against him was to be conducted under the banner of the constitution.

The Communists had never constituted more than a small minority in Cuba and had little appeal. Even in the years they enjoyed legal status and participated in the government, they used to get hardly 10 percent of the vote in free elections. They did not make or direct the revolution in its first stage and had to submit to Castro in the second. Even those revolutionaries who had sympathies for communism—if not for the Communist Party—refrained from proclaiming it:

Sure—if at this time, when we were only a handful, we had proclaimed from the top of the Pico Turquino [the highest mountain of the Sierra Maestra] that we were Marxist-Leninists, we might never have been able to come down to the plains.[5]

[4] The Cuban "Autenticos," organized as a party by Grau San Martin, pursued a radical, pro-"welfare state," anti-imperialist line and were violently opposed to dictatorship in any form. The party won the elections of 1944 and remained in power until Batista's *coup d'etat* in 1952.

[5] Speech of Dec. 21, 1961, in *El Mundo* (Havana), Dec. 22.

The unpopularity of the Communists did not decrease but rather increased after Castro's victory, as he himself has stated:

The anti-Communist prejudices were so strong that a wave of protests used to arise each time a Communist was appointed to even a very modest post.[6]

Thus, the Cuban example shows that a Communist-type revolution can be successful where there is no feudalism, little conscious misery, no general popular despair, no mass desire for a "socialist" transformation, and no strong Communist Party.

The Pitfalls of Class Analyses

According to Marxist ideas—shared by many non-Marxists—revolutions must be explained as the outcome of class struggles and must be classified according to their class character. During 1959 the official Communists described the Cuban revolution as a "progressive, democratic, anti-imperialist" revolution led by the petty bourgeoisie and "national bourgeoisie,"—*i.e.*, as a fundamentally *bourgeois* revolution. Some authors classified it in its first stage, before it turned socialist, as a *peasant* revolution, while not a few analyzed it as a revolution of the *intellectuals*. The present "socialist" stage must, from the Marxist standpoint, be classified as *proletarian* revolution.

In the writer's view, however, any analysis framed in terms of social classes is utterly misleading and befogs the character of the Cuban revolution, as much in its first (democratic) as in its final ("socialist") stage.

The revolution against Batista cannot be understood as a bourgeois or middle-class revolution. It is true that most—though by no means all—of its leaders and very many of its active participants were young intellectuals of middle-class extraction. Yet this has been the case in most modern revolutions and cannot serve to differentiate them. It is also true that the widest if not always most active support for the struggle against the Batista regime came from those groups of people who can be called middle-class—precisely because this label is used to cover the totality of diverse and heterogeneous strata found between the "rich" and the "poor". But in no way can it be inferred that the revolution was conducted on behalf of the bourgeoisie and for the attainment of its class aims. In Cuba there existed neither feudalism nor absolutism. There was no fundamental opposition between the landed interests of an oligarchy and the bourgeois "capitalists"—both

[6] *El Mundo*, Dec. 2, 1961.

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groups were mixed and intimately related to each other. The landowners participated in capitalist enterprise and the bourgeoisie invested in land. Batista favored the bourgeoisie and encouraged industrialization, although his record was marred by terrorism and corruption.

Just as important, imperialistic interests were no longer hindering the development of a Cuban bourgeoisie, as had been the case up to the 1930's. Local industries had developed under the protection of tariffs, and many of them were either in Cuban hands or operating partly with Cuban capital. The proportion of Cuban capital to foreign capital was constantly growing, as shown by the increasing number of Cuban-owned sugar mills and banks. Cuban capitalists were participating in business ventures with North Americans. As a result there had been a decline in anti-imperialist sentiment in the course of recent decades—hence the great effort of the Communists and other radicals to revive this issue by hurling "pro-American" charges at the representatives of the Cuban progressive bourgeoisie who were ministers in the first postrevolutionary government.

Neither can the Cuban revolution be classified as a peasant revolution. The peasants formed only a small minority of the total population, and even those whose lot was most miserable were not revolutionary. Cuba was no land of *"jacqueries"*—there was no peasant unrest comparable to that which preceded and accompanied the revolutions of Mexico and Bolivia or to that now apparent in northeastern Brazil and Peru. Most of the population of the countryside remained passive throughout the struggle against Batista. A small minority of young peasants joined the guerrillas in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, mainly because, like young men from other social classes, they had to flee from police and army persecution, which was particularly marked in the regions where the guerrillas were active. This group was not in the least representative of the Cuban agricultural population; moreover, it was not in any sense inclined towards socialist solutions for Cuba:

The first territory occupied by the Rebel Army . . . was inhabited by a class of peasants different in its cultural and social roots from those that dwell in the regions of extensive, semi-mechanized Cuban agriculture. . . . The soldiers that made up our first guerrilla army of country people came from that part of . . . [the peasant] social class which shows its love for the possession of land most aggressively, which expresses most perfectly the spirit catalogued as petty bourgeois; the *campesino* fights because he wants land, for himself, for his children. He wants to manage it, sell it, and make himself rich through his work.[7]

FINALLY, neither in its first (democratic) nor in its final ("socialist") stage can the Cuban revolution be characterized as "proletarian." Indeed, the workers as a whole were the most passive section of the population during the struggle against Batista. Strikes were called for economic reasons, but wherever political strikes were attempted they failed to arouse the mass of the workers—as demonstrated most notably in the "general strike" of April 9, 1958. This passivity of the "proletariat" was—at least initially—admitted by the official Communists, who attributed it not only to fear of persecution and the subservience of the trade unions to Batista, but also to the materialistic attitude of workers interested in mere economic betterment and expecting to achieve it through actions of the government in power.[8] Later, Fidel Castro accused the better-paid urban workers in particular of having sacrificed their birthright to rule the country for a miserable pot of lentil soup.[9]

There is nothing astonishing in this passivity. Cuban economic conditions were good in 1956-58. The benefits which successive governments (including that of Batista) had conferred on various elements of the working class were quite substantial, and in fact had been carried so far that they contributed in some degree to the relative stagnation of the Cuban economy.[10] In order to develop the country more rapidly, Castro's government —once it had reached its "socialist" phase—tried to force the workers to work harder for less pay, annulled many of their former benefits, introduced "voluntary" work and "socialist emulation," and transformed the trade unions into organs of the state with the job of increasing production. The results have been described by a pro-Castro author:

The revolution has faced a difficult and potentially dangerous problem in the attitude of city workers. While for the most part they love Fidel as the orator and guerrilla-fighter . . . they have been slow to acquire a consciousness of their own indispensable role in the revolution, with its burdens and opportunities. *The initiative for the transition to a workers' state has come from the bourgeois leaders* of the revolution, not from a politically conscious working class.[11]

All efforts of the revolutionary leaders to get the voluntary cooperation of the workers failed, as Che

[7] Che Guevara in *Monthly Review* (New York), July-August 1961.

[8] Blas Roca in *World Marxist Review* (Prague), No. 8, August 1961.

[9] *Obra Revolucionaria* (Havana), No. 32, Dec. 15, 1960.

[10] On this subject see *Report on Cuba*, Mission of the International Bank, Washington, D. C., 1951.

[11] J. P. Murray in *Monthly Review*, July-August 1961. My italics.

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Guevara noted bitterly when speaking about the introduction of advisory workers' councils in the factories:

The main sin [*pecado*] of the advisory technical councils is that they have not arisen out of the pressure of the masses. They are a bureaucratic creation, introduced from above in order to give the masses a vehicle for which they had not asked—and in this consists the sin of the masses.[12]

While opposition to revolutionary measures came originally from urban workers, it soon spread to the countryside, as has been evident from the constant complaints of leading members of the government, the poor results of agriculture, the introduction of piecework and "norms" for agricultural work, and the transformation of the former "cooperatives" into state farms.

There remains to be noted a "Marxist" interpretation of the revolution which, in a certain sense, evades the problem of class characterization. According to one analyst, the Cuban revolution in its *first* phase was essentially a *"popular"* revolution, as had been the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Russian revolution of 1905-07. He quotes Lenin's remarks calling these revolutions "popular" because the masses of the people intervened actively and in an autonomous manner, pushing their own political and economic aims.[13]

But neither will this interpretation do for Cuba. The revolution against Batista was the work of a small minority, supported by the sympathies of a growing majority. There was little active participation of the masses, and certainly they did not behave in the manner described by Lenin.

The Social (*vs.* Class) Base

To reject a class analysis of the revolution does not eliminate the need to look for a social basis in those parts of the population which, because of their economic and social situation, could expect most from its victory and even from its socialist transformation. There were such people, but they did not form a social class.

Social classes arise, in the last analysis, out of a social division of labor. But in Cuba—as in most Latin American countries whose economies are growing too slowly—there was a huge number of persons who had no real "work," who therefore stood outside the social division of labor. An investigation conducted by the Consejo Nacional de Economia (National Council of Economy) during the economically favorable period of May 1956 to April 1957 showed that out of a labor force of 2,200,000, some 361,000 (16.3 percent) were totally unemployed and 134,000 "underemployed"[14]—without taking into consideration "hidden" unemployment, the people classified under "services" or as "independents" who in fact were underemployed, or the many superfluous "civil servants" filling the governmental offices.

The majority of these persons have had no real roots in the economy of their nation and are, in some respects, comparable to the *Lumpenproletariat.* Because of their rootlessness they have frequently been inclined toward social radicalism; since they could expect little from reforms of the existing system, they have been favorably disposed towards its substitution by another in which they might be able to take root. Because of its utter heterogeneity, this mass of people has never been able to develop a common consciousness or to form a common political organization. As a conglomeration of rootless individuals, unaccustomed to work, they have resisted strict discipline and have been prone to corruption of all kinds—their hopes being pinned on some "caudillo," or benefactor. Since they have not worked, they more than others have been able to participate in terroristic and guerrilla activities. These are the people who may be said to have given something like a social basis to the Cuban revolution as a whole. A closer look at the social composition of the anti-Batista rebels reveals that, rather than the middle-class extraction of their leaders, it is this rootlessness which has been the common denominator tying them together. They were recruited from the young unemployed and underemployed of the cities and the countryside, as well as from university and high-school students and from frustrated intellectuals of all descriptions who, with a lot of time on their hands, had only their rootlessness to lose and a world to conquer. Whether the regime will now be able to mold these people into workers for "socialist reconstruction" is quite another matter; given their social and psychological characteristics, the task would appear formidable.

The Uniqueness of Cuba

There seem to be three main peculiarities of the Cuban revolution which distinguish it from other "Leninist" revolutions: (1) it was initiated and led

[12] *Obra Revolucionaria,* No. 17, May 15, 1961.

[13] Jacques Arnault, "Cuba et le marxisme," *La Nouvelle critique* (Paris), Special number of 1962, esp. pp. 53-54.

[14] *Resultados de la encuesta sobre empleo, sub-empleo y desempleo en Cuba,* Consejo Nacional de Economia, Havana, January 1958.

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not by a Communist Party, but by a charismatic leader; (2) it passed through a "humanist" phase characterized by the bestowal of immediate benefits on the majority of the underprivileged; (3) its transformation from the democratic to the totalitarian phase was continuous, peaceful, and made without change of leadership.

The first peculiarity is well known and has been referred to earlier. Suffice it to add that during the whole process of the anti-Batista struggle and even during the first months of 1959, the Communist Party, which had considered Castro a petty-bourgeois putchist and had only come to an understanding with him in the fall of 1958, continued to be as distrustful of him as he was suspicious of their "old guard." These mutual suspicions were not entirely dispelled even at the beginning of the "socialist" phase; they led to a power struggle within the embryonic form of the future unitary party of the revolution, resulting in a purge of the "old" Communists and the submission of the party to Castro (see footnote 2).

The outcome of this struggle was never in question. From the first to the last phase of the revolution virtually all power resided with Castro. If ever there has been in history a charismatic leader, Castro embodies the type in almost chemical purity. It was Castro who appointed the first revolutionary president and gave him a free hand to choose ministers—only to assume the premiership himself six weeks after his entry into Havana. It was just as easy for him to dismiss the president and various other ministers when he later wanted to do it.

It is therefore utterly misleading to talk of a period of "dual government" in Cuba analogous to the duality of the English Revolution (Cromwell's army *vs.* Long Parliament), the French Revolution (the Paris Commune *vs.* the Legislative Assembly and Convention) or the Russian revolution (the Soviets *vs.* the Provisional Government). If the "bourgeois" government under Urrutia had no independent power, neither was there any counterbalancing power opposing it.

To cast the rebel army in this role is to overestimate its numerical strength, to ascribe to it a particular will, and to overlook its inner differentiations. Although the army grew quickly during the last weeks of the anti-Batista struggle, and even more rapidly in the first days after victory, its kernel was exceedingly small. There were less than some 2,000 guerrilla fighters, even including the members of the "Second Front" of Escambray who soon fell out with Castro. Castro's own forces at the end of December 1958 can be estimated at about 1,000, and the great majority of them had joined him only during the previous six months (as late as April 1958, according to Castro himself, his men numbered only 180.)[15] Moreover, the members of the Rebel Army had no common political opinion; many of them were soon purged, while those openly opposing the turn towards the Communists were arrested.

The INRA, the organization created to direct the agrarian reform, for a time enjoyed wide power, but it does not fit into the concept of "dual government" either. It is true that during the second half of 1959 and the first half of 1960 the staff of the INRA largely ran affairs behind the back of the official government —but both arms of authority were headed by Fidel Castro, who at no time relinquished his power over either.

THE SECOND PECULIARITY of the Cuban revolution was the heyday of what might be called its "humanist" phase. Marked by an increase in mass consumption, a trend to disinvestment and an atmosphere of general enthusiasm (as well as general disorganization), this phase was in keeping with the political necessities of a revolutionary leadership that had not yet established its own apparatus of power. Castro's policies in this period went contrary to economic reason, necessitating the postponement of "socialist reconstruction" and in fact increasing the difficulties of such a transformation later on. The largesse of the regime was possible because the revolution had succeeded without Cuba's experiencing either a period of economic crisis or the destruction of a real fighting war. The economy was intact, with ample and underutilized resources of almost every description:

During the first year of the revolution there was an abundance of everything. The warehouses were full . . . on the other hand, there were many people without work. Almost all building had stopped and one had to occupy the people. . . . From this period we inherited the legacy of unproductive labor.[16]

Many leading revolutionaries were conscious of the danger of this economic policy. Guevara, for example, stated in a television speech in early 1961 (when the humanist phase was already waning):

We are consciously retarding our development by creating workers' circles, day nurseries, playgrounds for children, in order that everybody may enjoy benefits which other peoples have got ten only after forty years of hard

[15] Figure of 180 cited in Castro's speech of Dec. 21, 1961, *loc. cit.* Other figures are not exact but are estimated on the basis of various pieces of evidence.

[16] Castro, speech quoted in *Obra Revolucionaria*, No. 30, Aug. 26, 1961, p. 215.

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toil. . . . We are building a thousand houses, knowing quite well that from the economic standpoint it would be much better to build a factory. But we desire the people to feel that a revolution like this one is made to benefit the great majority.[17]

Thus the leaders knew that in a certain sense they were sacrificing the future to the immediate present. And so it turned out: this period was short and the difficulties it created drove the revolution along totalitarian paths.

Contrary to Castro's later declarations, the second stage of the revolution was brought about without any major violence. Confiscations were carried out peacefully, both in the cities and in the countryside. While growing opposition became apparent, it was ineffectual; for the most part it took the form of verbal protests against the introduction of totalitarian measures, resulting in the arrest or in the flight of opponents—but there was hardly any real struggle. Hence it can be said that the revolution, insofar as it was violent (in the phase of the struggle against Batista) was not socialist, and insofar as it was socialist was not violent.

Castro—Master of His Fate?

The transformation of the democratic into the socialist-totalitarian revolution was the result of the interaction between the personal decisions of the supreme leader and their consequences—consequences which, in turn, forced him into new decisions.

Castro was a typical revolutionary intellectual—voluntaristic, romantic, impatient, and unwilling to enter into compromises. He was not a Communist; in fact he distrusted and to some extent despised the old opportunistic and bureacratic leaders who were creatures of Moscow, who for many years had collaborated with Batista, and who had not taken part in the armed struggle. Being a revolutionary pragmatist who had read very little "Marxist" literature, he at first had no clear program for Cuba, although he was certainly more radical than he chose to pretend—and in many respects more radical than the Communists. *"On s'engage, puis on voit,"* the formula of Napoleon, also fits Castro, whose ideas changed (or developed) with the change of circumstances. When he came to power he was free to do what he wanted, as few historical personalities have been. He may have wanted to establish a system of mixed economy and a society which combined social justice with individual freedom, but the changes inaugurated by his decisions made such an outcome impossible. They imposed on Castro, who was ever reluctant to pause or to retreat, further decisions that made any form of capitalism or mixed economy and any representative form of government as unfeasible as the maintenance of more or less friendly relations with the USA; on the contrary, they drove him towards totalitarianism and dependence on the Soviet Union.

This became clear even in the "humanist" phase of the revolution, in the course of 1959. Massive confiscations of the properties of "Batistianos" and of almost everybody connected with the dictatorship led to the emergence of a huge, heterogeneous state sector of the economy. Wage increases, price reductions, the promise of a vigorous collection of taxes, and a general climate of legal insecurity combined to make the functioning of private enterprise virtually impossible. The halving of rents and the decree devaluating land values stopped private building, sapped the wealth of the middle classes, and forced the government to undertake its own building program.

The agrarian "reform" was impelled along a similar course. As originally formulated, the reform was quite radical but by no means socialist in character. While liquidating the vast latifundia—already prohibited in principle by the Constitution of 1940—it permitted agricultural units up to 30 and in some cases up to 100 caballerias in size to remain in private hands (one cab. = 33.5 acres). The land was to be redistributed gradually, with the subdivision of state-owned property (including that seized from the Batistianos) taking place before the expropriation of first the unproductive and finally all other latifundias. Adequate indemnities payable in bonds were promised, based on a careful evaluation of land values, and independent tribunals were to be set up to decide conflicts. Homes, machinery, implements, cattle, etc., were exempted from forcible expropriation. The land was to be redivided either in private plots or in larger units owned collectively by "cooperatives."

In practice, however, almost none of this program was honored. Indeed, the agrarian "reform" was rapidly transformed into a chaotic agrarian revolution, led by impetuous youths in uniform who confiscated any properties they wanted, including the houses on the land, cattle and implements. Nothing was done about evaluation and indemnification, no "bonds" were ever even printed, and no tribunals established. Finally, a number of state farms were set up, and the new "cooperatives" were soon remodeled into state units in everything but name.

[17] Speech reproduced in *Bohemia* (Havana), Jan. 15, 1961.

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The effect of all of these developments virtually rendered any form of "capitalism" or even of a "mixed economy" out of the question, whatever Castro initially had in mind. The course of events also provoked growing opposition in Cuba, which in turn led to the progressive curtailment and disappearance of civil liberties, the freeze in US-Cuban relations, and Castro's rapprochement with Moscow.

Why the Revolution Was Possible

That Castro was able to proceed along this course without a major breakdown of the revolution was due on one hand to the existence of certain favorable circumstances in Cuba, and on the other to the absence of major obstacles.

Among the factors in his favor were the relative richness of the country, the fact that its economy was intact and at the same time under-utilized, the weakness of the independent peasantry, and the prevalence of big agricultural enterprises which could be easily nationalized. The first two of these factors made possible the freehanded distribution of benefits to the masses in the "humanist" period, winning enormous support for Castro, especially among the vast numbers of "rootless" people disposed to "getting along" through gifts from a *"caudillo"*. This mass support far outweighed the opposition that began to grow as the revolution progressed to its second stage. In the atmosphere created by the regime's initial largesse, it was not difficult to convince the masses that their former poverty had been due to capitalist and imperialist exploitation. With the help of popular simplifications, and through a clever use of semantic devices which cloaked the second stage of revolution in appealing slogans, it was possible to win over a considerable part of the population to support of a "Marxist-Leninist" ideology which probably very few understood.[18] Simultaneously, the slogans of "anti-Yanquism," playing on latent resentment of the rich neighbor to the north, provided Castro with a rallying call for national unity and a basis of appeal to the "have-nots" in other Latin American countries.[19]

The success—or better, the non-failure—of Castro's course is also explained by the lack of any serious obstacles in his path. There were simply no brakes that could have slowed down the process of radicalization. The old state apparatus had been destroyed; the former parties were prevented from reorganizing, with the single exception of the Communist Party; and repeated purges destroyed any chance of effective opposition in such institutions as the trade unions. The Church was weak: there were only some 700 priests in the country and most of them were non-Cubans. Finally, there was a lack of unity and direction among foreign opponents of Castro. As Guevara has remarked:

> **The condition that we could call exceptional is that North American imperialism was disoriented and could not measure the true depth of the Cuban revolution. . . . When imperialism wanted to react . . . it was already too late.[20]**

TO SUM UP, when one discards the myths, abandons the use of irrelevant social categories and misleading historical analogies, and looks dispassionately at the historical events, the Cuban revolution ceases to be so incomprehensible. Its "uniqueness" far outbalances its typicality as a "Leninist" revolution—and it will probably remain unique because nowhere else in Latin America do we see the same constellation of factors as those that existed in Cuba from 1958 to 1960. Its outcome did not even conform to what Castro had

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[18] The revolutionary leaders have at times been quite frank about the use of such simplifications and semantic devices. Castro, for example, discussing in retrospect the language that had been used in the agrarian "reform" law, remarked: "It was discussed if the ground should be given as property or in usufruct. Then we said, well, in reality it will be the same, but let us not put down 'usufruct,' let us write—precisely so that the enemies cannot take advantage of it—'property' of . . . the cooperative. This property is entirely equivalent to usufruct . . . because the cooperative cannot sell the land." (Speech of Dec. 21, 1961, in *El Mundo* Dec. 22.) When the peasants became so afraid of "cooperatives" that, as Castro said, "they could not even hear the word mentioned" (*Revolucion*, Nov. 11, 1961), the new name "agricultural society" was substituted.

The Communist leader Blas Roca has best summed up the importance of such semantic devices: "Many things done in Cuba are called with new, strange names. But this has many advantages. If one had used high-sounding words, when the forces [of the revolution] were not yet consolidated, when consciousness was not yet developed, nothing would have been achieved. Herein consists . . . the cunning of [the revolutionaries], that the necessary tasks have been done under new names and with new methods." (Speech printed in the records of the Eighth National Assembly of the PSP, Havana, Ediciones Populares, 1960, p. 388.)

[19] One of Castro's sympathizers (Jean Paul Sartre) has remarked, rightly, that Castro would have had to invent the "Yanquis" if they had not existed. Although the evidence suggests that he initially wavered on the question of accepting US financial aid (a fact which he later denied—*e.g.*, in a speech of Dec. 1, 1961, reprinted in *El Mundo* Dec. 2), he soon came around to the view of the Communist-oriented Castroites (including his brother Raul) that "anti-Yanqui" propaganda would help him more than US economic help, which might have put a brake on the radicalism of his revolution.

[20] *Monthly Review*, July-August 1961.

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originally wanted—a sort of socialism that would combine "freedom, independence, and bread." But impatient radicalism leads to extreme solutions, and totalitarianism arises because such "solutions" must be applied forcibly since they inevitably meet with some opposition and resistance. Such resistance seems to be innate in human nature; when it is directed against "socialist" solutions, the Marxist-Leninists attribute it to persisting "capitalist" influences in the society. However they wish to explain it, human nature still constitutes one of the main dangers along the road to the "socialist" utopia.

Castro himself knows this and feels it. Hence his strange outcry—so contrary to any genuinely Marxist conception:

> **In the Communist Manifesto Marx says that capitalism is digging its own grave—but capitalism digs two graves, one for itself and the other for the society which comes after it. What we must do is to fill the hole rapidly, so that the legacy of capitalism may not destroy and bury socialism.**[21]

[21] Speech delivered in Camaguey, reported in *Hoy* (Havana), May 15, 1962.

Castroism—Challenge to the Latin American Communists

By Ernst Halperin

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE on the Soviet-Cuban talks recently held in Moscow announced the establishment of "fraternal party relations" and the impending "exchange of party delegations and of information of mutual interest" between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Cuban "United Party of the Socialist Revolution" (Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista, PURS).[1] Thus Fidel Castro has at last been officially recognized as a genuine Communist and his party welcomed as a member of the international fraternity of "Communist and Workers' Parties." Yet it is quite obvious that in spite of his vociferous professions of adherence to the Marxist-Leninist creed, he is no orthodox Communist of the Moscow—or, for that matter, of the Peking—mold.

It is sometimes claimed that Castroism has no ideology of its own. This is too harsh a judgment. If one reads Fidel Castro's speeches attentively, he will find a good deal of ideology and—despite Castro's political evolution from liberal democracy to communism—even some degree of ideological consistency in all of them.

"Justice"—At What Cost?

Fidel Castro's training is that of a lawyer, and his first important political speech was a plea in his own defense before the Special Court which tried him for his attempt to capture the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953. The closing words of this speech were: "Condemn me! It is of no import! History will absolve me!" Many of his later speeches similarly appear to be a lawyer's plea before the Supreme Court of History. Again and again in these speeches one finds him accusing opponents of breaching some specific code, be it the Cuban constitution as in

[1] See the joint Cuban-Soviet communiqué of May 23, 1963, as distributed by the news agencies TASS and Prensa Latina and published by *El Siglo* (Santiago de Chile) on May 27 and May 28.

Mr. Halperin, a Swiss journalist who has long specialized in the field of Communist affairs, is currently reporting on Latin America and has just returned from an extended trip to Cuba. A past contributor to Problems of Communism, *he is also author of* Triumphant Heretic *(London: Heineman, 1958), a study of Tito.*

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the case of Batista, or international law as in the case of the Kennedy administration, or simply that natural law which states that all men are equal. And again and again one finds him demanding justice for a client: for the Cuban people, for the peoples of Latin America, for the international proletariat.

In brief, Castro is a man possessed by the idea of "justice"—and by the notion that he is the instrument chosen to bring it about. However, his concept of what constitutes justice has changed and gradually widened in the course of his spectacular political career. At first it seemed to him that justice could be realized by the mere restoration of the Cuban Constitution of 1940, which had been suspended by Batista; but by now he has reached a state of mind in which nothing but a complete and worldwide revolutionary reconstruction of the social order, the abolition of "the exploitation of man by man," will suffice.

In pursuit of his aim, Castro has repeatedly demonstrated that utter disregard for human life, including his own, which is typical of men in the grip of an obsession. This was apparent most recently in the equanimity with which he faced the prospect of atomic war during the Caribbean crisis. Much earlier it was apparent in his suicidal attempt to shoot his way into the Moncada Barracks at the head of 160 ill-armed civilians, and again in his 1956 invasion of Cuba with a force of only 80 men. The second venture, though ultimately successful, was as insanely reckless as the first. A normal, rational human being would not have risked his own life and the lives of his devoted friends and followers in either episode. Here, then, is a man who is willing to let the world perish, if only what he regards as justice is attained.

"Well, To Start With, Of Course You Know He's A Nut"

—Reprinted from *The Washington Post*, Nov. 27, 1962.

But rationality and common sense are by no means prerequisites to historical achievement; indeed, they are often a hindrance. On the other hand, monomaniacal obsession may under certain circumstances be a tremendous asset to a political leader, for it endows him with a steadfastness of purpose, a self-confidence, and a capacity to recuperate from disappointments and reverses that fascinate and enthrall otherwise normal men in search of a cause to give meaning to their life. In order to become a charismatic leader, the victim of an obsession must of course also possess other, less egregious attributes of leadership. And above all, the idea by which he is obsessed must be one of wide appeal. These conditions are fulfilled in Castro's case. His personality is of well-nigh irresistible charm. He has the true leader's gift of manipulating men. He is capable of biding his time, and his tactical skill is great. As for his obsession: the appeal of the idea of absolute justice is worldwide, and it is particularly strong in a region so beset with inequalities and unjustifiable privileges as Latin America.

Orthodox Marxism does not argue that socialism and communism will come about because they are "just"; it maintains that their advent is inevitable because they are higher stages of the economic development of society. It is not easy to reconcile this dogma with Castro's concept of history as a struggle for the achievement of absolute justice, the highest stage envisaged by Marx—although the theoreticians might try to gloss over the contradiction by claiming that communism is identical with Castro's realm of absolute justice.

In any case, the representatives of orthodox Marxism-Leninism can afford to put up with Castro's somewhat unorthodox interpretation of their creed. Communism in Latin America has greatly benefited by its association with Castroism. A movement that had become stale and bogged down in humdrum trade-union activities and sterile drawing-room debate has been rejuvenated by the influx of thousands of enthusiastic new activists. In view of this, the leaders of Latin American communism would be foolish to make an ideological issue

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of what, in effect, is little more than a difference in propagandistic approach.

There is, however, another, definitely heretical aspect to Castroite ideology which the Communist leaders cannot possibly dismiss as harmless and unimportant.

Guevara's Revolution by Guerrilla War

Castroism not only interprets the struggle for communism as the struggle for the realm of absolute justice; it also gives a fascinatingly simple, entirely unorthodox answer to the question of how this realm may be attained—namely, by guerrilla warfare. This is Ernesto "Che" Guevara's contribution to Castroite ideology. His book, *La guerra de guerrillas,*[2] is at once a guerrilla training manual and a detailed exposition of the doctrine that guerrilla warfare is the main instrument of social revolution in Latin America—a doctrine which runs directly counter to the teachings of orthodox Marxism-Leninism as propounded by the Soviet ideologists and accepted by the Latin American Communist parties.

In 1956, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union officially repealed Lenin's dogma of the inevitability of violent revolution.[3] But even when this concept was in favor, Marxist-Leninists of the Soviet stamp did not regard guerrilla warfare as the correct road to power. Then as now, the official dogma held that the urban proletariat is the main revolutionary force and that the Communists cannot hope to come to power until they have won the bulk of this class to their cause. Such support is the first but by no means the only prerequisite stipulated by orthodox Marxism-Leninism for the seizure of power: other necessary conditions include the existence of a "peasant-worker alliance" and a situation of serious decline in state authority through economic crisis or defeat in war. In other words, the orthodox Communist concept of how revolution would come about was derived from Lenin's analysis of the conditions prevailing in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik take-over in 1917.[4]

Actually, the specific circumstances of the Russian Bolshevik revolution were not repeated in any of the countries in which the Communists came to power during or after World War II. But one man—Stalin—had a monopoly on ideological pronouncements, and he did not choose to rectify Marxist-Leninist doctrine in the light of these new and different situations. To admit that the experience of other Communist parties could in any way influence the development of Marxism-Leninism would have meant to violate one of the very few principles dear to Stalin's heart: the principle of the leading and guiding role of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party. Stalin's heirs, however, have been unable to maintain the Soviet ideological monopoly. It is being successfully challenged not only by the Chinese Communists, but even by such a rank outsider as Che Guevara.[5]

In *La guerra de guerrillas,* Guevara states:

We consider that the Cuban Revolution contributed three

[2] This book was written in 1959 on the basis of the author's experiences as one of Fidel Castro's most successful field captains. It was first published by the Publishing House of the Cuban Ministry of Defense (Ediciones Minfar, Havana) in 1960, and has since run through innumerable editions. Two English editions, one by Praeger, New York, and the other by Monthly Review Press, New York, are available in the United States. Neither of them does justice to Guevara's limpid prose.

[3] This revision of Leninist doctrine was later confirmed in several Soviet and international Communist documents. Thus, the November 1957 resolution of the twelve ruling Communist parties states: "Under the conditions prevailing today, and based on a workers' and people's united front, and on other possible forms of agreement between various parties and social organizations, the working class, headed by its advance guard, can in some capitalist countries unite the majority of the people, conquer state power without a civil war, and assure the transition of the basic means of production into the hands of the people. . . . In each country, concrete historical conditions will determine which of the two roads of transition to socialism is to be taken." (Translated from the Spanish version of the resolution in the volume, *Hacia nuevas victorias del movimiento comunista internacional.* Editorial Antec, Buenos Aires, 1961).

[4] See the collected works of V. I. Lenin, Volume XXVI, 4th Russian edition, specifically the essay: "Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Themselves in Power?" The main reasons given by Lenin for the success of the Bolshevik *coup* were: a) the straight Bolshevik majority in the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets of the main cities, and b) majority support in the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Soviets in the rest of the country for the Bolshevik postulates of immediate land reform and rupture of the government coalition with the bourgeois parties.

[5] Many Cuban anti-Communists maintain that the Argentinian Ernesto "Che" Guevara is simply an agent of 'international communism" who infiltrated into the Castro leadership and has successfully accomplished his mission of bringing Cuba under Soviet domination. But so far, no concrete evidence of Guevara's previous party affiliation has been produced. A perusal of *La guerra de guerrillas* shows that at the time he wrote this book, he was certainly already a Marxist, but definitely not of the orthodox Moscow trend. There is no trace of Soviet phraseology in his writing, but evidence of both Trotskyite and Maoist influence. Yet Guevara's flat denial of the leading role of the proletariat is directly contrary to Trotskyite doctrine, and even Mao never went as far as Guevara in this direction. Such fine distinctions are of course incomprehensible to the multitude of militant anti-Communists who naively regard Maoism, Castroism and even Trotskyism as mere branches of one vast, Moscow-directed conspiracy.

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fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionary movements in America. They are:

(1) Popular forces can win a war against the army.

(2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.

(3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

Point (2) is clearly in flat contradiction to the basic Leninist tenet that a revolution can be successful only if both the "objective" and the "subjective" conditions for it exist. Plainly polemicizing against the Latin American Communist parties, Guevara continues:

Of these three propositions, the first two contradict the defeatist attitude of revolutionaries or pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take refuge in the pretext that against a professional army nothing can be done, who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate them. . . .

The third proposition is a fundament of strategy. It ought to be noted by those who maintain dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the immense participation of country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America. Of course the struggles of the city masses of organized workers should not be underrated; but their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be carefully analyzed where the guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In these conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function secretly without arms. The situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places beyond the reach of the repressive forces, the inhabitants can be supported by the armed guerrillas.[6]

[6] Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1961, pp. 15-16.

On Communist Errors

In Cuba, the Communist Party did not lead the revolution, but its influence made itself felt, and its participation was {sic} important in the present socialist stage . . . the Communist Party did not see clearly, it did not properly understand the methods of struggle, it erred in its estimation of the movement's chances of success. Here, this extremely serious {gravisimo} mistake was not costly, because we had Fidel and a group of real revolutionaries. In other countries such a mistake can be very costly, it can lead the revolution astray.

—Che Guevara, interview with Latin American visitors to Cuba, reported in Hoy (Havana), Aug. 24, 1963.

In another chapter of his book, Guevara states that "*the guerrilla fighter* needs full help from the people of the area."[7] In order to win this help, he has to be an agrarian reformer:

We have also already said that in the conditions that prevail, at least in America and in almost all countries with a deficient economic development, it is the countryside which offers ideal conditions for the fight. Therefore the foundation of the social structure that the guerrilla fighter will build begins with changes in the ownership of agrarian property. The banner of the fight throughout this period will be agrarian reform.[8]

COMMUNIST PARTY DOCTRINE maintains that a revolution cannot be launched before the mass of the working class has rallied to the party banner. Guevara is much more sanguine:

We shall not speak here of the number of persons that should be readied. This depends upon so many and such varied conditions that it is practically impossible to specify. But the minimum number with which it is possible to initiate a guerrilla war can be mentioned. In my opinion, considering the normal desertions and weaknesses in spite of the rigorous process of selection, there should be a nucleus of 30 to 50 men; this figure is sufficient to initiate an armed fight in any country of the Americas, with their conditions of favorable territory for operations, hunger for land, repeated attacks upon justice, etc.[9]

Thus, Guevara's doctrine not only is highly heretical from the purely ideological point of view; but its adoption by the Communist parties of Latin America would also signify a complete change in their practical policies, strategies and tactics.

The doctrinal tenet that "objective conditions" are not yet ripe for revolution has hitherto enabled the Latin American Communists to pursue moderate policies of collaboration and infiltration. In practice, though not in theory, they are less sectarian than Communists in other parts of the world. As a result, they have managed to integrate to a certain extent into the normal political life of Latin America. Even in countries where the Communist Party is small and clandestine, its collaboration is often eagerly sought both by dictators and by democratic political groups.[10] The fruits of these labors would be lost, and the entire position of the Com-

[7] *Ibid.* p. 17.

[8] *Ibid.* p. 43.

[9] *Ibid.* p. 111.

[10] For a detailed history of the innumerable deals between non-Communist politicians and the Communist parties of Latin America in the course of the last three decades, see Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1960.

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munist parties in Latin American politics jeopardized, if they were now to accept Guevara's theses and switch over to a policy of sending guerrilla fighters into the mountains.

In spite of this, the leaders and ideologists of the Latin American Communist parties have hitherto refrained from openly attacking Guevara's book. The reasons for this reticence are obvious: the party leaders can ill afford to antagonize the innumerable Castroites inside and on the fringe of their parties; nor do they want to pick an ideological quarrel with the Soviet Union's sole Latin American ally. This does not mean, however, that they accept the Castroite doctrine of revolution by guerrilla war.

In practice, only a single Latin American Communist party is trying to implement the strategy advocated in Guevara's book—that of Venezuela. All the others are using a wide variety of arguments and pretexts in order to continue with their accustomed policies of collaboration and peaceful penetration.

The Case of Venezuela

In his study Guevara made one important qualification concerning his theory of revolution by guerrilla warfare—namely, that guerrilla war was possible only against a dictatorship:

> **Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.**[11]

Such was Guevara's view in 1960. By now, apparently, even this qualification has been dropped. The one country in which the Castroite policy of revolution by guerrilla war is actually being implemented has one of the most progressive and democratic regimes on the entire continent. One reason why the Castroite policy is being tested in Venezuela is that this regime is very young. It has not yet fully managed to establish its authority and is therefore more vulnerable than the traditional Latin American dictatorships.

Ever since 1945, when the Tachira military clique was toppled after nearly half a century of dictatorial rule,[12] Venezuela has been in the throes of an indigenous social revolution somewhat similar to, though infinitely less violent than, the long revolution in Mexico. In 1948 the military staged a comeback under Perez Jimenez. Ten years later the dictator was overthrown, and the revolution got into stride again. By now, it has entered a new stage marked by dissension among the victorious revolutionaries.

Thus, President Betancourt has had to contend not only with the Communists and the moderate leftist Unión Republicana Democrática of his old rival Jovito Villalba, but also with two groups, ARS and MIR, which have split away from his own ruling party, Acción Democrática.

One of these groups, the MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria), is openly Castroite and has proclaimed adherence to the "Marxist-Leninist faith.[13] At some point in 1962, the Castroites apparently also gained control of the Communist Party of Venezuela. Under the pretext of "self-defense," the MIR and the Communists then formed a "National Liberation Front" (FLN) and embarked upon a Cuban-style campaign of guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism. The program of the FLN states:

> **Taking into account that we cannot rout our enemy without destroying his repressive forces and weapons and without changing the character of the armed forces, which are at present a repressive machine in the service of the North American monopolies and of domestic groups of oligarchs and other reactionary forces, the National Liberation Front has decided to establish as its military branch an army of national liberation.**[14]

In a statement published in the official organ of the Communist world movement, *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* the MIR leader Simon Saez Merida declared:

> **Today, after four years of his [Betancourt's] government, the forms of non-peaceful struggle have crystallized in the establishment of four rural guerrilla nuclei, of dozens of armed detachments in the cities and in a wide patriotic sector of the Venezuelan Army, which together constitute the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).**[15]

The practical results of this campaign appear, however, to be falling far short of the leaders' expectations, and recently there have been signs of discouragement in the ranks of the National Liberation Front. Thus, an unsigned document presumably issued by guerrilla headquarters and found on a guerrilla captured last May, reads in part:

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[11] Guevara, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[12] From the turn of the century until 1945 Venezuela was ruled by army officers from the town of Tachira in Western Venezuela.

[13] See statement by MIR leader Simon Saez Merida in *Nuestra Epoca,* (Chilean edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*) No. 3, 1963; this and subsequently cited references all appear in the English and other language editions.

[14] Translated from *Pekin Informa* (Spanish edition of *Peking Review*) No. 4, April 17, 1963.

[15] Merida, *loc cit.*

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The struggle will be long and difficult, and the experience acquired in past failures will enable us to reach a better understanding of conditions prevailing in our land; from which it follows that . . . we must adopt flexible tactics and adjust to conditions, endeavoring thus to avoid our previous mistake of taking our desires for reality . . .[16]

Even more significant is the fact that in the same month of May, the MIR and Communist Party leaderships attempted to negotiate a deal with the government. Using the moderate opposition leader Raúl Ramos Gimenez as a go-between, they asked the government for permission to resume their legal activities and to participate in the coming presidential election. In return, Communist Party leader Gustavo Machado cynically offered "the suspension of self-defense activities."[17] As a first step, the National Liberation Front declared a "truce"—*i.e.,* the temporary suspension of terrorist and guerrilla activities. When the government refused to accede to the MIR and Communist demands, these activities were resumed.[18]

But although the deeds of the bands of urban terrorists make spectacular newspaper headlines, they have so far not managed to disrupt the economy or seriously disturb the normal flow of life in the cities of Venezuela. As for the guerrilla bands in the countryside, the Betancourt government's policy of agrarian reform and of large-scale investment in education and other public services in the rural areas has prevented them from gaining the peasant support which, according to Guevara, is "an indispensable condition" for success.[19]

Although it is certainly a very great nuisance, the present campaign of guerrilla warfare, sabotage and terrorism does not appear to constitute an effective threat to the democratic order. As long as a *coup* by impatient rightist military elements can be avoided, democracy seems safe in Venezuela.

The Failure in Peru

At first glance, Peru would seem to offer far better conditions for an experiment in guerrilla war than democratic Venezuela. The Peruvian Indian's plight is worse than that of the Venezuelan peasant, and so far there has been no large-scale land reform in Peru. Moreover, in the second half of 1962 and the first half of 1963, the country was under the dictatorial rule of a military junta. Yet a small group of revolutionaries who tried to launch a guerrilla campaign met with ignominious failure early in 1963; what is more, this attempt has since been decisively repudiated by the official Communist leadership.

In November and December 1962, Peru was swept by a wave of violence culminating in a riot at the American-owned Cerro de Pasco Mining Company's plant in La Groya, in the course of which the company store and a cokery were set on fire.[20] Simultaneously, a peasant union organizer named Hugo Blanco commenced guerrilla operations in La Convención valley in central Peru. According to data furnished by the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, Hugo Blanco is an intellectual in his late twenties who studied at Argentinian universities. In several UPI dispatches from Lima, he was described as "a Trotskyite". Prensa Latina, on the other hand, did its best to present him as a Peruvian Fidel Castro: detailed accounts of his real or alleged successes and photographs showing him surrounded by his guerrilla fighters were furnished by the Cuban agency to the Communist press of Latin America.[21]

AT THE TURN of the year, the military junta clamped down on the Peruvian leftists. On January 5, several hundred Communist, Castroite and Trotskyite leaders and activists were arrested. Some were released after screening, others kept in jail or sent to detention camps. This drastic action effectively brought to an end what had evidently been an attempt to back up Hugo Blanco's guerrilla activities by a campaign of terrorism, strikes and sabotage in the urban areas. From then on, Hugo Blanco was on the run, and there was little further mention of him in either the Communist or the non-Communist press. On May 30, the government finally announced his arrest.[22]

A week before Blanco's capture, the authorities succeeded in frustrating an attempt to revive the guerrilla campaign. The gendarmerie at the frontier town of Puerto Maldonado on the Madre de Dios river intercepted an armed group of seven young Peruvians who had been trained in a Cuban guerrilla school and had re-entered their country by coming upstream from Bolivia. Eleven more members of the group were arrested on the Bolivian side of the frontier and sent to La Paz under police guard.[23]

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[16] Translated from the Caracas newspaper, *La Republica,* May 10, 1963.

[17] *Ibid.,* May 8, 1963.

[18] See UPI dispatch, datelined Caracas, June 5, 1963.

[19] Guevara, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

[20] UPI dispatch datelined Lima, December 20, 1962.

[21] See, *i.a.,* Prensa Latina dispatches datelined Lima, Dec. 27, Lima, Dec. 30, and Havana, Jan. 1 in the Chilean Communist newspaper *El Siglo* of Dec. 28, Dec. 31 and Jan. 2.

[22] See UPI dispatch datelined Cuzco, May 30, 1963.

[23] See *Time,* (New York) May 31, 1963, and AP dispatch datelined La Paz, June 3, 1963.

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Prensa Latina's publicity campaign for Hugo Blanco is proof enough that his attempt at revolution had Havana's blessing. The diminutive Trotskyite movement also lent its support.[24] But the attitude of the official Communist Party leadership at the time was far from clear, and five months later it came out publicly with what amounted to a solemn denunciation and condemnation of the entire adventure.

In its issue of May 1963, *Nuestra Epoca,* the Chilean edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* published a statement describing the abortive revolution as a deliberate provocation engineered by the government and foreign imperialists with the aid of Trotskyite stooges. The same statement also lashed out at the Havana-inspired legend of Blanco as a guerrilla hero:

In the framework of this plan of repression directed against the people, Trotskyite provocations, adventurist and terrorist activities play a part which must be seriously taken into account. . . .

The bank raids in the capital, in which known Trotskyites played a prominent part, the distribution of pictures showing Hugo Blanco and the peasants accompanying him with carbines and shotguns, which are of common use in the regions bordering on the jungle, have the same purpose as the burning down of the La Oroya store, namely to provide the spokesmen of reaction with the elements necessary for the creation of an atmosphere favorable to the application of repressive measures against the people.

In a footnote, the statement shrugged off Hugo Blanco:

In La Convencion there are 150 peasants' syndicates. Hugo Blanco is the secretary of one of them. The military junta is so convinced of the inexistence of the "guerrilla" that it has detached not more than 25 policemen to capture him.[25]

In the June presidential election, the Communist Party leadership supported the moderate leftist candidate, Belaunde Terry. By this as well as by its ridicule of the Havana-sponsored Hugo Blanco and its denunciation of the leftist terrorists as "Trotskyite provocateurs," the leadership of the Peruvian Communists has clearly demonstrated its preference for the traditional "soft" policy of collaboration and infiltration over the new Castroite policy of Instant Revolution.

Reactions in Other Countries

Elsewhere in Latin America, Communist leaders have given some clear indications of their views, best examined country by country.

[24] See *Vanguardia Proletaria,* organ of the Chilean Trotskyites, No. V, second fortnight of January, 1963, specifically items headlined: "The Peruvian Masses Fight with a Trotskyite Program," and "Solidarity with the Peruvian Masses!" The latter item states: "The Revolutionary Workers Party (Trotskyite), Peruvian section of the fourth International, is at the head of these struggles, and the members of the leadership of the Miners' Federation which led the latest strike belong to the Party. . . . Similarly, in the agrarian zones and in the organization of the struggle for the occupation of lands it is Trotskyism which is leading the organization of the struggle and increasing its influence. Hugo Blanco, whose Trotskyite sympathies are known, is an expression of the spreading of our ideas and positions in the bosom of the masses which are fighting for a workers' and peasants' state."

[25] *Nuestra Epoca,* No. 5, 1963.

CASTRO'S RALLYING CALL

What happened in Cuba was by no means a miracle; exactly the same thing may happen in many Latin American countries . . . It would not make much sense for us Cubans to celebrate this anniversary with so much joy and revolutionary enthusiasm if this anniversary did not spell a lesson, a useful lesson for dozens and dozens of millions of brothers in Latin America . . .

And in many Latin American countries conditions for revolution are incomparably better than those that prevailed in our country; there are countries . . . despoiled and squeezed dry by the monopolies and oligarchies, where desperate starving masses are waiting for the breach through which to erupt into history. And it is the duty of the revolutionaries to open this breach; . . . the duty of the revolutionaries does not consist in filling their heads with revolutionary theory and forgetting the practical necessity for revolution; the duty of the revolutionaries consists not only in absorbing and knowing and feeling a conviction and a way of life, but in comprehending a road, a tactic, a strategy which will lead to the triumph of these ideas. This is the duty of the revolutionaries, and not to wait until the Greek calends for this road to open on its own and the regime of the exploiters to disappear through some miracle . . .

—Fidel Castro, speech on the anniversary of the July 26th Movement, as reported by Hoy (Havana), July 27th, 1963.

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Argentina. With its great instability of government and disaffected working class, Argentina would appear to be good ground for Guevara's strategy. Yet Argentinian Communist Party chief Victorio Codovilla has declared that guerrilla warfare could not be embarked upon until "the masses" were ready to support it. In an article published in *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* Codovilla wrote:

> The peaceful road does not mean waiting with folded arms until the present regime disintegrates completely. The peaceful road presupposes constant mass action for immediate economic, social and political aims with a view to the general struggle for power. The task of organizing, mobilizing and leading the struggle of the masses is hard, sometimes dreary, and immediate results are not always obtained. . . . But there is no other way of assuring the triumph of the workers' and the people's cause. There are some comrades who pose the problem in the following manner: we agree that the decisive element is the struggle of the masses, but could the process not be accelerated by the use of guerrillas? Is this not a shorter way? It would be the shortest way if it were accompanied by the action of the masses, and for the masses to march in this direction it is necessary for them to convince themselves by their proper experience that this is the road they must follow.[26]

This passage demonstrates in classic form the antithesis between orthodox Marxism-Leninism with its insistence on the "objective" and "subjective" conditions for revolution, and the new Castroite doctrine according to which "it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them." [27]

Brazil. The chief of the Brazilian Communist Party, Luis Carlos Prestes, stubbornly clings to his policy of collaboration with leftist government circles in the face of criticism by the radical wing of his party and by the Castroite Francisco Juliao. In an interview given to Communist newsmen last March, Prestes first praised the leftist "national bourgeois" politician L. Brizola and then attacked Juliao as follows:

> Juliao's case is more difficult. He is a lawyer, a member of the Socialist Party. With his work as a lawyer, defending peasants in the courts, he once won great prestige; he was a positive factor in the development of the peasant movement. But from the year 1961 onward, he practically abandoned his activity among the peasants and dedicated himself to preparing "the revolution." In this respect he maintains certain very "radical" positions for which we have often had to criticize him. His peasant movement has no organic structure. In reality, the peasants are following the Communist lead.[28]

In a statement published in the May issue of *Problems of Peace and Socialism,* Prestes again defended his policy of moderation and lashed out against ". . . certain 'leftist' groups and politicians who stand for extreme measures—men like Francisco Juliao, for example, who do not understand the present situation in the country . . ." [29]

Chile. Next to the Cuban PURS, the strongest and most influential Communist Party of the hemisphere is the Chilean organization. Its Secretary General, Luis Corvalan, has stated in no uncertain terms that while other Latin American countries may choose the road of violent revolution, the Chilean Communists stand for "the peaceful road to socialism" by means of a popular front victory at the polls. At the same time, Corvalan attacked the Chilean labor leader Clotario Blest, an enthusiastic supporter of Castro, describing him as an adventurer and dogmatist of Trotskyite views:

> At this stage of the development of events in Chile, one may affirm that objectively the revolutionary process is taking a peaceful course, the course marked out, in accordance with reality, by our party. All the parties of the Popular Action Front agree on this. The adventurers and dogmatists have been pushed aside. The people have passed them by. This has happened, for instance, with Clotario Blest, former president of the Chilean Labor Union Federation, who lately has gone over to the positions of Trotskyism and in consequence could no longer even obtain reelection to the leadership of the Federation at its last congress.[30]

Colombia. The Colombian Communists are presently engaged in violent polemics with the Castroite "Movement of Workers, Students and Peasants" (Movimiento de Obreros, Estudiantes y Campesinos, MOEC). In an article published in *Nuestra Epoca,* party secretary Gilberto Vieira recently wrote:

> An attentive study of the experience of the revolutionary movement, of the history of armed insurrections, the successful ones and those that failed, undertaken in order to draw conclusions and to extract lessons, leads us to conclude that revolution, whether peaceful or nonpeaceful, can only triumph by daily political and organizational work among the masses, gathering them round the vanguard in the struggle to "overthrow" (or weaken) the old government, which will never, not even in a period of crisis, "fall" if it is not "made to fall." And the masses cannot be mobilized against the decrepit regime solely by means of isolated armed actions. . . . In this respect one cannot pass by without mention those tendencies, specifically represented by the group named MOEC (Movement of Workers, Students and Peasants), which advocate guerrilla warfare in the countryside as the only commendable form

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[26] Translated from *ibid.,* No. 12, dated December 1962 but actually published in January 1963.

[27] Guevara, *op. cit.,* p. 15.

[28] Interview in *El Siglo,* March 14, 1963.

[29] *Nuestra Epoca,* No. 5, 1963.

[30] *Ibid.,* No. 12, 1962.

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of struggle and which consider that the moment for the revolutionary offensive has already arrived. Such tendencies disregard and disdain the need to spur the masses to action and the broadest forms of popular struggle, the need to accumulate forces so that the revolutionary aims may be achieved at the least possible cost to the people and the democratic movement may be prevented from suffering reverses through premature action.[31]

Panama. A recent statement by the Communist "People's Party" (Partido del Pueblo de Panama) takes the paradoxical stand that the advocates of armed insurrection are guilty of "petty-bourgeois opportunism":

Leftist deviationism is another form in which petty-bourgeois opportunism manifests itself. This deviation, which at present is the most active, impedes the development of the mass struggle and induces the masses quietly and fatalistically to wait for the appearance of men of destiny. This leftist current postulates that revolution in Panama should take the form of insurrection—meaning, however, only one of its forms, namely guerrilla warfare. Starting from a subjective analysis which disregards the real development of events in our country and overestimating the revolutionary capacity of the masses, they claim that all the conditions for such a form of struggle are already fulfilled. Nevertheless, they do nothing to convince the people of the necessity to take up the struggle for the solution of its problems. The leftist deviationists maintain a mistaken position in regard to the movement of the masses and in regard to the party, in regard to the Communists, even though they claim to be Marxists-Leninists. . . .[32]

Castroites *vs.* Old-Guard Communists

A common pattern emerges from the above quotations. In every case we find Castroite individuals or groups, outside or within the party, clamoring for violence and guerrilla war. And in every case we find the party leaderships fighting back with the old orthodox Marxist-Leninist argument that action by small groups is of no avail and that the masses must be organized and induced to move.

The party leaders denounce the advocates of insurrection as adventurers, dogmatists, Trotskyites, leftist deviationists or even petty-bourgeois opportunists. Never do they call the insurrectionists by their true label—Castroites—although the affiliations or sympathies of such men as Hugo Blanco, Francisco Juliao and Clotario Blest, and of such organizations as the Colombian MOEC, are notorious. Nor do the Communist leaders openly mention what specific doctrine they are polemicizing against. Yet it is quite obvious that statements such as those of the People's Party of Panama and of the Colombian party leader Vieira are directed not only against specific Panamanian or Colombian groups, but also and quite as much against the doctrine expounded in Che Guevara's book *La guerra de guerrillas.*

The passages quoted from Peruvian, Argentinian, Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian and Panamanian party statements clearly demonstrate that today the Communist movement of Latin America is deeply split between the Castroite advocates of violence and the Old Guard leaders who stand for a policy of collaboration and infiltration.[33] In some countries the Communist movement is on the brink of an open rift, and in others this rift has already occurred.

IN HIS SPEECH to the Havana congress of American women on January 16, 1963, Fidel Castro openly vented his anger at the rejection of his policy of insurrection by the majority of Latin American Communist parties. He said:

The number of those who die each year in Latin America, who die each year of starvation and disease, without treatment, is much greater than the number of those who would die if the peoples of Latin America fought for their freedom. In this country the struggle cost 20,000 lives, but through it many times 20,000 lives were saved. We may wait, and the numbers will pile up—the millions of unfortunates, of the exploited, of the dying. These numbers are the result of feudal and imperialist exploitation. And the problem of the numbers should not be one of manipulating them and writing them down in a graph or a pamphlet, but of thinking how to change the situation. There are experts in figures, but what we need to be is experts in changing the situation, experts in leading the people to revolution. . . . This is the duty of the leaders and of the revolutionary organizations: to get the masses to move, to lead them into battle. This was done in Algeria, and this is what the patriots in South Vietnam are now doing. . . .

It is logical for the theoreticians of imperialism to worry about preventing revolutions, and the theoreticians of imperialism exert themselves in slandering the Cuban revolution, in sowing lies and slander . . . (concerning) the worst horrors, in creating fear of revolution among the people. But may no one with a revolutionary position try to create confusion and fear of revolution. Let the theoreticians of imperialism preach conformism; the theoreticians of revolution shall fearlessly preach revolution.

This is what we think, and this is what we said in the Declaration of Havana, a declaration which in some brother countries has received the honor of being shelved by some revolutionary organizations—"the honor of the shelf"—when it should have received the publicity it

[31] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1963.
[32] *Ibid.*

[33] A similar situation prevails in other Latin American countries—such as Mexico, where the Castroite elements gather around ex-President Lazaro Cardenas.

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justly deserved. It is as if we now shelved everything that has been said here, and indeed, if we do not want the masses to hear it, we must shelve it. But if we tell the masses what the situation is, we must also show them the road, we must lead them on the road to battle, for this road is much easier in many nations of Latin America than it was in Cuba.[34]

Such a statement can only be interpreted as an expression of Castro's will to impose his leadership and his policy of armed insurrection on the Communist movements of other Latin American countries. But since he spoke the above words, he has been forced to take a step backwards. The Soviet-Cuban joint communiqué which he signed in his capacity as First Secretary of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) and Prime Minister of Cuba includes the following passage:

The policy of both the Soviet and Cuban parties is based on the fact that the main concern of our area is the transition from capitalism to socialism, which began with the great socialist October revolution. This inevitable historical process is the same for all countries in that which is basic—in the essence of the economic-social and political-social transformations—but takes a different course, with different concrete forms, depending on the domestic and foreign conditions and peculiarities of each country. The PURS and the CPSU consider that the question of peaceful or non-peaceful transition to socialism, in one country or the other, will be definitely solved by the peoples themselves and in accordance with the practical ratio of class forces and the degree of resistance of the exploiting classes to the socialist transformation of society.[35]

This statement will certainly be used by the Old Guard leaders of Latin American communism as an argument against Castro's claim that the Cuban example is valid for their countries. Yet if he had not agreed to sign the communiqué, he would hardly have obtained Soviet recognition of his PURS as a fraternal party and full member of the world Communist movement. It would be rash indeed to assume that he will now give up his efforts to persuade or force the other Communist parties of Latin America to follow his road to socialism—the road of terrorism and guerrilla war.

The mere fact that a party of such heretical tenets as the Cuban PURS is now admitted to the Communist fraternity is a striking indication of how far ideological diversification and disintegration of discipline have already spread in the Communist camp.

[34] Translated from the Prensa Latina version of the speech, as published by *El Siglo*, January 18, 1963.

[35] Cuban-Soviet joint communiqué, Prensa Latina text, *El Siglo*, May 28, 1963.

Castro Between Moscow and Peking

By Andres Suarez

THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT places the regime of Fidel Castro in a difficult position. To appreciate the seriousness of the Cuban predicament, it is necessary to understand the nature of the relationship between Cuba and the two largest Communist states. It is the purpose of this article to reconsider the development of Cuba's external relations since 1959 and thus throw some light on Castro's current dilemma.

Mr. Suárez, a Cuban now living in the United States, is currently at work on a book dealing with the problems posed for Cuba by the schism in the Communist world. The study will be published by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

During his first few months in power, the Cuban leader appeared to have the most serious doubts about his future relationship with the world Communist movement. In a speech made on May 8, 1959, upon his return from the United States and South America, he reaffirmed his humanist aims and insisted that power was "firmly" held by the 26th of July Movement. A few days later, he signed the Agrarian Reform Act, sent Ernesto Che Guevara, one of his closest associates, on a trip to the Far East, and on May 21, during one of his television interviews, branded as counterrevolutionary the disorders which the Communists had instigated in Oriente Province. At the same time, *Revolución*, the official organ of the 26th of July Movement, published a strong attack

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against the Communist party (PSP-Partido Socialista Popular) newspaper *Hoy,* which was shortly seconded by a resolution of the Sugar Workers' Congress. The somber tones of Blas Roca's report to the Plenum of the party's National Directorate, which had been hastily summoned to discuss the ominous events, was easily understandable. "We are living through a critical moment of the revolution," the veteran Cuban Communist leader said, adding that "all this threatens to break the over-all revolutionary solidarity."[1]

But events soon proved that Roca's fears were unfounded. By June 12, 1959, Castro reshuffled his cabinet, eliminating some of the ministers whom the PSP had called "Plattists" and "laggards"—*i.e.,* those who had acted as brakes on the revolution. He did not, however, substitute Communists for those ousted. Four days later, the Revolutionary Students' Council (DER), after interviewing Castro at the presidential palace, issued a statement supporting "unity," that is, collaboration with the PSP. On July 3, Castro declared that he considered it "hardly honorable" to press his attack on the Communists just to avoid being called a Communist himself. The PSP thus achieved what it had been waiting for: a gesture which would allow them to "ratify and strengthen the party's support of the government and its Prime Minister, Fidel Castro."[2]

In order to understand Castro's peculiar tactics, it is useful to re-examine briefly his political position at that time. He knew by mid-1959 that, as his brother Raul had expressed it in a May Day speech, "if the revolution stops, the revolution dies."[3] He also knew that if the revolution were to spread abroad, he might gain even firmer national support at home. He could then definitely assert his dominance over the increasingly rebellious 26th of July Movement, and all internal changes could be justified in the name of the sacred national interest. If, on the other hand, that road should be closed, Castro had two other alternatives. He could adapt his program to the confused wishes of the majority, *i.e.,* the 26th of July Movement, and govern us a *primus inter pares;* or, he could try to crush the majority with the help of the minority, the PSP, which not only had a clear program to offer, but also showed docility because of its lack of participation in the war against Batista. With the Communists and with the external support of the USSR, Castro could set up a regime that would legitimize his personal power and allow him to break the bonds which his former comrades-in-arms were trying to impose upon him.

[1] *Hoy,* May 26, 1959.
[2] *Ibid.,* July 4, 1959.
[3] *Ibid.,* May 3, 1959.

Castro decided to try the path of conquest first. While continuing to eulogize the 26th of July Movement and censure the Communists (so as to keep his second choice open), he organized, and on June 14 began, the invasion of the Dominican Republic. This operation was of extraordinary importance to him; indeed, he became so involved in it that he asked the public to support it one day and denied its existence the next.[4] But the invasion failed completely, and the man who still claims to have changed the revolutionary strategy of the hemisphere suffered total defeat. Not only were almost all the members of the expedition killed, but the Cuban leader of the group, Commander Delio Gomez Ochoa, who had enjoyed Castro's absolute confidence, became Trujillo's collaborator after being taken prisoner.[5] Everything that has happened in Cuba since has had some relation to this failure. While the meaning of the defeat remained blurred in Cuba, it proved disastrous for Castro's relations with the United States Government, which had been watching with some anxiety the new "agrarian reformer's" indiscriminate efforts to buy armaments and seagoing vessels.[6] The Dominican adventure and the threat it posed to stability in the Carribean seemed to justify the apprehensions felt in the United States as well as within the Organization of American States.

In Castro's view, on the other hand, the revolution now had to be deepened and intensified in order to survive isolated on a small island 90 miles off the coast of the most powerful nation on earth. That meant that more social reforms had to be promulgated—a decision that resulted in new and increased resistance to the government. In turn, this resistance became a lever in the hands of Castro's enemies, his rivals, and even his supporters, who, having shared with him the same risks, were unwilling to acknowledge his right to total power.

Seeking Alliance With Moscow

Castro therefore looked to the Communists for support. He knew, of course, that he would thus increase the misgivings of the United States; and he knew equally well that he would then have to look for external allies. Under the circumstances, he had only one possible choice —the Soviet Union.

By mid-1959, however, the USSR was pursuing the "spirit of Camp David," which was incompatible with

[4] Castro's exhortation, *Hoy,* June 16, 1959; denial, *ibid.,* June 17, 1959.
[5] In his report to the October Plenum, Blas Roca said that "Gomez Ochoa strongly recommended to Trujillo that he keep Hubert Matos in mind." *Hoy,* November 8, 1959.
[6] See, *New York Times,* June 26, 1959.

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Castro's aspirations. Characteristically, Castro appears to have made known his displeasure with the new turn of Soviet-American relations since the PSP, in a resolution of its National Directorate, felt obliged to make the following comment on the subject of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting:

There have been doubts and reservations in our country regarding those talks on the assumption—for which no reasons are given—that they might result in agreements . . . harmful to small countries such as Cuba. . . . To harbor such doubts would only serve the interests of those who favor the cold war and international reaction."[7]

But censure has never stopped Castro. When in October 1959 the United States requested the British Government not to supply Cuba with military planes, the Cuban Ambassador to Washington declared that "if this opposition prevails, the Government of Cuba might consider the possibility of surmounting its supply difficulties by resorting to other sources open to them."[8] On November 3, *Revolución* suggested that Mikoyan, then visiting Mexico, be invited to Cuba. The visit took place in January 1960. It resulted in the signing of a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement which caused much irritation in the United States and in turn provoked a number of political errors in Washington.

When early in March a bill was sent to the United States Congress reducing the import quota for Cuban sugar by 192,000 tons, Castro's internal position was strengthened immeasurably. This time even the PSP found it necessary to rally to Castro's side. A resolution passed by the Plenum of its National Directorate charged that the United States Government was transforming its hostile attitude towards Cuba into direct action and open support of aggression." It expressed its thanks for the help extended to Cuba by the "socialist" countries and concluded that "at the present time we need even more of their solidarity, and we are sure that we shall have it."[9] This strong statement, it should be noted, was adopted in spite of the moderate report of the PSP Secretary General, Blas Roca.

It may indeed have been this unexpectedly rebellious mood within the party that moved Roca to decide on a trip to China and the Soviet Union. He saw Khrushchev in Moscow at the beginning of May, shortly after the U-2 incident, and it may be that by then the Soviet Premier had already made up his mind to wreck the forthcoming Paris summit conference. He may therefore have been ready to listen to the Cuban in a sympathetic frame of mind. While we do not know what particular decisions were reached on that occasion, it is significant that on May 7, during Roca's visit, diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR were established, and that a few days later Khrushchev sent his first greetings to the Cuban people.

May and June 1960 were decisive months for the Cuban revolution, and Castro was, as always, on the offensive. On May 21, President Dorticós began a trip through Latin America. At the end of May, William Galvez, Inspector General of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, was in Peking visiting Mao Tse-tung. In Moscow, early in June, Nuñez Jimenez, director of INRA (National Institute of Agrarian Reform), was inviting Khrushchev to visit Cuba, and on June 23, Raul Castro left Cuba "to attend the Spartakiade" in Prague, Czechoslovakia.[10] On July 7, the appointment of Sergei Kudriavtsev as Soviet Ambassador to Cuba was announced, and the very next day Castro pledged that automatic weapons would soon be distributed to his militiamen. On July 26, he confirmed that the weapons had already arrived in Cuba.

These gun shipments through Preston, a small port in Oriente Province, have been obscured by the public interest in Khrushchev's symbolic allusion to the use of Soviet rockets in the defense of the Cuban regime. "Figuratively speaking," the Soviet Premier stated on July 9, 1960, "Soviet artillerymen, in the event of necessity, can support the Cuban people with their rocket firepower if the aggressor forces in the Pentagon dare begin an intervention against Cuba."[11] Undoubtedly to Khrushchev's great dismay, Castro was quick to seize upon this somewhat enigmatic pronouncement.[12] The very next day, from his sickbed, he thanked the Soviet Union for "the totally spontaneous" gesture, asserting, in contradiction to Khrushchev, that the rockets in question were real and not token.[13] Thereafter the younger Castro was summoned to Moscow, and, significantly, the communiqué that was issued at the conclusion of the discussions there made no mention of rockets and

[7] *Ibid.*, October 8, 1959.
[8] *Ibid.*, October 18, 1959.
[9] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1960.

[10] This is an explanation for the trip given in *Hoy*, June 29, 1960.
[11] *Revolucion*, July 11, 1960.
[12] The following autumn, in an interview with Carlos Franqui, the then Editor-in-Chief of *Revolucion*, Khrushchev again refused to give any concrete meaning to his July 9 pronouncement: "I should like such statements to be really symbolic, as the enemies of the Cuban revolution say. For this purpose it is essential that the imperialist threat of intervention against Cuba does not resolve itself into military operations. Then there will be no need to test the reality of our statements concerning armed assistance to the Cuban people against aggression. Is this clear?" *Revolucion*, October 28, 1960; *Pravda*, October 30, 1960.
[13] *Hoy*, July 12, 1960.

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nuclear arms.[14] Fidel Castro, however, paid no notice. In the Havana Declaration issued the following September, he again expressed his thanks for "the rocket support of the Soviet Union."[15]

Relations with China

Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956 and the destalinization process that followed had caused a veritable turmoil in the PSP—until then one of the staunchest followers of the Stalinist line among the Communist parties of the world. Towards the end of 1956, just about at the time that Fidel Castro was landing in Oriente "to be free or die," Blas Roca was applying for a passport to travel to China as an ordinary citizen.[16] (He needed to protect his position within the national Communist movement.) The trip—from the Chinese point of view at least—was a success. After this journey, Roca invariably spoke of Mao as a "truly wise man" and throughout 1959 repeatedly referred to the Chinese experience as an example for the Cuban revolution.

The Chinese followed the Cuban developments of 1959 with much interest. By the spring of 1960 they were convinced, as Kuo Mo-Jo was to say in a ceremony marking the founding of the Association for Chinese-Latin-American Friendship, that "the storm of the national and democratic revolution had arrived in Latin America."[17]

During his trip to Peking in March 1960, Blas Roca saw Mao, and at their farewell meeting the Chinese leader promised the Cuban revolution the support of his 650 million countrymen.[18] The meeting appears to have been a cordial one, but difficulties in the relationship between the two Communist parties soon made themselves felt.

On his return trip, as we already know, Roca was received by Khrushchev in the Kremlin. The Cuban Communist was not only aware by then of the disputes between the Chinese and the Russians, but also apprehensive lest the "leftist deviation" to which Castro was inclined threaten the monolithic power of the PSP. Having been forgiven for his Stalinist sins, Roca apparently decided then to disengage himself from the Chinese and return to the bosom of his traditional bosses in Moscow.

Castro's course of alignment within the Communist camp was quite different. On July 6, 1960, President Eisenhower virtually excluded Cuban sugar from the United States market, and in August the Cuban Premier responded by nationalizing most American enterprises in Cuba. Khrushchev thereafter rushed to Castro's rescue, promising to buy the 700,000 tons of sugar which the United States had refused to take. The Soviet intervention brought danger as well as relief to Cuba, for the island would now be dependent on the USSR for economic survival. This was a development that was not unwelcome to the PSP—by that time about as docile and well-organized a mercenary corps as Khrushchev has ever had; Castro, however, had not fought to escape from the claws of the "Yankee paper tiger" in order to fall into the clutches of the Russian bear.

The Cuban Premier perceived only one way out of the dilemma: to exploit the angry Sino-Soviet dispute and seek protection of his interests in Peking. In July 1960, Odon Alvarez de la Campa, the Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Cuban Labor Federation (CTC), traveled to China and at the conclusion of his visit signed with Chinese union leaders a joint statement fully supporting the Peking party line.[19] At about the same time, Cuba and China signed a trade agreement which *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) praised as an example of good relations between states "with different social systems."[20]

During the months that followed, Castro pressed on for Sino-Cuban amity. His progress reached an important milestone on September 2, 1960, when he announced in the Declaration of Havana formal diplomatic recognition of the Peking regime. Relations which, in the words of Castro, "Cuba had up to now maintained with the Formosan puppet regime supported by the Yankee Seventh Fleet," were suspended.[21]

In exchange for this gesture, there came the following October a generous Chinese response. Arriving in Peking empty-handed from Moscow, Che Guevara was offered by Mao a trump-card which in the future the Cubans could use to extract better economic terms from the Soviets: a trade agreement providing for the purchase by the Chinese of 1,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar per annum and a credit of $60,000,000 to Havana.

On April 16, 1961, on the eve of the doomed Bay of Pigs invasion, Fidel Castro spoke in Havana about "the

[14] *Pravda*, July 21, 1960; *Hoy*, July 22, 1960.

[15] *Revolucion*, September 3, 1960.

[16] See *Hoy*, May 6, 1959.

[17] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 20, 1960 (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2228, March 31, 1960).

[18] *Revolucion*, May 5, 1960.

[19] A few days later, however, after a meeting with Soviet Union leaders, Alvarez de la Campa signed a communiqué in Moscow supporting the Soviet view. See *Hoy*, Aug. 3, 1960.

[20] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 26, 1960 (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2308, August 2, 1960).

[21] *Revolucion*, September 3, 1960.

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socialist context of our revolution." Next day, *Revolución* carried a banner that read, "Long live our socialist revolution!," while the Communist *Hoy,* as if trying to hide its confusion, could only say: "The USSR will help us." In the days that followed, *Hoy* referred timidly to the "patriotic, democratic, and socialist" revolution, but on April 28, it announced that "the people were waiting for Fidel's statement," and asserted that "Cuba will continue building its socialism."

This is not the place to dwell in detail on the anguish experienced in those days by the PSP theoreticians, or on the struggle that led to the compromise agreement of July 26, 1961, between Castro and the Communist leaders. Suffice it to say that on that date Castro accepted the Communist thesis regarding the stage reached by the Cuban revolution ("to say that our revolution is a socialist one," he declared, "means that the revolution is advancing toward a socialist regime"), and that the PSP, on its part, agreed that the establishment of a single unified party would be preceded by a preparatory period during which the 26th of July Movement, the Revolutionary Students' Council, and the PSP would operate still as self-contained groups, within the framework of ORI, the newly formed Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. Thus the exigencies of Marxist-Leninist dialectics were satisfied and Castro remained in power as before—alone.

Quest for Admission to the Camp

Things were not so easy, however, when recognition for Castro's brand of socialism was sought from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The difficulties that arose are easily explained. First, there was an ideological problem. It was precisely with countries such as Cuba, Guinea and Mali in mind that the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties in November 1960 devised the concept of the "national-democratic" state which, providing for the collaboration of all the "progressive" forces, was to represent in many underdeveloped countries a transitional stage on the road *from pre-capitalist and semi-feudal conditions to* "socialism." Obviously, from a Marxist point of view, Cuba could not progress within only five months from "semi-feudalism" to "socialism."

The Soviets, however, had another and more important reason for their reluctance to accept Cuba as a full-fledged member of the Communist camp. They wanted to avoid further commitments to the Cubans, fearing the danger of being drawn by Castro into a conflict with the United States. Yet the guarantees that come with membership in the Communist camp was precisely what Havana wanted. It was therefore no accident when Castro announced on April 16, 1961, that the Cuban revolution was a "socialist" one.

Castro's need to join the camp had become urgent in December 1960 when, on his way back from Peking, Guevara signed in Moscow a trade treaty with the USSR. In the communiqué announcing the agreement, the Soviets once again failed to make any reference to rockets and simply stated that they would "render Cuba full support in defending its independence against aggression." "Both parties declare emphatically," the statement concluded, "that world peace will never be endangered or violated in any way by actions of the Soviet Union or Cuba."[22] The Soviets thus made their attitude quite clear, and Castro could no longer talk about rockets. If he wanted to receive the guarantees he had sought when he approached the Communist bloc, there was no other alternative for him but to advance full speed towards communism at home and worm his way into the bloc. The Soviet leaders probably knew well what Castro meant by his proclamation of a "socialist" revolution in Cuba, but they were in no mood to renew Khrushchev's early rocket commitment, of which they had rid themselves in the treaty communiqué four months before.

It would take Castro more than a year to break down Moscow's resistance, and space does not allow discussing here all the events that marked that long and hard-fought battle. The first signs of success came on April 15, 1962, when greetings to "the heroic people of Cuba, who have embarked on the path of building socialism" were included among the slogans prepared by the Central Committee of the CPSU for the forthcoming May Day celebrations.[23] But even this statement did not quite satisfy Castro; it was only with the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba that his country's equal status with the other members of the Communist bloc seemed assured.

The problems of Castro's relations with Communist China were somewhat different since the difficulties with Peking were mainly of an ideological nature. Until Guevara's visit to Peking in December 1960, the Chinese considered the Cuban revolution a movement of national liberation headed by the country's democratic forces under Fidel Castro, *and the PSP.*[24] Guevara cleared up this "confusion," and thenceforth all statements from Peking about the Castro regime referred simply to the

[22] *Pravda,* December 20, 1960.
[23] *Ibid.,* April 15, 1962.
[24] See, for example, *Hung ch'i: Survey of the China Mainland Press,* No. 2332, September 1, 1960; and *Ta-Kung Pao, Survey of the China Mainland Press,* No. 2336, September 6, 1960.

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Cuban "national liberation movement headed by Prime Minister Castro."

During that same visit in Peking, Guevara pointedly declared that "the [Cuban] revolution has entered into a second phase with the October 14 nationalization of all banks and private enterprises and with the October 15 law of urban reform."[25] But the Chinese leaders would not take the hint, and they appeared just as surprised as the PSP and the Soviets by Castro's April 16 proclamation of a "socialist" revolution in Cuba. The Second Havana Declaration which followed on February 4, 1962, undoubtedly played a key role in Peking's recognition of Castroite socialism. Formal recognition, however, followed only after the publication of the CPSU May Day greetings.

The October Crisis and Its Aftermath

July 26, 1962, marked the highest point achieved thus far in Fidel Castro's Communist career. By then he knew that the rockets he had dreamt of for so long were on their way, that Russia and China had sent messages explicitly recognizing Socialist Cuba; and, thanks to the procedural plan devised by himself, he had the assurance that it would be only much later, perhaps never, that a single United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) would be formed. Less than three months later, however, Castro was confronted by the most serious crisis of his turbulent political career. The way he handled and overcame it, emerging virtually unscathed, confirms how erroneous it is to underestimate the cleverness and audacity of the Cuban leader.

Even after the Soviet answer to President Kennedy's speech of October 22, Castro reaffirmed his faith in the USSR, referring to it as "firm, calm, fully backed by arguments and reasons."[26] However, when Khrushchev ordered the diversion of Soviet ships en route to Cuba, Castro promptly countered with orders to fire upon US military aircraft violating Cuban air space, and his determination was underscored by the shooting down of an American plane. Later, when it became clear that he had been abandoned by Khrushchev, Castro came out with his "Five Points," and this, together with his order to shoot down intruding aircraft, prevented the resolution of the crisis from prejudicing his position. U.N. Secretary General U Thant's subsequent visit to Cuba constituted recognition of that fact and signified that the worst was already over for Castro.

[25] NCNA, November 18, 1960 (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 2384, November 25, 1960).

[26] *Hoy*, October 24, 1962.

But the Cuban leader was not content simply to survive the crisis: he wanted to recover the position he had held before October. This he could accomplish only through the Russians since they were the ones who had taken away the guarantees previously extended. First, however, he had to pave the way by appropriate internal measures.

During the October crisis, the Communists controlling *Hoy* had shown signs of faltering in their "Fidelista" faith. For example, *Hoy* did not publish Castro's Five Points until November 1, and the newspaper's editorial of November 3, entitled "Peace with Dignity," was strongly slanted in favor of the Russians. Further, on November 7, the Communist organ devoted a full page to an itemized listing of Soviet economic assistance to Cuba, thus violating the secrecy customarily maintained in such matters. It was then that Castro began bringing back from limbo some of his early supporters in the struggle against Batista—such as Efigenio Ameijeiras, Universo Sánchez, Faustino Perez, and Enrique Oltunski—reinstating them in high positions in the army and the administration. Another person brought back from

"Dear Nikita — It Was Interesting To See Your Test-Ban Treaty, Which You Can Put Away In The Same Place You Keep Your Missiles"

—Reprinted from *The Washington Post*, Sept. 5, 1963.

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oblivion was Euclides Vázquez Candelas, who had played the chief role in the 1959 Fidelist dispute with *Hoy*. Writing in the November 3, 1962, issue of *Bohemia*, Vásquez hailed Castro's speech of two days before as "the international complement of the thesis expounded by the Prime Minister on March 26 of this year regarding the incorrect handling of our internal contradictions."

At the same time, Castro made use of the Chinese, who warmly supported him throughout the crisis. Chinese statements backing Cuba were prominently displayed in the newspapers, including an editorial from the Peking *Jen-min jih-pao* entitled "The People Urge Defense of the Cuban Revolution," which was reprinted by *Revolución* on October 31 and by *El Mundo* on November 1.

NEXT, CASTRO confronted Mikoyan. The exact content of their protracted talks is not known, but one aspect of the conversations—or at least the Cuban attitude concerning it—can be conjectured from reading a statement made by the Cuban Revolutionary Government on November 22, while Mikoyan was still in Cuba. The government declaration explicitly denied "the speculations of American news agencies regarding the alleged signing of a new agreement on economic assistance between the Soviet Union and Cuba." This was not because the Cubans considered such speculations inappropriate while questions of principle were being discussed; rather it was a simple statement of fact. For, as the declaration added, "during the course of the present crisis, Cuba has not entered into any agreement whatever with the government of the Soviet Union." [27]

The fact that no communiqué was published at the conclusion of the talks clearly confirmed the absence of any accord. This was further underlined by statements which the ORI and the Council of Ministers issued at the time of Mikoyan's departure, explicitly reaffirming that "an armed conflict has been avoided, but peace has not been achieved." Further, they reserved to Cuba "the right to acquire armaments of any type for her defense," and they refused to recognize any value in non-aggression pledges made by the United States.[28] Needless to say, these statements received immediate support from the Chinese government.

All this served to strengthen Sino-Cuban friendship. *Revolución, Hoy* and *Bohemia* all reprinted a *Jen-min jih-pao* editorial of December 15 entitled, "Proletariats of all countries, let us unite against our common enemy!" This editorial, it may be noted, was subsequently cited in the letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of June 14, 1963, explaining the CCP's position vis-à-vis the Soviets.

Meanwhile, early in December 1962, a Cuban economic mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez went to Moscow. Although, in a communiqué issued on December 20, the leader of the mission expressed his "satisfaction with the development of the negotiations," it was nevertheless announced that further talks would be conducted in Moscow. The man designated to carry on the negotiations for Cuba was Alberto Mora, president of the Foreign Trade Bank, a young man belonging to the Revolutionary Students' Council and endowed with a courage matched only by his ignorance. All this suggested that Rodriguez was somewhat premature in voicing satisfaction with the results of the negotiations, and that actually little or nothing had been accomplished.

From Estrangement to Reconciliation

The impression of continued coolness between Havana and Moscow was heightened by Castro's speech of January 2, 1963, commemorating the fourth anniversary of the revolutionary victory. The Cuban leader, who had kept quiet until then, made his first reference to the Sino-Soviet dispute, though only to plead for "unity within [Socialist] principles" and to stress that the Cubans must strive for "unity within and outside" their country.[29] Thirteen days later, however, addressing the Congress of Women of America, Castro was not so cautious. He criticized "conformism," the "policy of waiting forever to start a revolution," the viability of the "peaceful road" to socialism (which he did not deny but which, he said, has yet to be demonstrated), and forgetfulness of the revolutionary Second Declaration of Havana. In conclusion, he reiterated that he would go on fighting for unity within the Socialist camp, but that he would do so according to "proper criteria—not those of a *caudillo*, but of a Marxist-Leninist." [30]

Then, on February 8, a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement for 1963 was at last concluded. Under it Cuba obtained a long-term credit on "favorable terms" to offset the balance of payments deficit resulting from her inability to cover Soviet imports. According to a *New York Times* report (June 2), the agreement also authorized Cuba to sell one million tons of sugar from

[27] *Ibid.*, November 22, 1962.
[28] *Revolucion*, November 26, 1962.
[29] *Ibid.*, January 3, 1963.
[30] *Ibid.*, January 16, 1963.

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the Soviet quota in the world market, although this proviso had not been mentioned in the communiqué announcing the accord.

From then on, there was a conspicious waning of pro-Chinese enthusiasm in the Cuban press. Moreover, Castro, who had let the opportunity presented by the first anniversary of the Second Havana Declaration pass by without uttering a word, finally broke silence on February 22, but only to discuss certain problems connected with the organization of the PURS—a clear sign that he had returned to the fold of Soviet orthodoxy. This was further indicated by Castro's reading, in the course of his speech, of a cable from Marshal Malinovski.[31]

The reconcilation between Havana and Moscow reached its culmination with Castro's visit to the Soviet Union. The Cuban leader must have had powerful reasons for accepting the Soviet invitation because he could not have doubted that the Chinese would regard the visit as an open show of partiality for the Soviets. The communiqué issued at the end of Castro's official stay in the USSR and the speech he made on his return to Havana both served to confirm the Chinese in such a view. Castro, like Blas Roca, found in Khrushchev "one of the most brilliant intellects I have ever known," a "serious adversary of imperialism," an "extraordinarily human man . . . a very simple man."[32] The question now is this: Has Castro really come down to the level of a Blas Roca? Or—as in July 1962, when he shouted, "Long live Cuba's great friend, Nikita Khrushchev!"[33] just as his brother Raul was leaving for Moscow to complete the arrangements for the installation of Soviet rockets in Cuba—has he been lavishing praise on the Soviet leader simply because the latter granted all his requests?

Castro, Moscow, and Peking

Those who claim that on January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro was a naive and romantic youth concerned only with the welfare of the Cuban people and the economic development of the country not only ignore the established facts of his life, but also bar themselves from comprehending the whole revolutionary process in Cuba which bears the profound and indelible stamp of Castro's personality.

The fact is that Castro never has been such a person.

[31] *Cuba Socialista.* March, 1963.

[32] *Revolucion.* June 5, 1963.

[33] See Castro's farewell speech to the Soviet technicians, *Hoy.* July 1, 1962.

COINCIDENCE

For us, the Sino-Soviet dispute is one of the saddest events. We do not participate in this dispute. We are trying to mediate. But as it {the dispute} is a fact, we inform the people about it and it is discussed by the party. Our party's attitude is not to analyze who is in the right and who is not. We have our own position, and as they say in the American movies, any resemblance is purely coincidental.

—Che Guevara, interview with student group reported in *Revolución*, August 2, 1963.

He is a cunning politican bred by a continent as yet only superficially touched by modern ideologies, and who has emerged in an age in which the leaders of the masses, as well as those who aspire to such leadership, have lost both religious faith and confidence in the excellence of Western cultural values. Furthermore, lacking a native and ancient culture, and living in an environment in which nature has not yet been conquered by technology, these Latin American leaders pour all their energies into political action and focus their attention solely on those physical realities that are susceptible of being exploited for political ends—*i.e.* the masses, the nation, and the race.

When he reached Havana in January 1959, Castro faced a dilemma. Either he could try to adapt the Cuban revolution to the historical and natural limitations of the environment—limitations which, though not inflexible, were nonetheless real and could be manipulated only by a leadership possessing ideological maturity and strong discipline, characteristics that Castro lacked. Or he could undertake the formidable task of overcoming those limitations by expanding the revolution. The Dominican fiasco, however, closed the latter road. From then on, Castro had no alternative other than to seek assistance from the only foreign power capable of restraining the adversary he himself had antagonized by his unbridled ambitions.

But when Moscow promised Castro the protection he sought, the Soviet Union had long since passed beyond the stage of revolutionary fervor. Moreover, it already had an agency of its own in Cuba whereby it could exert its influence on the internal situation. Thus, Castro found himself facing a dual danger: on the one hand, he ran the risk of being forsaken by his Soviet protector in a moment of serious crisis; and, on the other, he had to live with the threat of being smothered inside Cuba

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by the PSP whose first loyalty continued to lay with Moscow.

To guard against the first danger, Castro had to accentuate his identification with the Soviet regime in order to obtain guarantees sufficient to remove his dread of being abandoned by Moscow. This meant that Cuba would either have to gain admission to the Warsaw Pact or obtain a supply of weapons so powerful that they would enable Castro to drag the USSR into an armed conflict. And for a man of Castro's temperament, the prospect of armed conflict, in the author's judgment, is one that has irresistible attraction.

To avoid being smothered by Moscow's Cuban supporters, Castro looked to China. But in view of his scorn for ideological factors, it seems extremely doubtful that the Cuban leader has ever been deeply attracted by the doctrinal fervor of the Chinese, and the wary prudence he has shown in dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute thus far suggests that he has always been aware that China can play only a subordinate, if nonetheless indispensible, role in his strategy. China, after all, can neither give him the military guarantees he seeks, nor finance his revolution.

To take Castro's pilgrimage to the USSR as a sign of readiness to drop the Chinese completely would, however, be to ignore his characteristic political cunning. In this context, it appears highly significant that José Matar, president of Cuba's all-powerful Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, left for Peking on April 11, six days before the announcement of Castro's trip to Moscow. During his stay, which lasted until the first part of May, Matar was received by Mao, and abundant homage was paid to Sino-Cuban solidarity. Castro is very fond of this kind of diplomacy, as already evidenced by the Galvez visit to Mao in May 1959 and Nunez Jimenez's visit to Khrushchev in June of the same year.

But if Matar's mission was to maintain Sino-Cuban cordiality, it appears to have had little effect. From the moment that Castro arrived in the Soviet Union, the interest of the Chinese press in Cuban events decreased noticeably. Moreover, the June 14 letter from the CCP Central Committee to its Soviet counterpart, made no further mention of Cuba. The CPSU's reply, however, ironically asked, "Why is it, then, that our Chinese comrades stubbornly ignore the approval given by the Cuban leaders to the Soviet government's policy, which they consider a policy of fraternal solidarity and genuine internationalism?"[34]

* * *

At this time of writing (early August), it appears that Castro's position is once again becoming critical. The Soviet-American talks confront the Cuban leader, at the very least, with the danger that Khrushchev may impose his own conditions for protecting Cuba. In his speech of July 26, Castro voiced approval of the nuclear test ban treaty, but at the same time his anxiety for the future was reflected in his call for further revolutions in Latin America and his renewed attacks on the United States. The impression of uneasiness was not lessened by Castro's rather vague assurance to Latin American revolutionaries that "whenever a people does what the Cuban people did, it is sure to receive the decisive support of the Soviet Union."[35]

As for the Sino-Soviet schism, it is quite evident that the Cuban leaders are painfully aware of its implications for them. According to a *New York Times* report of July 28, Guevara stated that the Cubans "would not decide who is right in this conflict," explaining this neutral posture by saying, "We are too small"—a consideration that both he and Castro obviously ignored in 1959 when they plunged Cuba into the maelstrom of the cold war.

Castro's worries over the schism are easily understood. For if the time comes when he must definitely take sides, he will have to choose between two highly unpalatable alternatives. On the one hand, by siding with Peking, he can gain Communist China's support of his ambition to become the leader of the hemispheric Communist movement and Chinese benevolence towards his personal despotism in Cuba—but only at the sacrifice of Soviet military guarantees and economic assistance. On the other, he can stick with Moscow and retain such guarantees and assistance—at the cost, however, of renouncing his continental ambitions and remaining strictly subservient to Khrushchev's orders.

The words of Guevara cited above reflect the seriousness of this dilemma. For the first time in their careers, Castro and his lieutenant—born enemies of neutralism—find themselves forced to raise what they themselves always held to be a "cowardly" flag.

[34] *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

[35] *Revolucion*, July 27, 1961.

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Conflict and Authority: A Discussion

EDITORS' NOTE: The life, the vigor, and the political condition of the man who stands at the helm of the USSR are always subjects of intense interest to students of Soviet affairs. When, furthermore, a political crisis or the pressure of advancing years casts a shadow over the man's progress, the interest heightens. On both these counts considerable speculation has arisen in recent months over the political fortunes of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. In the first two articles below, Khrushchev's position in the Soviet leadership is reexamined. Mr. Linden concludes, largely on the basis of policy analysis, that the First Secretary's rule has been enfeebled during the past years by continuous and lively opposition within the party leadership. Mr. Rigby, on the other hand, proceeding mainly from an institutional argument in his rejoinder, fails to find any signs of serious disagreement with Khrushchev, and indeed asserts that the Soviet Premier is sufficiently strong not to tolerate from any of his colleagues persistent opposition on basic policy questions. In the third article, Mr. Conquest looks beyond the present controversy, examining with some pessimism the question of Khrushchev's succession.

Khrushchev and the Party Battle

By Carl Linden

ANYONE WHO STUDIES the pattern of Khrushchev's political behavior over the past several years will be struck not only by the underlying consistency of purpose which has informed and guided his policies, but also by the constant backing and filling that has accompanied their implementation. Again and again one sees him returning to the same themes: agriculture, consumer goods production, resource allocations, chemicals—the parts and pieces of his persistent and seemingly elusive quest for a more abundant Soviet society. One wonders why a leader so amply endowed with political power should be condemned to this seemingly futile toil of pushing the same stone up the same endless slope. Part of the explanation can, of course, be found in the weight of the stone—the complexity of the problems with which Khrushchev has to deal; the inefficiency of the bureaucratic instruments with which he must work; the mutally competitive character of various policies, foreign and domestic, which require constant adjustments and reschedulings of programs. But part of the explanation can also be found in the limitations of Khrushchev's political strength. It is this author's view that Khrushchev has been fighting an

An American student of Soviet affairs, Mr. Linden here makes his first appearance in Problems of Communism.

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uphill battle over the past several years not only against the deadweight of the problems which beset Soviet society but against the lively opposition of political forces represented at the top levels of the Soviet regime.

This article seeks to present evidence to document this viewpoint. It takes up a number of major issues which have agitated Soviet policymakers over the past several years and identifies the indications of opposition to Khrushchev's policies which manifested themselves in the press and in the public statements of other leaders. This account of Soviet leadership politics suggests that while Khrushchev succeeded in suppressing his challengers in 1957, he did not succeed in disposing of the issues they had raised against him at that time. These issues have returned again and again in various garbs. It suggests further that Khrushchev did not succeed by his 1957 victory in finally extricating himself from the constraints built into the Soviet system of power. He has remained dependent on the arrangement of political factors which gave him his victory—his organizational and political influence within the party apparatus. He continues to operate within the context of this arrangement, and not above it. As a result, his power and prestige within the party are, to a far greater extent than Stalin's, dependent on the success of his policies.

This account of leadership politics suggests, finally, that Khrushchev operates amidst an alignment of political forces in the party leadership which ranges from orthodoxy on the one hand to pragmatism on the other; from conservatism to reformism. In his political activities Khrushchev must take the existing balance of these forces into account. It is this imperative of practical politics which goes far to explain the shifts and turnabouts in his policies. They are a measure not of his arbitrary authority, but of the intensity and complexity of the political battle by which he must seek to sustain that authority.

The Anti-Party Group and Destalinization

Nothing has so deeply colored and illuminated Soviet leadership politics since June 1957 as the anti-Stalin campaign and the related question of the "anti-party group." In the context of regime politics, Khrushchev has been exploiting both issues as major instruments of his continuing effort to consolidate and extend his power over the party. But herein lies also the paradox of Khrushchev's leadership: he rose to undisputed preeminence on the anti-Stalin platform, but as an instrument of his will the policy is a double-edged sword.

The dilemma Khrushchev has faced is best exemplified by the handling of the "anti-party group" issue in intra-party politics. Though he won a major victory over his chief rivals for the Stalin succession in June 1957, the successful resistance of Khrushchev's associates to his repeated efforts to expel the defeated leaders from the party exposes both the limits of the 1957 victory and the limits of Khrushchev's power. It is virtually certain that Khrushchev regards the expulsion of his fallen foes from the party, and perhaps even their trial, as the unfinished business of his drive for total dictatorial power—not because they pose a direct political threat but because their removal would be tantamount to giving him an effective purge weapon over his present colleagues. In this pursuit, however, Khrushchev has been hamstrung by the general foreclosure of recourse to terror as a means of enforcing discipline at the top levels of the party—a situation that he himself has played a large part in bringing about.

The 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961 provides a striking spectacle of the failure of Khrushchev's strategy of exploiting the Stalin issue against the "anti-party group." It was at Khrushchev's signal that the congress—presumably meeting to consider the party's new Draft Program—was converted into an anti-Stalin carnival and a vehicle of unprecedented onslaught against Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and —for the first time—Voroshilov. However, despite the seeming success of the anti-Stalin drive symbolized by the removal of Stalin's remains from Lenin's mausoleum (an action which originated on the floor of the congress and conceivably was thrown up to the Presidium as a *fait accompli*), Khrushchev failed to achieve his objective of expelling his foes from the party and winning party endorsement of their indictment for Stalinist "crimes." The campaign proved to be short-lived, and the influence of Khrushchev's colleagues in stifling it was clearly discernible. Suslov evidently was among the latter.[1] Kozlov's position was less clear; he

[1] Speakers at the 22nd Congress took divergent approaches to the anti-party group issue. Some dwelt on the "crimes" of Khrushchev's ex-challengers and either demanded their expulsion from the party or implied support for further punitive action against them, or both. Others focused only on the group's political errors and skirted the issue of new punishments. Suslov, Mikoyan and Kosygin typified the position of the relative moderates on the issue. None used the argument, which was characteristic of many of the speakers who pressed for punitive action, that the case of the group was being reopened because "new facts" had come to light; instead, they suggested that the "ideological" routing of the group was being recalled to bring home a historical lesson. For Suslov's speech, see *Pravda*. Oct. 23, 1961.

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implied that he favored new action against the group's leaders but conspicuously failed to commit himself on the immediate issue of party expulsion placed before the congress.[2]

Khrushchev's failure to win his case was mirrored in the congress resolution.[3] While condemning the political errors of the "anti-party group," it conspicuously disregarded the insistent demands by Khrushchev's supporters for their expulsion from the party. It took no note of the flood of "new facts" offered to the congress on the "crimes" of Molotov and company. Moreover, treating the matter as closed, the resolution hardly squared with the damning descriptions of the ex-party leaders as "criminals" and "sadists" responsible for "mass slaughter" of countless innocents. Despite Khrushchev's assurances that Stalin-style purges were a thing of the past, the gravity and virulence of the charges he and his supporters had raised were reminiscent of the denunciations of politically disgraced leaders in Stalin's time and forewarned of an effort to lay the groundwork for punishments more dire than party expulsion. In effect, Khrushchev had raised the specter of a reintroduction of terror through the instrument of anti-Stalinism—an instrument that could eventually be turned against recalcitrant colleagues in the present leadership. It was in the interest of all the Presidium-level figures not directly beholden to Khrushchev for their positions to unite in an effort to prevent such an eventuality.

The Challenge from the "Metal-Eaters"

The failure of Khrushchev's drive against the "anti-party group" coincided with his failure at the congress to win a clear-cut victory for his consumer-oriented views on resource allocation. The sharp debate in the Kremlin since 1960 over this issue is of undoubted significance in assessing Khrushchev's leadership. The controversy has, in effect, been a battle over Khrushchev's own program for dovetailing a limited détente with the West with a consumer-oriented internal policy.

The signs of conflict over allocation policy emerged as Khrushchev initiated major moves at home and abroad to prepare the ground for his domestic program. The most dramatic of these moves were his trip

[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1961. Kozlov said he shared the view of other congress delegates that Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov must be held responsible for their "criminal and "anti-party" actions, but he did not specify any actions that should be taken against them.

[3] *Ibid.*, Nov. 1, 1961.

Proposals That Failed

There must be, however, an end to the patience and generosity of the party, after all! Or can our great party reconcile itself with renegades and dissenters in its ranks, who insolently oppose the most important theses of Leninism, the Leninist policy of our party, and the great new program of our party, this manifesto of the Communist Party of our era, which has been generally acknowledged? Many delegates to the congress rightly said that Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich cannot be members of our great Leninist party.

Doubtless the 22nd Congress will unanimously approve the proposals of several delegations to expel these dissenters and fractionaries from the party ranks. (Applause.) They must also bear responsibility for their criminal actions during the period of the Stalin personality cult and for the attempt to oppose the Leninist policy with their anti-party, anti-Leninist, and dangerous line, harmful to the cause of communism!

—From a speech by P. N. Pospelov at the 22nd CPSU Congress, Pravda, Oct. 28, 1961.

to Camp David in September 1959 and his proposals in January 1960 to cut the USSR's military burden through major troop reduction and reliance on a "cheap" rocket deterrent strategy. Radical in terms of traditional party policy, the moves produced a visible reaction among Khrushchev's more orthodox colleagues. The U-2 incident on May 1, 1960, clearly provided them with the handle for challenging the First Secretary's strategy. They were now in a position to protest that this was not the time for "consumer communism," when Soviet vulnerabilities had been exposed to the world. Notably, it was on May 5, the day Khrushchev announced that a U-2 plane had come down on Soviet soil, that he also divulged the fact that "some comrades had raised arguments against his pro-consumer moves.[4]

More traditional themes on resource allocation and defense began to intrude in regime statements in the summer of 1960. In late 1960, both Kozlov and Suslov appeared to range themselves against Khrushchev, and the influence of their more orthodox views evidently played a role in blunting Khrushchev's renewed initiatives in January 1961. Both indicated their preference for continuing the favored treatment of the heavy-industrial defense sector over any significant reorienta-

[4] *Ibid.*, May 6, 1960.

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tion of the economy toward consumer goods production.[5]

Against this background Khrushchev unveiled at the January 1961 plenum a program for a "revolution" (*povorot*) in agriculture favoring the consumer. He accused "some comrades" of having an "appetite for metals that could only unbalance the economy," and warned that failure to close the widening gap between consumer supply and demand would be "fraught with dangerous consequences."[6] Despite his impassioned arguments, no revolution in agriculture emerged from the plenum.

Soon thereafter, Khrushchev campaigned in agricultural areas for pro-consumer economic development as the best politics for the party abroad as well as at home. He who did not understand this, Khrushchev declared in a speech on February 18, could not be a "real leader." Following the tour, *Kommunist* denounced unnamed anti-consumer "theoreticians."[7] While the shoe fit Khrushchev's antagonists in Peking among others, the journal's criticism—appearing in an editorial pegged to the January agricultural plenum—applied also to those in the Soviet party whom Khrushchev had accused of wanting to push steel output to the limit and thereby upset the economy and let the consumer go begging.

By the time of the 22nd Congresss in October 1961, an uneasy balance between the pro-consumer proponents and the "metal-eaters" appears to have been established. The new Party Program, ratified at the congress, reflected neither Khrushchev's pro-consumer platform in its more radical formulation nor a full reassertion of the traditional dicta on the priority of heavy industry. Yet the congress marked a discernible shift toward economic orthodoxy, both in its proceedings and in its emphasis on the future role of heavy industry in the final text of the Party Program.

[5] Among the various signs were the following: (1) Kozlov and Khrushchev differed on a point that appeared indicative of their outlooks. Kozlov, in his October Revolution annniversary address (Nov. 6), asserted that "everyone knows" steel output is the basic index of a country's economic strength. As if in response, Khrushchev in his January plenum speech (Jan. 17) argued that a state's position is measured not only by the "metal" index but also by the "amount of products a man receives and eats." (2) Soviet accounts of speeches by Suslov and Mukhitdinov in the weeks before the January plenum also provided a notable contrast. Suslov (*Pravda vostoka*, Dec. 25) emphasized the development of heavy industry and Mukhitdinov (*Turkmenskaia iskra*, Jan. 6) entirely skipped the subject, focusing instead on the party's concern for civilian welfare.

[6] *Pravda*, Jan. 21, 1961.

[7] *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1961, p. 4.

Although taking various opportunities to agitate for his program, Khrushchev did not make any major breaches in the wall of economic orthodoxy up to the time of the Cuban crisis. At the plenum on November 19 last year, he voiced his frustration at those in the regime who, he said, still cry, "Steel!, steel!" And in an apparent exposure of past failures to contain the pressures for more steel, he complained that the Seven-Year Plan steel goal was being surpassed by "13 million tons."[8] Instead, the regime's energies, he declared, could have been spent on increasing production of plastics.

Leadership Shifts and the Party Conflict

The intensification of the controversy over resource allocations and related issues coincided with a major leadership shake-up at the time of the U-2 incident; similarly, other personnel changes that have occurred since then also appear to have been closely related to conflict over policy. Two key developments of the period—the May 1960 shake-up and the ouster in April and May 1962 of I. V. Spiridonov from the Central Committee Secretariat and from his post of first party secretary in Leningrad—illustrate the political balance in the leadership.

The adverse effects of the U-2 affair for Khrushchev were echoed in the major redistribution of forces in the party leadership on May 4, 1960—the day before he referred to "some comrades" objecting to pro-consumer measures. Khrushchev's reliable support in the Secretariat was weakened, and at the same time the political stock of Kozlov and Suslov, neither of whom is directly beholden to Khrushchev for his position, was boosted. Kozlov gained a commanding position in the Secretariat second only to Khrushchev's. He replaced his fallen rival, Kirichenko, and another major competitor, Brezhnev, was moved out of the Secretariat to the ceremonial post of Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Suslov, no less than Kozlov, acquired greatly broadened influence in the Secretariat through the reduction of its membership from eleven to five members. As a consequence of the June 1957 purge, the Secretariat had been heavily staffed with Khrushchev appointees, who were in a position to exert powerful influence in the Pre-

[8] Various indications around the time of the January 1961 plenum suggested that Khrushchev had sought to hold down steel output. In his January 6 speech, for example, he specifically indicated that he opposed plans for a 100-102 million ton output by 1965—the Seven-Year Plan target had been set at 86-91 million tons—and implied that the original target was sufficient.

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sidium by virtue of their foothold in both bodies; their departure from the Secretariat in May deprived Khrushchev of one of his levers over those Presidium members who were not his political dependents.

Kozlov's and Suslov's political gains were duly registered at the next Central Committe plenum in July 1960. Both attained unusual prominence in leadership activities in that month, while Khrushchev's role was less obtrusive than usual. Kozlov gave the Central Committee's report on Khrushchev's trip to the bloc leaders' meeting in Bucharest the month before, and Kosygin reported on industrial technology; Khrushchev did not report to the plenum at all. Suslov set the party line for literature and art at the July 17 session of party leaders and intellectuals and delivered a series of speeches on domestic and foreign policy during the remainder of July. What is more, his speech to the writers was printed in *Pravda* while Khrushchev's was not, and in the following months Suslov was often cited as a guide to the party line in the literary and cultural press. Khrushchev regained the spotlight in the sphere of cultural policy only some ten months later with the publication of an abridged version of his July 17 speech.

Though his colleagues could not prevent Khrushchev from mounting dramatic initiatives on numerous occasions after July 1960, the events of that month conveyed the distinct impression that under the new balance of forces in the leadership Khrushchev's influence was subject to a measure of constraint.

THE SPIRIDONOV AFFAIR in 1962 provided a strong hint that the policy debates at the top had come to involve a serious conflict between Khrushchev and Kozlov. Immediately after the March 1962 agricultural plenum, where Khrushchev's pro-consumer agitation once more fell upon deaf ears, Khrushchev struck out at Kozlov's organizational base in Leningrad and moved to increase his own support within the Presidium. He identified himself personally with the fall of Kozlov's Leningrad colleague, Spiridonov, from the Secretariat in April, and, at the same time, Kirilenko—a manifest Khrushchevite—was returned to the Presidium. Khrushchev's trip to Leningrad at the beginning of May, to be on hand for Spiridonov's ouster as Leningrad party chief, provided a display of the Soviet leader's political strength, but at the same time raised the question of why he decided to become publicly involved in an action normally relegated to lesser leaders.

These moves were most notable, however, for what they suggested about the series of top-level changes at the 22nd Congress, for it was the salient feature of the Kirilenko-Spiridonov shifts that they overturned actions taken by the congress only six months before. At the congress, Spiridonov had moved into the Central Committee Secretariat and Kirilenko had lost his candidacy in the Presidium. The reversal of these decisions under Khrushchev's personal aegis unveiled his disapproval of them and approval of the new action.

Moreover, the development raised questions regarding the circumstances under which demotions of other former Khrushchev protégés and supporters—in addition to Kirilenko—had taken place at the congress. These included Mukhitdinov, Furtseva, Ignatov and Pospelov.

Mukhitdinov's departure from the Presidium and the Secretariat was especially notable; his fall carried even further the reduction of the number of Khrushchev protégés with membership in both bodies. Khrushchev thus seems to have been reduced at the congress to one consistent supporter of his program in the Secretariat—Kuusinen, who also held Presidium membership. The result appears to have been a stand-off of the Presidium members in the Secretariat: Khrushchev and Kuusinen versus Kozlov and Suslov. The addition at the congress of five new secretaries—without Presidium standing—probably reflected moves on both sides toward upsetting the balance in that body whenever the opportunity presented itself.

In any event, the Spiridonov affair pointed to the existence of sharp infighting in the leadership and supported the view that Khrushchev had gained strength in the Presidium, but not enough to assure his control over the forces that had engineered the key leadership changes at the 22nd Congress.

The Road to Cuba

On the eve of the Cuban crisis, in September and October 1962, Khrushchev opened a new offensive to undercut the political positions of his long-term opponents within the CPSU. A new wave of anti-Stalinism made its appearance and was soon turned against "Stalin's heirs" in the party, and a vigorous drive was launched to promote Khrushchev's "economics over politics" line as inviolable Leninist dogma. These moves at home were complemented by bold action in the foreign field. The vigorous promotion of a rapprochement with Belgrade through the Brezhnev visit in September was aimed at Khrushchev's opponents in Peking and Tirana, but it also served to undermine any elements in the CPSU favoring a cautious approach in the

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conflict with the Chinese. And the emplacement of missiles in Cuba may have represented Khrushchev's supreme gamble aimed at subduing his critics in both Peking and Moscow with a momentous political victory over the United States.

Khrushchev combined his new sally against Stalinism with a renewed drive against the party conservatives' position on the role of economics in Communist policy. The campaign was keyed to the line that, contrary to long-established tradition, "economics" holds sway over "politics" in Soviet policy. A Lenin document supporting this line was "rediscovered" and pressed into service not only as a weapon against the champions of orthodoxy in the CPSU, but also to provide a rationale for Khrushchev's radical plan for restructuring the party, introduced at the November plenum.[9] The reform called for the division of the party into separate hierarchies of agricultural and industrial bureaus—a reorganization ostensibly designed to promote cadres with skills in technical and economic work. Khrushchev's reform could only undercut the top- and middle-echelon party *apparatchiki* whose careers were in the sphere of political-ideological work.

Almost immediately following the Soviet backdown in Cuba, the prospects of Khrushchev's campaign to overwhelm the bulwarks of orthodoxy began to lose momentum; his critics apparently pressed their advantage, and Khrushchev himself took to the defensive on a number of key issues. The counteroffensive of Khrushchev's opponents against the new anti-Stalin campaign became apparent within days after the Cuban fiasco. On November 1, *Pravda* reprinted a weeks-old Mongolian account of the purge of a top-level Mongolian leader who had ruthlessly exploited anti-Stalinism as an instrument of factional struggle. The analogy to the Soviet political scene and Khrushchev's own uses of anti-Stalinism was difficult to miss. Two days later, the same paper restored Voroshilov from the political disgrace to which he had been condemned by Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress. In a signed article, the old Bolshevik voiced support for Khrushchev's actions in Cuba, but the price of his support seemed evident in his treatment of anti-Stalinism as a dead issue for Soviet politics. Briefly alluding to the "errors and distortions" of the Stalin cult, he pointedly asserted that "now all this lies behind us."

But it was with the strike at the Soviet literary and artistic avant-garde—the most exposed salient of Khrushchev's destalinization movement—that the CPSU conservatives' counterdrive displayed its full power. The attack originating at the November plenum was clearly predicated on the accusation that the anti-Stalin drive had given free rein to "revisionist" influences among Soviet intellectuals and had even emboldened them to challenge the legitimacy of party authority over them.[10]

On the defensive, Khrushchev hastened to identify himself with the crackdown by displaying a tantrum over abstract art at the Moscow art exhibition on December 1. This was evidently a put-up affair staged by the leadership to dramatize a reversal of the regime's cultural policy and—more important—to put a halt to the anti-Stalin offensive. In the following months, exposés of Stalin's tyranny ceased to appear; the young writers—including Yevtushenko and Voznesenski—who had rejected the Soviet literary heritage as tainted with Stalinism were castigated; and those of the older generation who had served Stalin were vigorously defended.

Under the pressure of the strengthening conservative attack, Khrushchev in his March 8 speech to the writers and artists surrendered major elements of his own destalinization policies. And, most significant in terms of leadership issues, he even undermined his own charge at the 22nd Congress that the leaders of the "anti-party group" had been witting accomplices to Stalin's crimes. In response to Ehrenburg's admission that he had known about Stalin's misdeeds, Khrushchev now claimed that party leaders had been unaware "at the time" that most of the victims of terror in the Stalinist era were innocent.[11]

Without a Program

Khrushchev's retreat in the field of economic policy following the Cuban crisis was as dramatic as his retreat on the Stalin issue. At the November plenum he made his most unequivocal obeisance in years to the

[9] *Pravda,* Sept. 28, 1962. Purportedly, the new Lenin document consisted of just-deciphered chapters of an original shorthand draft of Lenin's article, "Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power," published in 1918. The Soviet press volunteered elaborate explanations why the document had not seen the light of day for 44 years.

Although leading Presidium members referred favorably to the new economics-over-politics formula in the two months after Cuba, Suslov (Nov. 6) and Kozlov (Dec. 3), in speeches to the Bulgarian and Italian party congresses, omitted any mention of it.

[10] "Artists" addressed a letter to the plenum asking the Central Committee why the party allowed "revisionism" in the arts access to the public media. The move almost certainly had Presidium-level sponsors. These may well have included Suslov, who raised similar questions at the 22nd Congress.

[11] *Pravda,* March 10, 1963.

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doctrine of the primacy of heavy industry.[12] Yet he did battle with the "metal eaters" by once again challenging the economic dogma that steel production is the criterion of national power and growth. He argued that chemistry now provides metal substitutes that devalue the metal criterion. And he brought in consumer goods through the back door by noting the wide uses of chemical products in consumer goods as well.[13]

Despite his pleas, however, the November plenum did not shift away from the conservative consensus on resource allocation that had emerged at the 22nd Congress. In any event, within three months after the plenum, addressing his constituents on the eve of elections to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev disclosed that his consumer program had been indefinitely shelved in favor of the claims of heavy industry and defense.[14] In early March he even paid further deference to military needs by introducing a reference to defense requirements in his "economics over politics" doctrine[15] —a qualification that had not been included when the doctrine was introduced as Leninist writ in September of last year.

Although Khrushchev had suffered dips in political prestige before, and although his policies had occasionally foundered, in the aftermath of Cuba he came close to being without a program—a serious vulnerability even for Khrushchev. In this respect, a low point in his fortunes was marked by his pre-election speech at the end of February. It contrasted sharply with the one given by Kozlov at the same time; where Kozlov exuded confidence and optimism about the Soviet present and future, Khrushchev disclosed his disappointed hopes regarding his program and could offer nothing more inspiring to the Soviet populace than the prospect of more belt-tightening. Kozlov conveyed the impression of a leader who knew where he was going, and he appeared to represent himself as a spokesman for the political center of the newly-emergent conservative consensus in the party. His confident assertions that all was well in the consumer sector, his cautious but weighted views on resource allocation, and his stress on the importance of ideological over material incentives in the productive process, all seemed to be part of a coherent program. He in effect revealed himself as a judicious "metal-eater."[16]

The forward momentum of the conservative countertrend was duly registered in *Pravda's* announcement on April 10 of a Central Committee plenum on ideology scheduled for the end of May—the first of its kind in the post-Stalin era. The accompanying editorial reflected the evident intent of the party conservatives to water down Khrushchev's "economics over politics" doctrine. The editorial counterposed ideology to "economics" as a generator of productivity in Soviet society and emphasized that ideology and Communist "consciousness" played chief roles in boosting production in the USSR. The argument was visibly at odds with Khrushchev's basic line since the 20th Congress that "material incentives" provide the key to expanding the USSR's productive forces in the "transition to communism."

The Offensive Regained

Following the low point in his political fortunes at the end of February and in early March, the Soviet leader began actively probing for ways of regaining the initiative. In April signs began to accumulate that he was gathering momentum, and by the time the ideological plenum was convened—after a postponement from May to June—he had clearly returned to the offensive. At the June plenum Khrushchev reverted with full energy to the characteristic political lines from which he had retreated earlier in the year. At the same time, through the appointment of his Presidium allies, Brezhnev and Podgorny, as Central Committee secretaries, he retrieved much of the leverage he had lost in May 1960 in the Secretariat. Thus, should Kozlov return to the Secretariat, any Kozlov-Suslov lineup could be offset by a Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Podgorny-Kuusinen coalition on the Presidium level.

At the plenum Khrushchev signalled an easing of the drive against the writers. He failed to praise Stalin's virtues as he had done in his March 8 speech, and he renewed the charge that the members of the "anti-party group" opposed his attack on Stalin at the 20th Congress because of their "great guilt." He portrayed himself as a man who had stood up to Stalin during the latter's life and countered the view that destalinization had begun immediately after Stalin's death—a position that Suslov had advanced after the 22nd Congress[17] and which Khrushchev had appeared to endorse in March.[18]

[12] Khrushchev stated that heavy industry would continue to play the "decisive" role in the USSR's economic future. His assertion was notable against the background of his efforts in 1961 to carry his consumer line even to the extreme of discarding the doctrine of primacy for heavy industry (as in his off-the-cuff remarks at the British Trade Fair in May of that year in the presence of Western correspondents.)

[13] *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1962.

[14] *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1963.

[15] *Ibid.*, March 14, 1963.

[16] *Leningradskaia pravda*, Feb. 27, 1963.

[17] *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1962, p. 22.

[18] *Pravda*, March 10, 1963.

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Since the plenum, Khrushchev's characteristic initiatives at home and abroad have come thick and fast and have combined to promote his long-term goal of destroying the bases of conservatism and orthodoxy within the Soviet party itself. Though the precise factors aiding Khrushchev's rapid recovery of the initiative can only be surmised, it seems reasonable to infer that Peking's extremism and the windfall of Kozlov's illness helped. Peking overplayed its hand against Khrushchev in early March by raising the issue of the Sino-Soviet borders. The border reference was a riposte to Khrushchev's sarcastic thrust in his Supreme Soviet speech in December that the CPR's tolerance of Macao and Hong Kong on its territory showed that the Chinese do not practice what they preach. Peking's apparent intention was to dramatize to Moscow the danger of pushing Khrushchev's anti-Chinese vendetta too far; instead, it gave Khrushchev a powerful argument against those elements favoring restraint in the conflict with China.

Furthermore, it seems scarcely coincidental that the clearest signs of Khrushchev's recovery of initiative can be dated from Kozlov's disappearance from public view on April 10. It is worth noting in this connection that during the remainder of the month Khrushchev appeared to be striking at Kozlov with the "clarification" of the May Day slogan on Yugoslav "socialism" and an unmistakable attack on the latter's views on industrial policy. The failure to note in the May Day slogans Yugoslavia's "building of socialism" occurred when Kozlov was the senior secretary in Moscow and Khrushchev was in the Crimea. One day after Kozlov dropped from public view and three days after the slogans had been published, *Pravda* in an unprecedented action set the record straight by noting that Yugoslavia was indeed "building socialism."

On April 24, Khrushchev challenged Kozlov's call in February for heavy investment in new machine-building plants to overcome a machine "shortage." He declared instead that existing plants should be more intensively utilized and cited figures showing that such a policy was twice as profitable as new plant construction.[19] Khrushchev's argument fitted in with the thrust of the speech as a whole—namely, that the heavy-industry proponents had permitted massive wastage of resources in the metallurgical and defense industries.

The Sino-Soviet Issue

The evidence regarding the role the Sino-Soviet conflict has played in Soviet politics since Cuba is limited but suggestive. From the outset it must be noted that there is little reason to doubt that the Soviet leaders, including Kozlov and Suslov, are united on the necessity of actively opposing Peking's attempt to replace Moscow as the capital of world communism; moreover, Chinese extremism in recent months has left less room than ever for any tactical differences that may have existed in Moscow on this issue. Nonetheless, without suggesting that there has been any genuine pro-Peking faction in the CPSU's top echelons, there were signs after Cuba that some elements in the leadership may have entertained reservations about Khrushchev's active rapprochement with the "Yugoslav revisionists"—the issue that Mao has made a *casus belli* in his conflict with Khrushchev.

Thus, in November, one day before the CPSU November plenum, a *Pravda* article by party secretary Ponomarev struck a discordant note by flatly asserting that revisionism remained the "main" danger for the Communist movement and that Yugoslav revisionism was "its fullest expression."[20] The article followed the appearance of an editorial earlier in the month in the *World Marxist Review*, the Soviet-controlled journal of the world Communist movement, which treated revisionism as a dead issue and focused on the possibility that dogmatism could become the main danger.[21] In any event, Ponomarev would thus appear to have fallen in the category of the "people" who—as Khrushchev complained in his Supreme Soviet speech of last December 12— "one-sidedly" stress the revisionist danger, and who in this connection name the Yugoslavs, "whether to the point or not."

But the clearest sign of top-level differences on the Yugoslav issue was provided by the above-mentioned April 11 revision of the May Day slogan for Yugoslavia. *Pravda's* lapse on the point had been all the more glaring in the wake of the CPSU's assertion, in its letter to the Chinese of March 30, that "we consider" Yugoslavia "a socialist country."

The Party Battle

The foregoing interpretation of CPSU politics views the changing fortunes of Khrushchev's political program since 1960 as a reflection of a continuing political battle between powerful and entrenched elements in the party's higher echelons. The issue that underlies the conflicts over particular policies in the CPSU—epitomized in the debate on "economics" *vs.* "politics"—

[19] *Ibid.*, April 26, 1963.

[20] *Ibid.*, Nov. 18, 1963.

[21] See editorial in *World Marxist Review*, No. 11, 1962, pp. 31-38.

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is the question of the role of the party in the Soviet future. Khrushchev's answer to this key problem of the post-Stalin era has been clear: the party must increasingly become a functional element in the management of the Soviet economy. His approach tends in effect toward the conversion of the party officialdom into a technocratic-managerial class conducting the mundane affairs of an advanced industrial society—an approach strikingly manifested in the restructuring of the party last November. With his proclamation in the new Party Program that a party and state "of the whole people" have now replaced the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the USSR, Khrushchev apparently seeks to bridge the gulf that has separated the party from Soviet society as a whole—a project that may not be unlike squaring the circle—and thus to facilitate the performance of the party's economic functions.

The party conservatives' answer to Khrushchev—like that of his Chinese opposition in Peking—is also evident. Khrushchev's subordination of "politics" to "economics" means in the long run a watering down of the party's role as the ultimate *political* authority and of its revolutionary mission and unique political function at home and abroad.

In focusing on the limitations upon Khrushchev's power to dominate his colleagues, the author does not wish to suggest that the Soviet leader is either weak or ineffective. Khrushchev wields his impressive powers with consummate skill. He holds great advantages over his colleagues through his commanding posts in the party and state. As First Secretary and Premier, he is in a far better position to initiate broad political programs than his associates in the Presidium, who are largely limited to counteractions. He uses his power of initiative to regain the offensive whenever he has lost ground—as a means of keeping critics off balance and to define the terms of political battle in his favor. His use of anti-Stalinism is a prime example of this technique; through it he has forced his conservative critics to maneuver in a political context disadvantageous to their cause.

The only avenue open to Khrushchev's critics is to chip away at his policies by exposing them to criticism whenever they run into trouble, or by rallying professional and institutional forces offended by one or another of his projects. The Cuban affair provided them with their most favorable opportunity to press their case against the First Secretary's past policies. Khrushchev has now regained the offensive, but time is running out for him, and his younger colleagues look increasingly toward the inevitable struggle for the succession.

Limits on the Successor

The fear that a neo-orthodox successor leadership might seek to "de-Khrushchevize" the party evidently weighs on Khrushchev's mind as the time left to him narrows. Indeed, the party conflict over the past several years indicates that there is some basis for Khrushchev's fear. A future neo-orthodox coalition might seek to stem anti-Stalinism as a menace to the party's hegemony over Soviet society and press for a return to tried and tested policies eschewing the Khrushchevian propensity for doctrinal innovation, reckless gambles abroad, and radical reform at home. Though the Sino-Soviet conflict runs too deep to make a Moscow-Peking reconciliation likely, such a coalition might even hope for some form of an accommodation with Mao's successors.

To say that the potential for an orthodox resurgence exists is not to say that it will take place. As long as terror is not reintroduced to enforce discipline under a new leader, party policy after Khrushchev is likely to show signs of disarray and indecision resulting from chronic contention between various elements in the party's upper echelons.

Whoever emerges as leader will have to contend with these conflicting elements within the party. Finally, the leader must contend with the country as a whole as well as the party. Without reintroducing Stalin-style coercion on a wide scale, even an orthodox leader could scarcely afford to disregard the increasing social pressure in the USSR for greater welfare and personal elbow-room, if not political freedom. The future Soviet leader, like Khrushchev, will be faced with the growing problem of balancing the demands of the party against the demands of a changing Soviet society.

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The Extent and Limits of Authority

(A Rejoinder to Mr. Linden)

By Thomas H. Rigby

FEW WOULD CONTEST Mr. Linden's view that there are sharp conflicts of interest, outlook and aspiration in Soviet society at large and within the party-state bureaucracy, and that many of the shifts in Soviet policy in recent years show signs of having been influenced by such conflicts. Not all, however, would agree with his identification of issues and alignments in the concrete cases he discusses.

The possible focuses of internal conflict within the Soviet system are very numerous indeed, but the following are some of the most important:

1) Between the principal leader (at present Khrushchev) and secondary leaders who have a common interest in setting limits to the former's power.

2) Between different individuals (and "groupings"?) within the secondary leadership, competing for influence over the principal leaders.

3) Between different aspirants for succession to the principal leader.

4) Between the inner leadership and the larger bodies from which its power formally derives: *e.g.,* Government Presidium *versus* Council of Ministers, and especially party Presidium *versus* the full Central Committee ("Anti-party Group" crisis, 1957).

5) Between subordinate officials and the occupants of superior echelons, whose posts they covet. This applies, for instance, to younger officials aspiring to positions like *obkom* secretaryships, which carry Central Committee status; to officials with Central Committee status aspiring to admission to the Presidium; to functionaries in the republics aiming at the republican leadership; to ministers and government committee chairmen coveting deputy premierships; and so on.

6) Between different formal sections of the bureaucracy, *i.e.,* between its major divisions [the party, the state administration, the army, and so on] or between particular units [*e.g.,* State Production Committees *versus* Gosplan departments *versus* sovnarkhozes; or raikoms *versus* Kolkhoz Production Directorates (1962); or the Party Presidium *versus* the Secretariat (1957) or the Government Presidium (1953-54 ?); or between different production branch units (*vedomstvennyi podkhod*)].

7) Between informal groupings of officials, usually based on past career associations and involving patron-client relationships, and either focussed on particular formal units or hierarchies or cutting across the formal structure.

8) Between the interests of one area and another, and between local and national interests (*mestnichestvo*).

9) *Within* groups entrusted with purveying different values (the arts, national culture, science, and even the official ideology), over the forms of orthodoxy; and between the purveyors of these values and the political leadership over the extent of the former's autonomy and influence over policy.

10) Between those cherishing such values and the official purveyors of them.

11) Between different occupational and skill groups over distribution of the national cake.

12) Between the "masses," valuing consumption, leisure, security and freedom, and the regime, valuing production, national power, development, and discipline.

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Although it would take far more space than is available here to demonstrate it, I believe that conflict focussed at each of these points has found some reflection in the politics of post-Stalin Russia. The principal defect of Mr. Linden's paper is its attempt to derive all Soviet internal conflict in the last few years from a simple dichotomy between a reforming, pro-consumer, and anti-Stalinist Khrushchev and his supporters on the one hand, and a conservative, production-oriented, and anti-anti-Stalinist opposition group on the other. This simplified analysis of Soviet politics seems to me both implausible *a priori* and inadequately supported by the evidence adduced.

THE VIEW THAT Khrushchev's victory over the "Anti-party Group" in 1957 reduced and modified the opposition within the leadership to his power and his policies, but without eliminating it, has been argued before, along various lines, by Mr. Robert Conquest, Messrs. David Burg and Peter Wiles, and others[1]—and Mr. Linden does us a service in providing an extended, up-to-date, and well-argued statement of this view. One might, of course, accept the viewpoint without accepting all the arguments advanced for it, or without treating it as the "key" to all Soviet politics in the last six years. It may be as well, therefore, to give some thought to this wider question, before glancing at some of Mr. Linden's detailed propositions.

First, however, let us not underestimate the difficulty of arguing sensibly about the limitations and opposition to Khrushchev's power. No one either questions on the one hand that Khrushchev occupies a position of special authority in the Soviet leadership (Linden calls him *the* Soviet leader), or suggests on the other that he can do what he likes. Conflicting estimates of his position, therefore, revolve around differences of degree and emphasis, and it is all too easy to argue at cross purposes on this level when the empirical data available to us are so meager, patchy and often conjectural. In this situation one needs to appeal beyond the data, the interpretation of which may be disputed, to broader notions about Soviet politics and about political man in general.

One such line of "appeal" is suggested in my paragraphs above on the focuses of internal conflict. Another might be to consider the Soviet leadership in the light of our knowledge of the workings of the supreme leadership in other political systems. Take, for example, the relationship between the premier and other ministers in the cabinet system of government. Despite "cabinet responsibility" (="collective leadership"), the power of the prime minister both over policy formation and over the fortunes of his "colleagues" is characteristically very great indeed—just consider the story of Mr. Macmillan's ministerial "purge" last year.[2] One does not have to imagine Khrushchev a "pock-marked Caligula" to be impressed with the tremendous power of his position: it is sufficient to imagine him a British prime minister *without* the constraints of an opposition party and legal intra-party opposition, free elections, a pluralist society, and a free press.

The most obvious comparison is, of course, with Stalin, and a fruitful approach here might be to ask how we always knew that Stalin enjoyed dictatorial power. After all, the myth of "collective leadership" was never completely dropped, and until Khrushchev told us otherwise in 1956, who of us did not imagine that the Politburo did, in some sense, "run" the Soviet Union? Our estimate of Stalin's position seems to have grown up on the basis of a number of considerations, but especially the following: 1) the power manifestly accruing to his *formal* roles, first as General Secretary of the party, later also as Premier, and during the war as Chairman of the State Defense Committee; 2) our memory of his past successes in dealing with opposition and his survival at the top in contrast to the ups and downs of other Politburo members (including "heirs apparent") and despite the manifest failure of some of his policies; 3) his initiatives as spokesman for the regime and as *ex cathedra* critic in all spheres of activity, and the publicity he enjoyed, vastly more flattering in both quantity and quality than that bestowed on any other leader.

If these were indeed the sources of our notions about Stalin's power, it is a striking thought that today they are scarcely less applicable to Khrushchev.[3] Of course, one immediately perceives differences in detail, but clearly one does not have to assume that the precise scope and character of the power of the two leaders were identical (no one would argue this) to recognize that there is a methodological problem here which is very pertinent to the dispute.

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[1] See Robert Conquest, "The Struggle Goes On," *Problems of Communism*. No. 4, 1960, pp. 7-11; David Burg and Peter Wiles, "Chruschtschows Machtstellung als 'Polyzentrismus' Innerhalb der Sowjetfuerung," *Ost Europa* (Stuttgart), Aug.-Sept. 1962, pp. 563-77. Professor Robert C. Tucker, of the University of Indiana, has also expressed a similar view.

[2] See "Behind the Ministerial Reconstruction," *The Times* (London), July 23, 1962.

[3] See T. H. Rigby and L. G. Churchward, *Policy Making in the USSR, 1953-1961—Two Views*, Melbourne, Lansdowne Press, 1962, pp. 7-9.

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OR WE COULD APPROACH the comparison from the other end. Was Stalin's authority unlimited? Could he, for example, have his principal lieutenants (let alone Tito) destroyed merely at the twiddle of his little finger? Evidently not. The purge of Zhdanov's supporters took him several months to carry through, cost him a considerable accretion of the power of Beria and Malenkov, and involved fabricating the elaborate cover of the "Leningrad Case". Again, as we know from Khrushchev's "secret speech," Stalin in his final months "had plans to finish off the old members of the Politburo." But this evidently cost him far more trouble than the British 1962 cabinet reorganization cost Prime Minister Macmillan, involving at least two complex fabricated "plots" and the intricate maneuver of reconstructing all the central organs of the party[4]—and we still cannot be certain that it did not cost him his life. Stalin did indeed amass tremendous power over the lives and fortunes of his fellow countrymen, but in the exercise of that power he remained, to a considerable extent, a prisoner of the methods through which it had been acquired. Stalin's career illustrates a lesson for which history provides ample evidence: that a tyrant, no matter how mighty, needs to proceed with a certain caution in order to avoid simultaneously alarming the majority of his normally submissive entourage.

Before leaving Stalin, we may also recall that even he devolved upon his lieutenants a good deal of power to initiate policy. Thus, in the postwar period, Zhdanov can plausibly be credited with the initiation of important measures in the field of ideology, Khrushchev in the field of agricultural administration, and Beria and Malenkov on matters of security and internal party organization. Nor did Stalin invariably act as spokesman on the most solemn occasions or on the launching of major innovations.

To sum up, and to state the comparison between Khrushchev's and Stalin's positions in the leadership in rather sharper terms than in the preceding paragraphs, I would suggest that those positions on the face of it show much in common—particularly if we take the Stalin of before the *Yezhovshchina,* when he was clearly on top but merely rusticated, rather than destroyed, his opponents or disappointing "lieutenants," and when he was still something like *primus inter pares,* receiving massive publicity but without being deified. If we see anything analogous between the post-1957 Khrushchev and the pre-1937 Stalin, we might well consider further that 1) in some ways Khrushchev's position looks stronger, particularly in his formidable concentration of formal roles; and 2) Stalin's power in the early 1930's proved sufficient, after all, to defeat the first moves against him and to *carry out* the *Yezhovshchina.* We may add here: while few of us would expect a repetition of the *Yezhovshchina* under Krushchev, are we always clear as to our reasons for this? Mr. Linden offers one possible (and partial) reason, but there are others. How much weight are we to assign to broad social changes, how much to differences of personality, how much to changes (and what changes?) in the structure of power, how much to differences (and again, what differences?) in the route to power pursued by the two leaders, and how much to differences in the international environment?

PASSING FROM PARTICULAR comparisons to a more general point, there is observably a strong tendency among groups of men entrusted with providing executive leadership—be they chiefs of a barbarian warband, a board of directors, or a British cabinet—to endow one of their number with special authority both within the group and over it.[5] Furthermore, a high level of continuity and security in office of the principal leader appears to be an important condition of the effectiveness of such groups, especially in combat situations.[6] Various devices have been invented to secure these ends and to place the principal leader, in some degree at least, "above politics." In states, the usual method until fairly recent times was to make the chief executive office hereditary; but even if we take the liberal-democratic states, the more smoothly-functioning and stable of them will usually be found to have generated some device for this purpose.[7] Moreover, quite apart from the

[4] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1956, pp. 84-85.

[5] One of the most interesting experimental explorations of this topic is that undertaken by Leonard Berkowitz. See his "Sharing Leadership in Small Decision-Making Groups," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* No. 48, 1953.

[6] To quote from the London *Times* report cited above, "For the Cabinet and the party managers realize that *only an unchallenged leader* and a strong administration will have the moral force to take Britain into Europe, or to withdraw from the negotiations to go in." (Italics added.)

[7] In Britain the House of Commons majority leader "forms a Government," which falls if he falls. This produces a strong incentive to solidarity behind the leader between elections. In the United States the leader's authority and security in office are ensured by making the cabinet appointive and the President's tenure independent of a Congress majority. The absence of comparable arrangements had much to do with the instability of governments under the Third and Fourth French Republics, which contributed to disillusionment in parliamentary processes and demands for a strong leader.

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pressures from *within* the ruling group for one man to be elevated above the others, a collective need is also experienced for a leader who will personify the government to the population at large and serve as a focus for their loyalty and confidence. Here, one may see a certain analogy between the manifest underpinning which the Soviet regime as a whole derived from the Stalin cult before 1953 and the concern shown by political parties in democratic countries for the "public image" of their leader.

All this is axiomatic, but do we always bear it in mind when discussing the politics of post-Stalin Russia? Of course, in Communist countries the situation is complicated by the lack of regular procedures for the transfer and legitimation of leadership. However, they are far from unique in that respect, and the student should merely see here a challenge to understand *how* leadership works in countries where such procedures are lacking.[8]

Of the many difficulties besetting the leader in such systems, perhaps the most obvious is the problem of leadership succession: How can he ensure that his departure from the scene will not be followed by a period of potentially disintegrative internecine struggle unless he fosters the formal and informal power of an "heir apparent" to the point where the latter may be tempted to seize his patrimony prematurely? Here, four lines of behavior would seem open to him:

1) To reconcile himself to handing over power in his lifetime;

2) To prevent any possible successor from accumulating special power, and—*"après nous le déluge";*

3) To foster possible successors, but to keep two or three of them in the running at any particular time (this involves the delicate matter of timing when the leader wishes to transmit a decisive advantage to just one of them);

4) To build up an "heir apparent," but at the same time to invest another leader (or group) with sufficient countervailing power to discourage an attempt at "premature succession."

On the whole Stalin seems to have favored the third line (was he in the process of tossing the scepter to Malenkov at the time of his death?), and Khrushchev the fourth, as indicated farther on.

There are special difficulties, too, attached to being one of the top man's "colleagues" in such a system. Not the least of these is that the stability and security of the ruling group as a whole necessitate investing the leader with considerable power, but this power then becomes a danger to the *individual* security of the other group members. How are the latter to set limits to this danger without direct collusion among themselves, which the leader would justifiably regard as a threat to *his* position and take measures to scotch?

THE RESPONSE TO these and similar intra-leadership problems in a Communist system will obviously be much affected by the personalities of the individuals involved and by the external environment, but the problems themselves are built into the basic relationships of leader and ruling group, and cannot be ignored. In particular, they largely determine the *expression* of disagreements over policy.

Those who believe there is some sort of "stop-Khrushchev" opposition within the party Presidium may fairly be asked for guidance on the following point: In 1957 a majority of Presidium members, including several whose long-term standing and prestige were no less than Khrushchev's, began to collude against him; they were quickly and decisively defeated; and all of them, sooner or later, were reduced to political impotence and obscurity. Since then, has Khrushchev been less well situated to deal with such hostile collusion? Has he lost all incentive to do so? If the answer to these two questions is No, I fail to understand not only how an opposition grouping whose existence is supposedly so manifest that it is apparent to foreign observers can manage to survive, but even how any Presidium member could be foolhardy enough to make the *first move* towards the formation of such a grouping.

It seems reasonable to assume that there are frequent disagreements in Presidium discussions; that Khrushchev actively participates in these discussions and finds himself from time to time at odds with other members; and even that he occasionally gives way on matters that he regards as major issues. But it seems equally reasonable to assume that he would not tolerate any persistent posture of opposition involving basic questions on the part of *any* of his Presidium "colleagues," or any sign of a recurrent configuration of opposition on the part of two or more of them. To revert to our analogy, no British prime minister would, or could, fail to take steps to eliminate opposition once it assumed such forms. Is there anything in the Soviet political or social structure that makes the Soviet premier and party first secretary less able, or less willing, to do so?

Considering Mr. Linden's paper in detail, alternative explanations immediately suggest themselves for many

[8] Valuable comparative evidence should be forthcoming not only on Communist systems, but on such non-Communist systems as those, say, of Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Spain, etc., not to mention political systems of the past.

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of the events and phenomena he describes. Let me give just three examples:

First, the recurrent attacks by Khrushchev and some of his younger colleagues on the "Anti-party Group" do not have to be viewed as "repeated attempts to expel the defeated leaders from the party," and there is therefore no need to attribute the fact that such expulsion did not eventuate to "the successful resistance of Khrushchev's associates." In part, these attacks are useful to Khrushchev as a reminder of the legitimacy of the steps taken against the "group" and as a prophylaxis against its becoming a focus for disaffection. But much more, I believe, they are a gimmick to exploit the prevailing revulsion in the USSR against the methods and atmosphere of the Stalin era—the foundation on which the Khrushchev regime has sought largely to build its popularity. On the one hand, by tarring his defeated opponents with the Stalinist brush, Khrushchev comes out as the savior of the people against the evils of the "cult"—a role that becomes increasingly plausible as the memory of the 1953-57 period fades. On the other hand, by stressing the enormity of the "group's offenses, he drives home the magnanimity of his treatment of them—and this is the most dramatic device at his disposal for convincing the population of the genuineness of his break with the past.[9]

Secondly, Mr. Linden takes the fact that it was Kozlov rather than Khrushchev who reported on the 1960 Bucharest meeting as evidence of the weakening of Khrushchev's position. Yet, could it not equally well be regarded as a demonstration that Khrushchev's intransigence under Chinese fire was not a personal stand but had the collective backing of the whole party leadership? (This interpretation becomes all the more plausible if one accepts Mr. Linden's view that Kozlov stands towards the "tough" end of the Soviet political spectrum.)

Thirdly, Mr. Linden also sees the leadership changes at the May 1960 Plenum and the 22nd Congress as a setback for Khrushchev because of the removal of leaders identified as his "supporters." But, as I pointed out in this journal last year, these changes greatly enhanced Khrushchev's personal dominance over the interlocking directorate of central party and government bodies.[10]

FINALLY, LET ME turn to three methodological criticisms of Mr. Linden's paper.

1) One detects in it little awareness of the difficulty of identifying sources of policy when you have a leader acting as general spokesman for the regime. Mr. Linden shows some tendency to identify Khrushchev's statements as personal views when they fit in with his (Linden's) own notion of the leader's basic policies and attitudes, and to treat them as concessions exacted by the opposition when they do not. All governments trim and alter their policies when those policies run into difficulties, or when circumstances change. There is no need to posit an internal tug-of-war in the leadership to explain this. Think, for instance, of Stalin's "zig-zags".

2) Mr. Linden does not explain his criteria for distinguishing between Khrushchev's supporters or protégés and others. The only definition of a "Khrushchev man" I can find is one who "is directly beholden to Khrushchev for his position." At times this appears to mean Khrushchev's old cadres from the Ukrainian and Moscow party organizations; but at others it takes in protégés who evidently came to enjoy Khrushchev's patronage only *after* the death of Stalin, including Ignatov, Mukhitdinov, Pospelov and Kuusinen. What are the grounds for identifying these, but not Kozlov or Ponomarev for instance, as Khrushchev men? If the identification rests solely, or largely, on the attribution of policy orientations, then we have a circular argument. I might add that in my reading of the politics of post-Stalin Russia, no one is more "beholden" to Khrushchev than Kozlov. Further, despite the great differences in the nature and degree of the present Presidium members' past dependence on Khrushchev, they *all* are now dependent on him as least to the extent that without his acquiescense they could not remain in the leadership. And to regard the replacement of some of Khrushchev's earlier protégés by newer ones as a setback to his power is as logical as to view the replacement of Rudzutak or Kossior in the 1930's as a setback for Stalin.

3) A final methodological criticism of Mr. Linden's analysis relates to the underestimation of the role of solidarity based on past career associations, and of rivalry for the succession to Khrushchev, as political

[9] The case of Voroshilov provides special opportunities here which Khrushchev has not been slow to exploit. See especially his reported comments to the orbiting Tereshkova in *Pravda*, June 17, 1963. At the 22nd Congress there was, of course, the added point that intra-bloc attacks on the Khrushchev regime flared up coincidentally with Molotov's memorandum to the Central Committee condemning the new Party Program, the common ground here being hostility to destalinization. This was an unprecedented development, and simple prudence dictated some prophylactic countermeasures.

[10] Thomas H. Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader", *Problems of Communism*, No. 5, 1962, esp. pp. 5-8.

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factors in recent years. The two have been inextricably linked by virtue of the fact that any claimant to the succession needs to be backed up by informal sources of power as well as by formal ones. To oversimplify somewhat, the two most important informal career groupings since 1957 have been based on association with the Ukrainian and Leningrad party organizations, and Khrushchev has alternately favored a *dauphin* from each. Taking a leaf from Stalin's book, he has consciously balanced one against the other, as well as against smaller groupings and individuals. When Kirichenko was heir apparent, Kozlov was the countervailing force; early in 1960 Kozlov was elevated to the position of *dauphin*, but Brezhnev soon emerged as the countervailing force. Between the spring of 1962 and that of 1963, the royal favor shifted to Brezhnev, and it is not yet clear whether a new counterweight will emerge and, if so, who it will be. One of the most fascinating spectacles of recent Kremlinology has been the ebb and flow of ex-Ukrainian and ex-Leningrad officials in secondary posts, parallel with these changes in the heir apparent. Without for one minute seeking to replace one magic "key" to Soviet politics by another, one may say that many of the ups and downs of recent years, which Mr. Linden interprets as clues to fluctuations in Khrushchev's dominance, can far more plausibly be viewed as shifts in the fortunes of these rival informal groupings and the contenders for the succession around whom the groupings were formed—shifts produced not only by their own efforts but by the changing distribution of Khrushchev's favor.

Finally, let me again urge acknowledgment of the multiplicity of conflicting interests, values and ambitions influencing Soviet politics, including the politics of the leadership, and—despite some relaxation of inhibitions which has stimulated the spontaneous interaction of these elements—the persistence of a specific political structure leading to considerable continuity in the way these conflicting elements have impinged upon power relationships between individuals.

After Khrushchev: A Conservative Restoration?

By Robert Conquest

IT IS GENERALLY agreed that the Soviet Union is passing through a transitional stage. What the transition is *from* is clear enough, though there may be various views about the other end of the process, set as it is in a not easily determinable future.

In any case, we may accept that transitions of this type, even such as may later appear to have been comparatively smooth, are marked by great political instability at the top. Moreover, Khrushchev is not politically invulnerable; and if he were, at least he is not immortal.

Mr. Conquest, a British student of Communist affairs and also a poet, has frequently contributed to this journal. His full-length works include Power and Policy in the USSR *(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961) and* The Pasternak Affair: Courage of Genius *(London: Collins and Harville Press, 1961).*

Stalin succeeded in thoroughly institutionalizing his regime. The men who came up in it were as conditioned, both consciously in ideology and unconsciously in political habit, to his form of state as the bureaucrats and theorists of legitimism had been to the prevailing system of the 1830's and 1840's. This is not to say that among them there were not those who, either to a greater or to a lesser extent, were susceptible to the impact of facts which no longer accorded properly with their prejudices. But in all of them the heavy ballast from the past was clearly discernible.

After Stalin's death, the political leaders were faced with definite problems, some of which would clearly not admit of old-time solutions. To take but one example of many, the agricultural and—to a lesser extent—the industrial progress of the country was evidently hampered by methods which were no longer ap-

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propriate (if they ever had been). The hard facts of grain and livestock production, which were presented frankly to the Central Committee in 1953-54, gave little encouragement to any who might argue that the old methods would do with no more than minor changes. Yet when we look at the reforms that have been introduced under the auspices of Khrushchev and his entourage, all of whom seemed ready for drastic action, we can see that the supposedly enormous shifts brought about under the new regime have, in fact, looked revolutionary only if compared with the even more conservative projects of some of Khrushchev's colleagues. Neither the "virgin lands" campaign, nor the MTS reorganization, nor even the increased incentive schemes for collective farms, have really come to grips with the basic organization of Soviet agriculture.

The "Khrushchevite" Period

In general terms, the prevailing "Khrushchevite" view is well expressed as follows:

In overcoming the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, the party at the same time considers it necessary to come out against any attempts, under the pretext of struggle against the personality cult, to shake the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, against attempts to rehabilitate anti-Marxist views and tendencies long since smashed in the party.[1]

We must make a distinction. The party and its Central Committee contain, in positions of influence, persons whose general views may be described as Stalinist, together with a number of individuals more ready than Khrushchev to move in the direction of concessions to reality. They do not include—or only as isolated individuals such as those occasionally denounced in the student or scientific branches of the party—any true radicals or progressives. The range, for purposes of practical power, runs from extreme right to, at most, left center. In the cultural disputes of 1962-63, for example, we may identify a reactionary policy aimed at bringing the writers to heel as in Zhdanov's time, and a centrist policy of making concessions to the writers and giving them some rope; but the notion of freeing them from party control, the notion, say, that abstract painting or sculpture are really to be tolerated, has no significance at the serious levels of politics. In fact, the current intra-party disputes may perhaps be best described as confrontations between repressionist and concessionist forces, both equally devoted to the notion of the divine right to rule of the self-perpetuating party leadership, but each convinced that its own recipe is the best way of perpetuating that rule.

NEVERTHELESS, THIS IS a real dispute. In the great struggle for power in 1957, the party was not split between progressive and reactionary factions, between right and left. Both the victorious and the vanquished factions contained elements of either political background. Malenkov's foreign policy proposals were evidently more "liberal" than any that Khrushchev was able to put into effect for several years; the same applies to his consumer goods policy. Shepilov's line on literary freedom was at least as advanced as anything which has succeeded it.

Khrushchev therefore found himself faced after 1957 with powerful allies not dependent upon him politically, and whose record, as seen in their previous speeches and alignments, had been definitely with the "left". As we have seen in the past few months, these elements retain great influence within the party.

Although there are no real portents of any relaxation of the grip of the *apparat* (whether in Khrushchevite or "conservative" hands) on the instruments of power, in more than one field there are stirrings or tendencies which may be taken as harbingers of a saner society. If the best should come to the best, it might well be that the Khrushchev era would rank with other attempts to combine despotism with relaxation, such as the Turgot-Necker period or the "Liberal Empire" of 1869-70 in France, both of which came to be regarded as symptomatic of the end of autocracy. Even economically, if we look on a free economy as a pyramid held together by natural laws, and that of Stalin's Russia as an essentially unstable structure held together only by the iron cables of brute force, we may think that *any* turn towards economic stability must automatically render such extraneous trusses less necessary and thereby hasten their decay. But though there are signs of hope, there is a long way to go even in this field.

It is true that one Communist party (in Hungary) did briefly and precariously fall into the hands of a leadership prepared to abandon the monolithic state. But it needs to be noted that the progressive forces which events brought into prominence came very largely from the intellectual, journalistic, academic and student sections of the party, and hardly at all from its *apparat*. Apparatist authorities have, under extreme pressures, abandoned—or rather shelved—collectivization, as in Poland and Yugoslavia. But they have never given up their own dynastic claims.

[1] *Pravda*, April 20, 1963—extract from the final chapter of the second edition of Lenin's biography.

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Moreover, it should be noted that in the Polish, Yugoslav and Hungarian cases a very strong element came into play which could not, as far as one can see, be paralleled in Soviet conditions. In all these cases, the immensely powerful force of nationalism galvanized social groups who otherwise would not have allied themselves with the reformers; and it was this force, too, that seemed to have demoralized the opposition. It is probably true that popular support for Khrushchev, and hence for his policies, is immensely strengthened at present by nationalist resentment against the Chinese. And this may perhaps be regarded as a constant. All the same, it is unlikely to be as effective as the similar anti-Russian feelings in Eastern Europe. It may be, nevertheless, that true progress in the USSR is not going to be possible without some such processes as took place in Warsaw and Budapest in 1956.

Some "Categorical Fallacies"

Observers often divide the Soviet political leadership into three groups. The first consists of seniors like Mikoyan and Khrushchev himself, who served throughout the Stalin period, but who have memories of other and better things and were not, so to speak, molded simply by the old dictator. The second group—sometimes referred to as "the middle generation"—includes men like Kozlov and Suslov, who are assumed to have risen simply as Stalin's creatures and to be thoroughly set in their ways. The third, the "later generation"—sometimes called the "Young Turks"—are assumed to be forward-looking and comparatively untainted by the stamp of Stalinist training.

It is this third group which, one hears, will inherit power. But leaving aside the fact that there is no set reason to assume the victory of any particular younger man over any particular older man (as was shown by Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov), there is still the question of just who these young men are. Let us look at the earlier careers of three of the most prominent "Young Turks":

Dmitri Stepanovich Polianski

Born 1917.
1934—in Komsomol work.
1939-40—Komsomol work in Kharkov.
1942—attended the Higher Party School attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
1942-45—Head of the Political Department of a Machine Tractor Station, then Secretary of a Party Raikom Committee in Novosibirsk.
1945-49—in the *apparat* of the CC, CPSU.
1949-52—Second Secretary of the Crimean Provincial Committee, CPSU.

Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny

Born 1924.
From 1941—in leading Komsomol work.
1945-46—Second, then First, Secretary, Donets Provincial Committee of the Komsomol.
1946-50—Secretary, then First Secretary, of the Ukrainian Komsomol.
1950—Secretary of the CC, All-Union Komsomol.

Aleksandr Nikolaievich Shelepin

Born 1918.
1940-43—Instructor, Head of Department, then Secretary, Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol.
1943-52—Secretary, then Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol.

Such were the careers of the leading "Young Turks" up to 1952-53—that is, within Stalin's lifetime. And these are the young hopefuls! When we consider that the party's ideology is still in the charge of Stalin's editor of *Pravda,* Leonid Ilichev, and that its international relations are run by a veteran of the Comintern from the 1930's, Boris Ponomarev, we may feel even less sanguine.

And what of the "progressive" Khrushchevite cadre itself? The present Head of the Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, Aleksei Yepishev, followed Khrushchev from Kiev to Moscow in 1951, there to become Deputy Minister of State Security in the "Doctors' Plot" period, 1951-53! The present Head of the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee, Nikolai Mironov, was also brought up from the Ukraine and put into "leading work" in the USSR MGB in 1951, remaining in state security posts until recently. The Head of the Party Organs Department (RSFSR), Churaiev, also followed Khrushchev to Moscow in 1951 and worked in the central *apparat* through the worst period.

THE "YOUNG TURKS," in any case, are young in comparison with the present top leadership, but they are not young by the standards prevailing in periods of political change. The first Politburo in 1917 had only two members over 40 and none over 50. This is not to dispute that a younger cadre will eventually rise in the party. But here again we must ask ourselves: Who are the ones most likely to emerge?

Unless great changes occur, the answer is a depressing one. A new generation of political leaders will arise,

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as ever, from among the party secretaries of the lower levels. These in turn will be the men who, in their late 'teens or early twenties, had been the most enthusiastic of Komsomol members and at the same time the most skilled committee intriguers in their university, technical college, or place of work. This would not be a very promising basis for a future leadership even within the Conservative or Labor parties in Britain—nor doubtless in their American equivalents. And even though we can be sure that the Komsomol is not so crudely or brutally managed a body as it was in the 1930's and 1940's, there is still considerable evidence that its spirit and its leadership have more in common with the Stalinist generation than with the Yevtushenkos or, for that matter, the Ehrenburgs. The youth gangs who wreck the poetry readings at the Mayakovsky statue, the young prigs who publicly censure girls' hairstyles or break into dance halls to stop excessive jazz—such are the activist rank and file. As for the secretaries, let us simply cite the words of the present Komsomol First Secretary, Sergei Pavlov:

We are amazed at the tendency of certain producers, scenario writers and playwrights to draw comparisons between Komsomol activists and workers and so-called ordinary people (as if the former were not ordinary people). In these films and plays the ordinary boys and girls at least bear a resemblance to normal people, but the youth leaders, the Komsomol activists, are invariably hidebound bureaucrats, formalists and fools. . . . And really, the figure of the activist migrates from book to book, from play to play, from film to film, always wearing the same silly mask of a bureaucrat, a colorless, stupid person.[2]

The recent controversy about "fathers and sons" is certainly significant in this context. The notion, evidently prevalent among the genuine post-Stalin and anti-Stalin generation, that a certain conflict subsists between themselves and their elders was heatedly rebuffed by Khrushchev himself. Perhaps even more interesting, it was pointed out that a similar controversy took place in the 1920's; at that time it was unequivocally settled in favor of the party veterans and such of the younger men as accepted their line. In a formal statement by the veteran Stalin-and-Khrushchev spokesman V. Stepanov, "the problem of fathers and sons" was branded as "a rotten idea of Trotskyite doctrine."[3] In fact, it is safe to assume that few of the real young men and women—*e.g.*, genuine "student" types—will be allowed to rise to prominent positions. Instead, a traditionalist Komsomol clique will most probably rise to the top.

Views and Policies

So far, all this is negative criticism. Is there anything more positive to say? I think there is. Though it is true that the young Khrushchevites were heavily indoctrinated under Stalin, they *may* yet turn out to be rather more open-minded than their immediate predecessors. In the first place, they seem to have risen quickly and without painful incident, so that their self-confidence may not have been sapped—or sapped as much as that of older men—by the continual, cumulative and ultimately exhausting friction of year upon year of Stalinist-style infighting. Secondly, some of them at least are fresh enough to have identified themselves, for factional purposes, with a more forward-looking policy. The ways in which power and policy considerations operate in Soviet political minds is a complex one. But it must at least seem likely to a Khrushchevite, to put it at its crudest, that his personal progress would not be great if he simply submitted to and supported a conservative take-over.

For purposes of comparison, let us take one clear example in which factional and personal attachment have affected policy decisions. In the military controversy of 1962 about the relative merits of the rocket and conventional forces, almost without exception the pro-

[2] *Molodoi Kommunist*, Moscow, April 1958.

[3] *Pravda*, April 16, 1963.

Leaders, Too, Are Mortal

Socialist society is strong in its organization and consciousness; in it all forces must be so deployed that there is rhythm in all phases of life, in the struggle for the further advance of this society to the great goal of mankind—communism. And who can and should organize this? The party of Communists! The party itself singles out from its midst a leading nucleus in which the most worthy and experienced leaders are assembled.

I think no one will assume that in talking of this I have my own particular position in the party in mind. I am already 69 years old and have the right to say this. [Stormy, prolonged applause.] After all, everyone understands that I cannot hold the posts I now occupy in the party and the government forever. Therefore, in talking about this, I am thinking not of myself but of our Leninist party, of the Soviet people, of the great cause of communism.

—Khrushchev, addressing the RSFSR Industrial and Construction Workers' Conference, Pravda, April 26, 1963.

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rocket men among the generals were those who had served along the southern fronts in World War II. This was obviously not the result of some geographic or climatic influence. The point was that these were the men who had worked most closely with Khrushchev. Thus we may conclude that on a matter which was in principle solely technical, opinions were determined to a large extent by the political or factional allegiance of the principals. We may similarly conclude that the *young* "Khrushchevites," too, support the opinions of the leader even though their training and background may dictate altogether different solutions to given problems. To be sure, the young party *apparatchiki* can abandon these opinions as soon as their patron is no more. But this is to assume a pure and conscious cynicism on their part: in practice, people become genuinely attached to the views with which they and their faction associate themselves. Indeed, the motives that lead them to such views in the first place may often be mixed: it is easy to attach oneself sincerely to opinions which suit one's career, but less easy to relinquish them when they seem to block it. This may be due as much to subjective reasons as to the fact that it is not easy for a man associated with a specific policy to convince his colleagues and rivals that he has given it up for purely meritorious reasons.

Some Possibilities

We *may,* therefore, see a continuation of Khrushchev-style "anti-Stalinism"—policies based on partial insight into the present condition of the Soviet Union and on willingness to undertake certain changes required by the objective situation. What seems unlikely is that either this group of leaders, or any other that might conceivably succeed it, would be willing to effect fundamental and necessary reforms, such as a virtual, even if not formal, abandonment of collectivization. Above all, one can trust them not to make the truly basic change of abandoning the principle of rule by the self-perpetuating *apparatocracy*.

But if genuine "liberalism" carries no weight at present in the higher councils, it most certainly does among the writers and students—and to dismiss its potential significance would be a mistake. In every great established empire with an entrenched bureaucracy and police system, the opposition view, and that is to say the potential revolution, has been carried initially by intellectuals without access to the political machinery. The histories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century show this clearly. It is true that these countries allowed more scope for oppositional activity than is the case in the Soviet Union. But though overt organization in opposition to the regime is no more possible in Moscow now than it was in Budapest in 1955, it should be clear by now that even a totally unorganized and inchoate stratum of intellectuals can be the seedbed of future change.

The question is, rather, whether the forthcoming succession crisis will create a climate in which these possibilities may crystallize into political realities. On first glance the answer is No. The momentum of the bureaucracy can certainly be relied upon to keep the present political structure intact even during a phase of great instability at the top. The most intriguing question, however, is: How long will that phase last? A long-lasting series of crises, following one another in rapid succession, with second-rate and third-rate men miscalculating and wildly scrabbling for power, might result in opinions becoming truly "hardened." For, if the mechanism of political rule deteriorated to this extent, we might find in the *apparat* itself that crumbling of self-confidence on the part of the ruling class which Lenin speaks of as being one of the conditions of a successful revolution.

Alternatively, such circumstances might lead to the opposite—namely, a military dictatorship. Its viability, however, would be short-lived unless it came to terms with some form of political leadership. Military dictatorships have sometimes allied themselves with old and defeated bureaucracies. Yet sometimes, too, they have provided transitions to more democratic regimes. It should be noted, however, that in present-day Russia the liberal intellectuals are probably even more opposed to the ambitions of the military than to the regime.

Distant prospects? Perhaps. Carrying speculation too far? Surely not. For without considering all long-range possibilities it is impossible to appraise even the immediate picture.

The *Apparat*

Leaving aside a form of liberalization that could come about only as a result of political disintegration, let us cast a glance at the potential weakness of the *apparat.* It is twofold. In the first place the political struggle continues. In the second, there is no evidence of any leadership of any weight, or *mana,* ready to take over in case of Khrushchev's death or displacement. When a man of Kozlov's limited abilities can seriously be presented as a successor, we are clearly in a situation pregnant with instability.

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Apart from Khrushchev himself, the one element of stability in the Soviet regime is the old *apparat*: yet it, too, is rife with clashes between Khrushchevite and more conservative attitudes and ideas. We have considered the possibility of a "Young Turk" Centrist regime. But we cannot ignore, not by any means, the contrary tendency. Khrushchev, by political skill and personal strength, has dragged the *apparat* into courses not necessarily palatable or natural to it. It is possible that a successor cadre is now adequately indoctrinated to continue his line. But it is equally possible that the conservative element will regain its grip and at least slow things down very considerably.

This likelihood presents itself not only because of the doubtful past of Khrushchev's own supporters, but also because of the power represented by the bulk of the ruling group, which is likely to have been less affected by recent counter-indoctrination. Men like Aleksandr Zasiadko and Dmitri Ustinov, veterans of Stalin's Council of Ministers, are even now Vice-Premiers. Old *apparatchiki* of great experience and prestige, though now often in lesser positions, have remained members of the Central Committee through thick and thin, purge or no purge. For example: Nikolai Patolichev, the experienced member of the central *apparat* whom Stalin made Secretary of the Central Committee in 1946; Nikolai Mikhailov, Stalin's First Secretary of the Komsomol and later Secretary of the Central Committee; Nikolai Pegov, a departmental head in the Central Committee from 1946, and eventually a CC Secretary. Of the nine surviving members of Stalin's last Secretariat—that is, the leading party *apparatchiki* of his most iniquitous period—seven, including the then heads of the Party Organs and Agitprop Departments, remain members of the present Central Committee. These are men of great experience, representative of a very large group of experienced party functionaries whose good will any regime at present would be glad to secure; whose neutrality, even, would be beneficial; and whose opposition would without doubt be a dangerous threat.

Moreover, after Stalin had executed Bukharin and the Rightists in 1938 and had at the same time liquidated Kirov, Ordzhonikidze and other leaders, there was in effect no alternative government. Except for the Old Bolshevik Grigori Petrovski, safely tucked away as deputy director of the Museum of Revolution in Moscow, and Trotsky in exile awaiting murder by ice-axe, there was no such thing as a living ex-member of the Politburo. The position now is different. Men who have held the highest positions in the party and government, including three ex-premiers, remain "available." It is true that they have been denounced and vilified, but it would be a mistake to assume that their political potentials have been effectively and irrecoverably destroyed. Indeed, there are prominent figures who have not been publicly attacked at all, or only barely so, such as Andrei Andreiev and Pantelemion Ponomarenko.

NONE OF THIS is to predict a truly "Stalinist" restoration. But it serves to remind us of the power of inertia, the possibility of a heavy, slow, clumsy swing to "conservatism"—perhaps irresistible to the low-grade "sub-Khrushchevites" who would survive the First Secretary. If even the most skilled operator has had difficulty in containing this tendency, then it should prove hard for any Brezhnev or Polianski to manage.

One thing, at any rate, is certain: the political struggle will go on. In all probability it will become more frenetic and unstable. Its immediate prospect is for the victory of a Khrushchev-type centrist faction. But the seeds of a more reactionary regime are in existence. These are the elements of the fairly immediate future. Beyond that one can only say that if the party is to cope with the circumstances facing the USSR, it will have to change a great deal and that such change cannot be simple and may not be peaceable.

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The Communist States and Western Integration

By Marshall D. Shulman

IN DISCUSSING THE process of integration in Western Europe, Communist writings invariably put the word integration in quotation marks and often preface it with "so-called" in order to drive home the central point that, while technological progress does create a tendency toward international economic activity, the capitalist system is inherently incapable of an effective response to this necessity.

Nevertheless, the movement toward European integration, with or without quotation marks, has become a major factor in the evolution of Soviet ideology and policy. Despite its ups and downs, the Common Market in particular has resulted in profound modifications in Soviet ideas concerning contemporary capitalism and the present configuration of power; it has led to a radical revision of Comecon (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance—the Soviet counterpart organization for Eastern Europe); and it has greatly complicated Moscow's leadership of the world Communist movement. Over the long run, if the non-Communist nations are able to sustain a movement toward growth and integration, this development gives promise of leading to fundamental transformations in Soviet policies and in the Soviet system itself.

That this eventuality is contemplated with skepticism in Moscow should occasion no surprise, but there are interesting differences of tone and conviction in the skepticism expressed at various times and places within the Communist world. Indeed, the Soviet assessment of the Western integration movement has evolved considerably in recent years through lively debate and compromise, which have been implicitly reflected in the occasional formulations on which the Soviet analysis, like a suspension bridge, is supported.

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A Brief Look Backward

From the first days of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union championed the cause of nationalism in Western Europe as an anti-coagulant against the impulse toward integration. "Raise the banner of nationalism!" Stalin urged the Communists outside the Soviet sphere in an effort to counter the integration tendencies of the European Recovery Program, which Moscow perceived as a device for establishing American hegemony in Europe and luring away the states of Eastern Europe from Soviet allegiance. The defense of sovereignty and national independence became the keynotes of the Communist campaign to organize an all-class opposition to the American aid programs. These themes also characterized the Communist attack on the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Coal and Steel Community, and they were significant factors in the defeat of the European Defense Community in 1954.

The first phase of the Soviet response to the European Economic Community, from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to Prime Minister Macmillan's announcement toward the end of July 1961 of Britain's interest in joining, was characterized by a low-keyed denunciation

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in the same vein. Relatively little attention was paid by the Soviet press to the Common Market during this period—possibly, among other reasons, because this was a time of ebullient Soviet confidence in a favorable tide in the flow of history following the first Russian space and intercontinental missile achievements.

The leading document of this period, the new Communist Party Program, which was made public in July 1961 as a draft for discussion purposes and adopted with minor changes three months later, paid only nominal attention to the Common Market in its survey of the main features of the contemporary world. "The international state-monopoly organizations springing up under the slogan of 'integration' . . ," it declared, "are in reality new forms of the redivision of the world capitalist market and are becoming focal points of sharp friction and conflicts."

The Party Program expressed confidence that the United States "had passed its zenith and entered the stage of decline," that the world had now entered a new stage in the third general crisis of capitalism, and that world capitalism would now be faced with more and deeper "contradictions" which it would be powerless to overcome. Against this background, the Soviet analysts saw the "Atlantic" conception as a vain effort on the part of American monopolies to preserve their leadership over Europe and to overcome European competition for world markets. The struggle which developed in the following months between the "Inner Six" and the "Outer Seven" was greeted by Soviet writers as confirmation of this analysis.

THE SECOND PHASE of the Soviet response began to manifest itself in the late fall of 1961 and, more strongly, in the spring of 1962, as the implications of possible British membership in the Common Market became clearer. Britain and the other members of the European Free Trade Association became the targets of an increasing volume of Communist diplomatic and propaganda pressure underscoring the disadvantages of joining. In July 1962, the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia expressed their displeasure with Norway's dalliance in this direction by discontinuing their importation of Norwegian frozen fish—a matter of considerable importance to the Norwegian economy. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were put on notice that the Soviet Union would regard any form of association with the Common Market as a violation of their neutral status since it would be bound to transcend purely economic arrangements and to become a form of political membership in the Western bloc. An emergency meeting of Comecon was convoked in June 1962 to consider the effects of anticipated barriers to the flow of raw materials from the Soviet Union, and of agricultural products and certain manufactured goods from Poland and Czechoslovakia (as well as Yugoslavia), in exchange for Western machinery and for Western currency usable in world markets. A revised customs tariff was adopted by the Soviet Union, apparently for the primary purpose of providing a bargaining instrument with which to seek most-favored-nation treatment from Western countries. Trade talks with France were broken off when that country refused to accept a clause guaranteeing the Soviet Union most-favored-nation treatment equal to whatever reductions might be reached under the Common Market arrangements.

Moreover, the Soviet leadership began to foresee dangerous consequences in the underdeveloped areas. Mr. Khrushchev chose the occasion of a friendship meeting in the Great Kremlin Palace on May 30, 1962, in honor of a delegation from Mali, to deliver his first strong denunciation of the Common Market. His line of attack was that the Common Market represented a new form of colonialism intended to keep African and Asian states as raw-material-supplying appendages to Western Europe. As an alternative, he revived an earlier Soviet proposal for a world conference to discuss a new international trade organization to include all countries. The proposal has since been embodied in a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly that obtained wide support from the neutral nations, but this did not deter 18 African nations from entering into a five-year preferential association with the Common Market.

In August of 1962, two documents appeared which were to become authoritative guides for the Communist movement on how the Soviet leadership now analyzed the Common Market, and what it proposed should be done about it. One of these documents was an article published over Khrushchev's signature in the September issue of the *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*. The article, entitled "Vital Questions of the Development of the Socialist World System," was also printed in *Kommunist,* the ideological journal of the CPSU, and has been widely distributed in brochure form. The other document consisted of 32 "theses" on the Common Market, prepared by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences. The "theses" were published in full in *Pravda* on August 26, in time to serve as the basis of discussion at a ten-day meeting of Marxist economists from

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23 countries on "problems of contemporary modern capitalism." The meeting opened the following day—August 27.

THESE DOCUMENTS made a few carefully qualified advances over previous thinking and implied the existence of varying schools of thought among Soviet economists. A number of apparent contradictions in the theses may have resulted from an effort to compromise differences over such questions as whether the process of integration did or did not have anything to do with the expansion of production in Common Market countries. An apparent shift in thinking was indicated by the description of the Common Market as "a new phenomenon in the development of modern capitalism" and one which now had to be accepted as a fact: "the Common Market—a state-monopoly association of the financial oligarchy of six West European countries—has become an economic and political reality." What is more, the documents threw out a broad hint that the Soviet Union was prepared to recognize the European Economic Community and to enter into negotiations with it as a bloc, as well as to reorganize itself to compete more effectively. Both Khrushchev and the theses made this point in the following terms:

We take into account the objective trend toward the internationalization of production that operates in the capitalist world. . . . In this connection we confront the question of the possibility of economic cooperation and peaceful economic competition not only between individual states with different social systems but also between their economic associations.

Although one may find both a reiteration of the orthdox theme of capitalist "contradictions" and some hints of a more liberal inflection in the Soviet documents, the pressure of events during the closing quarter of 1962 tended to give the latter somewhat greater weight of conviction. During this period, which also saw the Cuban crisis, the reorganization of the Soviet Party and economic administration, and a heightening of the Soviet dispute with Communist China, Britain appeared to be headed towards early entry into the Common Market, and the level of prosperity in Western Europe contrasted markedly with economic difficulties in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself.

A liberalizing force in shaping both the Soviet analysis of the Common Market and Soviet tactics in responding to the challenge it represented appears to have been provided by the Italian Communists, with some support from the Polish and Yugoslav parties. At the August meeting of economists in Moscow, and again at the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting on the Common Market problem at Leipzig in December, Italian party representatives stubbornly maintained that the Common Market could not be dismissed as an artificial creation of the monopolists; that it reflected real economic vitality; that the working classes of Western Europe had been benefited rather than harmed by this development; and that the only course open to the Communists was to work from within to "democratize" the organization rather than to attack it frontally. The Italian trade union federation, seeking to hold a unitary position with its Socialist members and mindful of the "economic miracle" in Italy, has gone so far as to station a representative in Brussels to maintain contact with the Common Market organization, rejecting the efforts of the WFTU leadership to mobilize forces in an "anti-monopolist world committee" against the Common Market. The Poles and the Yugoslavs have supported the Italian position and have encouraged the Soviet leadership to seek negotiations with the Common Market in order to keep open channels of trade with the West. Meanwhile, the Poles have negotiated a separate bilateral trade agreement with West Germany notwithstanding the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Hungarian government has been indicating an interest in making similar bilateral arrangements.

THE THIRD PHASE of the Soviet response to the European Economic Community may be said to date from General de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, and its attendant circumstances: *i.e.,* the disruption of the negotiations at Brussels for British entry into the Common Market; France's treaty of cooperation with West Germany; and the disagreements within NATO concerning the organization and control of its nuclear forces.

Whatever affirmative value these developments may have had in the eyes of Soviet analysts as a validation of their predictions regarding "sharpening contradictions" within the Western camp was overshadowed by the anxiety with which Moscow regarded the prospect of closer military collaboration between France and West Germany. Soviet attention centered predominantly on the military provisions of the Franco-German treaty of cooperation signed in Paris on January 22. In strongly-worded notes of protest to the two capitals, as well as in all its propaganda output, the Soviet Union attacked what it described as the "war treaty" and the

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new "Bonn-Paris axis." Moscow warned that General de Gaulle, in seeking to dominate the continent by keeping Great Britain out of the Common Market and by bolstering his position with West German economic support, was actually courting the danger of becoming the subordinate member of a continental alliance dominated by West Germany. In the meantime, the Soviets charged, France would help the West Germans acquire nuclear weapons—a development which the Soviet Union would regard as a direct threat to its vital national interests. What was being described abroad as "the integration of Europe up to the Urals," Moscow added, was tantamount to what Hitler had called "the new order."

The bitterness of its response to the "Bonn-Paris axis" did not, however, prevent the Soviet Union a week later from concluding a trade treaty with France, negotiations for which had been broken off a year earlier over the Soviet demand for "most-favored-nation" treatment. The treaty, as negotiated, provided for a 15-percent increase in trade volume and required the lower duty schedule on only one-fifteenth of the goods to be traded.

How did these new developments affect the Soviet "theses" on the Common Market? The answer was provided by two long articles in *Pravda* on March 8 and 9, 1963, under the signature of Academician Anuchevan A. Arzumanian, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, which has played a leading role in the formulation of the Soviet theoretical position on problems raised by the Common Market. According to Arzumanian, the developments following on the de Gaulle press conference of January 14 were to be regarded as "a new explosion of inter-imperialistic contradictions." While acknowledging that Western integration had proved a stimulant to economic growth and reporting a great deal of factual information about the accomplishments of the Common Market, the Soviet spokesman brought the weight of his argument down on the side of skepticism, reflecting the "winter of discontent" in the Western camp.

This new guiding formulation, though fundamentally reaffirming the Marxist-Leninist commitment to the obsolescence of capitalism, nevertheless managed to maintain—even in the face of the current difficulties in the West—some enlargement of the Marxist sophistication of analysis and preserved freedom of action to move either way depending on the course of events. Meanwhile, it sanctioned two different types of tactical response to the Common Market: the orthodox line of strikes and an "anti-monopoly union" against "the Europe of Trusts;" and also the line advocated by the Italians and Poles as a "democratic alternative," *i.e.*, working to increase Communist influence within the Western camp and to keep the channels of trade open between two blocs.

This, in briefest outline, brings the account of the main Communist responses to the Western integration movement down to the present writing. To convey a sense of the fateful implications of the problems from the Soviet point of view, it is necessary to look more closely at three aspects that have dominated the Soviet policy discussions: (1) the ideological analysis of Western integration; (2) the political and strategic consequences of this development; and (3) its effects upon the political economy of the Soviet bloc.

Soviet Ideological Analysis

There are two levels at which the ideological aspects of the process of European and Atlantic integration have been discussed in Soviet writings. One level is concerned with what is essentially a tactical function of the ideology: *i.e.*, the formulation of a line satisfactorily explaining the West European developments in Marxist-Leninist terms and prescribing a unified course of action for the Communist movement as a whole—for example, a union of all "democratic" forces against "the Europe of Trusts." At a more profound level, however, the ideological discussions also represent an effort to analyze the major features of the integration phenomenon as a basis for Communist thought and policy. In this sense, the question of how the nature of contemporary capitalism is to be understood involves one of the central columns on which the whole edifice of Communist expectations is supported, and it is therefore of great importance in the determination of Soviet policy.

Among the crucial questions which have been at issue in these discussions are the following: To what extent has the process of integration been responsible for the high rate of economic growth in Western Europe? How far is capitalism capable of adaptation and evolution (under such names as "neocapitalism" or "mixed economy") so as to accommodate itself to the problems on which the orthodox Marxist analysis has expected capitalism to founder? Can there be economic planning under capitalism? How far can integration really harmonize the competitive conflicts among the capitalist countries?

However cautiously and conservatively these issues have been dealt with, the very opening of discussion on questions so fundamental to the Marxist analysis is

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a fact of importance in Soviet development. The essential predicate of Soviet anticipations is that the present historical period is one in which "imperialism has entered the period of decline and collapse," as affirmed in the Party Program. If this cornerstone assumption is called into question—that is, if the mixed economy of the West does not correspond to the Marxist-Leninist description of the "imperialist" stage of captalist development—everything else in the Party Program is altered thereby. Soviet theorists have indeed accepted equivocal modifications of the Marxist analysis on some issues—such as the theory of the relative and absolute pauperization of the masses under capitalism—but up to this point they have held to the essential validity of the Marxist-Leninist perception of "internal and external contradictions" which the capitalist system cannot surmount. The Common Market is seen as a response to technical advances in the means of production making possible the expansion of markets across national boundaries. Soviet theorists now acknowledge that this market expansion has been at least a factor, although not the main factor, in the rapid growth of the West European economies. (The argument on this point has been couched in terms of whether the Common Market is or is not "more than the arithmetic sum of its parts.") However, the Soviets insist that there is a point beyond which capitalism cannot go in meeting this objective requirement for integration across national boundaries, because under capitalism integration can only serve the interests of the large monopolies. Those who argue that there can be planning under capitalism, or that the state can and does intervene in the economic process as an independent factor limiting the power of the monopolies, are characterized as "revisionists." The Communists do not take at face value the provisions in the Rome Treaty imposing limitations on international cartels, and they regard the tendency toward concentration of heavy industry under the Common Market as the inevitable and dominant trend.

Despite this "internationalization of state-monopolies," however, the Communist theorists maintain that fundamental "inter-imperialist contradictions" cannot be harmonized under capitalism. The individual national bourgeoisies have their own separate and competing aspirations, for power and for markets, and this competition is said to be growing sharper as the "imperialist world market" contracts as a result of the liquidation of colonies. (One of the difficulties faced by the Communists is how to explain the continued high growth rates of some West European countries that have been "de-colonized," since it had been maintained that the loss of colonies would be a major factor in the collapse of capitalism.)

Finally, a point of major emphasis in recent Soviet theoretical writings on Western integration has been a claimed slackening of economic activity in the West. High levels of unemployment and a general downward trend in the economic life of Great Britain and the United States, as well as a levelling-off of economic growth rates in West Germany and France, are cited to prove that the factors responsible for the previously rapid growth of the West European economies were transient, and that the inherent limitations of capitalism, particularly its inability to overcome the disparity between production and distribution, cannot be escaped through integration.

IT IS INTERESTING to observe that each of these points of Communist attack—the policy of the Common Market with regard to cartels, the conflicts of interest and policy between the major nations of the West, and the slackening of economic activity in the Western world—is also the subject of much self-examination and concern in the West. The difference, however, is a vital one of degree: when Soviet writers use the term "contradictions" to describe conflicts or problems within or between capitalist countries, they imply by this term that the conflicts or problems are inherent in the institutional structure of these societies and cannot be harmonized or remedied. The West accepts no such fatalistic assumptions—whether rightly or wrongly history will decide. From the point of view of Western analysts, it is at least premature to regard signs of slackening growth rates in Western Europe as an indication that the Common Market has passed its peak, or to regard British and American unemployment and lagging economic growth as irremediable problems.

Moreover, the response of the "Europeans"—the men who are inspiring and guiding the integration movement—to the question of cartels is pragmatic rather than doctrinaire: Where and to what extent can cartels be useful, and where do they become a limiting factor? Of course, anyone committed to a rigid "class" analysis of Western society will doubt the ability of the "Europeans" to exercise restraints upon the cartels—but he will also be obliged to reexamine his assumptions if the sources of political power in the West demonstrate in fact the diversity and independence which Western theory takes for granted. If events continue to validate the West's belief in the flexibility and adaptability of its institutions, the relatively greater degree of sophis-

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tication and interplay thus far shown by Soviet theoreticians in dealing with the problems of Western integration may become of real importance.

Soviet economists have indeed come a considerable distance since 1948-49, when Eugene S. Varga was so severely castigated for daring to manifest an exploratory attitude toward capitalist adaptations in wartime. (Incidentally, Varga, now in his eighties, has been contributing to the conservative side of the Soviet debate on Western integration.) A considerable volume of factual reporting and empirical data has been adduced in the current discussions—along with the familiar dogmatic assertions. The stereotyped formulations of the published statements preserve only a hint of the range of flexibility of the oral discussions that must have preceded their writing, and surely it would be an error to take those statements as representing the full range of sophistication among Soviet students of Western economies. Even so, the printed record of the ideological discussions concerning Western integration bespeaks at least a growing potentiality for decisive adjustments to bring Soviet ideology into closer accord with reality. To the extent that events continue to evoke these adjustments, a major source of conflict between the Soviet Union and states that do not accept the same premises about the future will be moderated.

Political and Strategic Analysis

From the outset of the development toward integration in Western Europe, Soviet analyses displayed uncertainty whether to treat this phenomenon as a further extension of American hegemony over Europe or to regard it as an assertion of European independence from the United States signifying the emergence of a new power center in international politics. Increasingly in recent writings, the emphasis has favored the latter interpretation.

For example, in the earlier mentioned articles by Arzumanian in *Pravda* (March 8-9, 1963), the line of argument is that the United States, in helping to build up Europe after the war and encouraging the movement towards European integration, has not really understood what it was doing. More bluntly, the American leadership has failed to realize that by promoting the buildup of the European Economic Community as the foundation for NATO military power, the United States has been helping to create an economic and political rival to its own power. Although the United States is still the chief imperialist country, according to Arzumanian, it has passed the zenith of its power and begun to decline. This is shown by the low level of economic growth and the high level of unemployment in the United States, by the US balance of payments problem, and by the very fact that the Bonn-Paris axis came into being as a defiance of American leadership. The American "imperialists" tried to push England into the Common Market in order to water down the political unity of Western Europe, but failed. Furthermore, American talk of "partnership" or "the interdependence of the Atlantic Community" conceals an effort to maintain US domination over Europe. Arzumanian concludes that two competing groupings have emerged in the Western camp: the American-British and the French-West German, although conflicting tendencies are also to be found within each of these factions.

Although, from the Soviet point of view, there is much appeal in the prospect of a European "third force" independent of the United States and susceptible to political and military neutralization and economic courting, there has also been some apparent realization in Moscow that one effect of the weakening of American influence on the continent might be the emergence of West German domination in its place. Perhaps, as has been reported, some in the Communist world have begun to wonder whether Soviet interests would not have been better served if Britain had entered the Common Market, thereby influencing the distribution of power within that grouping. In any case, the actual turn of events has left the Soviet Union with a dominant preoccupation: namely, that integrated Europe may be in the process of becoming a new power center in the world, dominated militarily, politically and economically by West Germany. For a long time, the danger of a revival of German militarism and revanchism has been a central theme in Soviet propaganda. Now, however, since the Bonn-Paris Treaty, Soviet pronouncements reflect a new sense of real urgency regarding the possibility of a nuclear-armed West Germany. Ironically, the crisis produced by French resistance to Britain's entry into the Common Market and French insistence upon a national nuclear force rather than relying upon American nuclear deterrent power—developments which might have been expected to advance the Soviet interest in the fragmentation of the Western coalition and the reduction of United States influence on the continent—has instead deepened the Soviet sense of insecurity in Europe.

This turn comes on top of a discouraging trend in the realization of Soviet policy objectives. The underdeveloped countries have been less responsive to Soviet leadership than Moscow at first hoped; the advanced industrial countries have obviously been distant from anything like a prerevolutionary condition; and the

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Soviet economic and military base has not provided the support necessary for a strong foreign policy. In Europe at least, the Soviets are obliged to look farther into the future for any encouragement, in the hope that the advent of a post-Adenauer Germany, a post-de Gaulle France, a Labor government in England, a post-Franco Spain, and an Italy with a revolving door to the Left instead of a window, may produce a Europe more amenable to Soviet appeals for trade and political naturalization, particularly if the momentum toward the Common Market, as presently conceived, shall have been dissipated.

Impact on Comecon

According to the principle of electrodynamic induction, it is possible for a charged body to induce an electrical or magnetic current in a nearby body without physical contact. This physical analogy well illustrates the effect that the Common Market has had upon Comecon. From its founding in 1949 until recently, Comecon was a loosely organized and relatively ineffective economic coordinating body for Communist Eastern Europe. Since the Common Market came into being, Comecon has become transformed into an instrument through which the East European states are being absorbed into the Soviet economic complex and moved in the direction of political merger. Integration in Western Europe is producing integration by induction in Eastern Europe.

The rise of the Common Market has confronted the states of Eastern Europe with painful problems. Roughly about a third of their foreign trade is with the countries of the Common Market; and this trade has been increasing very rapidly, amounting in recent years to about a billion dollars each way. Its value, however, exceeds even this measure, for it has brought to Eastern Europe certain machinery, industrial raw materials, and foodstuffs which are in short supply in the Communist bloc, as well as foreign currency which can be used to purchase goods elsewhere. The rise of the Common Market tariffs threatens the countries of Eastern Europe with diminished trade, with serious economic shortages, with the loss of an intangible sense of contact with the West, and with an enforced increase of dependence on the Soviet Union. This applies to Yugoslavia as well as the countries formally within the Soviet bloc, and in the case of both Yugoslavia and Poland, the detrimental effects are intensified by US Congressional limitations upon aid and trade from the United States.

The reorganization of Comecon began at a meeting in Moscow in June 1962. A Polish counterproposal to a Soviet plan for an even more tightly-knit control organization resulted in the establishment of a Comecon Executive Committee, to be made up of deputy premiers from each of the member countries. Vladimir N. Novikov, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union and former chairman of its State Planning Committee, was assigned as permanent Soviet representative on the new control body. The Executive Committee's primary mission is to introduce an international division of labor into Eastern Europe: in place of the autarchic drive toward general industrialization in each of the member states, national industrial specializations are being assigned. This requires detailed and integrated planning for the bloc, an incredibly complex and difficult function—as Soviet experience has recently demonstrated—in the absence of a pricing system based upon costs of production. It is a curious fact that international planning for Comecon is vastly more difficult and uncertain than it is for the Common Market, which has the help of competitive markets and comparable pricing systems in determining the most economical producers. Nevertheless, at the June 1962 and subsequent meetings, Comecon has worked out a 20-year plan extending to 1980, synchronized and meshed with Soviet economic plans. Mutual investment plans have also been adopted to enable Comecon members to share the development costs of industries whose benefits they expect to share. A bloc-wide bank on the model of the late European Payments Union has been proposed and is intended to serve as a multilateral clearing house for trade based on the Soviet ruble. Until now, in the absence of convertible currencies, all export and import trade within the East European bloc has had to be balanced bilaterally, with the result that intra-bloc trade has been immensely complicated and unwanted goods have often found their way into uneconomical re-exportation.

Among the concrete projects of Comecon integration, two in the field of energy are of particular importance: an electric power grid that will unite all of Eastern Europe and the European part of the Soviet Union in a single power generation and transmission system; and a vast oil pipeline system which will link the abundant Volga oil fields with three terminals in Central Europe. These undertakings are of crucial importance for a number of reasons. The vast power projects, besides being enormously impressive to visitors from underdeveloped countries, will provide an essential ingredient for the industrialization of Eastern Europe; and the capacity to supply cheap oil to Western Europe through the pipelines is expected to have both economic and political usefulness to the Soviet Union. Finally, it is apparent that the economic dependency of the

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East European "people's democracies" upon such centralized sources of energy will necessarily increase their political dependency upon the USSR as well.

THIS FACT points up the central political consequences of the intensified economic integration of Comecon, or what Khrushchev has called "perfecting the political and economic interrelations among the socialist countries." Once again, Soviet leaders are beginning to speak of building a "commonwealth of socialist states," reviving a term which was widely used in 1956, before the troubles in Hungary and Poland caused its retirement. Since that time, the Soviet leadership has been experimenting with varying degrees of political autonomy in the "people's democracies" in an effort to achieve a more resilient control system that would call forth local creative energies within the confines of secure allegiance to the bloc. This experimentation and the ambiguous degree of autonomy which some of the East European states managed to achieve in their cultural and economic contacts with the West now appear to be diminishing as a consequence of the Soviet reaction to the Common Market.

The extent to which this becomes true may depend in part upon the policies followed by the Common Market countries. The encouragement of bilateral trade arrangements between individual countries of East and West, within the framework of agreed Common Market policies, may support polycentrist tendencies in Eastern Europe, whereas a substantial impairment of trade or exclusive reliance on bloc trading arrangements between the Common Market and Comecon would, of course, have the opposite effect. Another factor which may retard the integration of Comecon is the Soviet need to consolidate its relations with the parties and governments of Eastern Europe in the face of the Sino-Soviet dispute. As a consequence of this need, Rumanian resistance to the throttling of its promising industrial beginnings has been met with a conciliatory Soviet promise to proceed more cautiously with the proposed integration effort.

Even so brief and limited a survey leads to the inescapable conclusion that the effects of the Western integration movement upon the Communist world not only are complex but may be radical. The central point is that the continued demonstration of the vitality and effectiveness of pluralistic societies is the major factor that may eventually induce the Soviet leadership to retire permanently the obituary they have prepared for the West. Not by argument, but by action alone, can they be persuaded that the report of our death—to borrow Mark Twain's quip—has been highly exaggerated.

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BOOKS

Surveying the Soviet Economy

Accounting in Soviet Planning and Management, by Robert W. Campbell. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963.
Soviet Industrialization, 1928-1952, by Naum Jasny. Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961.
Le Capital dans léconomie soviétique, by Marie-L. Levigne.
Paris, Société d'édition d'enseigement supérier, 1961.
Central Planning in Poland, by John Michael Montias. New Haven and London, Yale Univ. Press, 1962.
Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union, by G. Warren Nutter,
Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1962.
The Soviet Economy, by Nicholas Spulber. New York, Norton, 1962.
Planification de la croissance et fluctuations économiques en URSS, Vol. I, 1918-1932, by Eugène Zaleski,
Paris, Sociéte d'édition d'enseignement supérieur, 1962.

Reviewed by Vaclav Holesovsky

IN SPITE OF the many important advances in the study of Soviet-type economies during the past decade, the spadework stage has not yet been left behind. That monumental synthesis which promises to emerge from present-day partial studies still eludes us. With this fact in view, the rich variety of approaches and accents in the present sampling of seven books is in itself a contribution, quite apart from the specific findings which they contain. Since they generate countervailing correctives and fresh questions, lopsided treatments inspired by personal idiosyncrasies are sometimes better for the advance of knowledge than premature attempts at a balanced presentation of half-resolved issues.

Some of the studies here reviewed prove how hard it is to get away from Soviet ways of presenting economic events and achievements. In a conscious effort to dissociate himself from Soviet yardsticks, Naum Jasny made the rejection of the official chronology in terms of successive five-year plans a major theme of his study of Soviet industrialization. Jasny's own alternative, put forward in the highly personalized idiom of this maverick among the scholars in this field, is to subdivide the peacetime history of industrialization in the USSR according to the criterion of changing growth rates. Periodicity in the pace of growth is a phenomenon of the utmost importance, to be sure, but it is positively irksome as an organizing principle in the presentation of economic history. In Jasny's treatment it breaks up the relatively short time span of Soviet experience (twelve prewar and eight postwar years) into even shorter segments within each of which the various aspects of the economic system—industry, agriculture, trade, prices, etc.—are mechanically taken up one after the other. The result is that the reader himself is left with the task to reconstitute out of the wealth of data and estimates the organic structure of the economy as well as the continuity of Soviet development. In spite of this flaw, however, one cannot but agree with Professor Franklyn Holzman in calling Jasny's book "the best available economic history of the Soviet Union from 1928 until the death of Stalin."

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VERY SIMILAR GROUND is being independently covered in a study by Eugène Zaleski (only the first volume, covering the 1918-1932 period, has appeared so far). Zaleski's ambition has been to explore the mutual interaction of Soviet planning and autonomous economic forces. It would naturally be most instructive to find out how Russia's economic structure, with its intrinsic laws, resisted the manipulation of command planning and to what extent the planners have had their own way. Unfortunately, however, the author's efforts have thus far yielded little beyond (1) a very meticulous, and also very tedious, collation of plan targets, plan fulfillments, and subsequent plan revisions, and (2) a rediscovery of the fact that whenever it became impossible to fulfill the targets of the over-all plan, production in consumer goods industries was generally cut back, while output of producer goods continued to grow unabated or decreased at a smaller rate—a reconfirmation, in short, of the "priority principle."

It is Zaleski's conclusion that, as they reached the operative annual-plan stage, all the vision-of-the-future plans were adapted by trial and error to the real possibilities of the economy. Jasny talks in the same connection of "bacchanalian planning," purely propagandistic in content; in contrast to many a writer of the younger generation, he will rarely give the Kremlin the benefit of the doubt if common sense tells him otherwise.

To be sure, a methodical disregard of the Soviet framework of reference is helpful only in the historical reconstruction of bare economic facts. For an analysis of the system, its efficiency and dynamics, the institutional approach is necessary. But the most satisfying, as well as the intellectually most exciting studies of this kind are those which try to deal with reality on several levels at once. Such an approach involves an analysis of the institutional framework of the economy; the reduction of the system to a pure theoretical model; confrontation of the model with general norms of economic efficiency; and a consideration of how things get done in practice, as well as of proposals and prospects for reform. In this respect, J. M. Montias' book on planning in Poland represents a rare achievement, and so does, in a much more circumscribed area, Campbell's study of Soviet accounting.

WHAT IS BECOMING increasingly clear is the need to distinguish very strictly between formal plan construction in Soviet-type economies and the operational elements of the system. There is a deplorable tendency among Western academic economists, fascinated as they are by the abstract-theoretical facets of the problems, to ruminate over the possibility of efficient planning, introduction of rational prices, and the like, while neglecting the decisive operational aspects of the system. Efficient or not, what is the operational significance of plans—be they ever so short-term—if actual orders and delivery contracts, and therefore production decisions, have to be made three to six months in advance of the promulgation of the plans? The most perfectly balanced and innerly consistent plan—with input-output matrices all filled out and alternative solutions sifted out by linear programming methods—will have *little* meaning as long as output-hungry planners refuse to capitulate to the limitations of real capacity, forcing thus the truly operational "priority principle" to take over.

A minor point of semantics might also be mentioned in this connection. A number of authors—Spulber and Montias among them—tend to discuss the inoperative side of planning as its positive attribute, as "flexibility" in "open-end planning." Their own analysis, however, suggests that it would be more sensible to reverse the formulation: the operational elements of the system (the informal self-help of managers, the market elements, the play of priorities in the face of capacity limits) have to fill the gaps left by planning as such.

The same rule—attention to the operative elements—should apply to the analysis of Soviet-type pricing and costing practices. Marie-L. Lavigne has done an admirable job of presenting in a classically organized study the problem of value and allocation in the Soviet system, thus placing the central issue of capital "husbandry" into its broadest theoretical context. The author has a gift of making the jargon of Soviet economic theories and arguments intelligible, and some of her passages—such as the one on the Stalinist doctrine of value—are gems of lucid exposition. She is equally good as a guide through the post-Stalin discussions among Soviet economists, but unfortunately the writings that appeared after 1960 are not covered.

It is regrettable that Mme. Lavigne's conclusions on the efficiency of capital allocation are vitiated by a disappointing lack of *esprit de suite* in bringing into the picture relevant operational elements. In isolated places, the effects of direct physical allocation of producers' goods—*i.e.,* the operative side—is duly noted; but the author is so impressed by the undervaluation of producers' goods through the price system that she seems unable to conceive of other causes leading to waste in the allocation of capital. It leads her to see the problem of misallocation exclusively in terms of overemployment of capital in relation to labor, capital being artificially cheap and labor expensive (since money wage rates reflect the turnover-tax-inflated prices of consumer

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goods). But Soviet managers are not in reality free to procure for themselves as many capital goods as they might be led to do. on the basis of the price structure. As soon as we concentrate upon the operative features of the system, we find that, on the plant level, it is labor that is being wasted at the expense of capital goods.

MME. LAVIGNE HERSELF, as well as Professor Campbell, have in fact found that Soviet depreciation accounting operates in such a way as to lead managers to indulge heavily in labor-intensive repairs and maintenance when replacement would be more economical. Interestingly, it has not been the low level of depreciation allowances that has been at fault, but one operational detail: managers have been free to dispose of that part of depreciation allowances which was earmarked for capital repair, while the portion destined for replacement is centrally pooled, and the manager can never be sure that he will actually receive his share in the shape of new physical equipment.

However, the really important point about waste in capital allocation is the planners' inability to take into account, or to estimate correctly, the exact future time pattern of outlays on inputs and of the final output flow. Hence the notoriously long gestation periods of investment projects, and the high amounts of capital tied up in construction. These difficulties have often been further compounded by mistaken estimates of the supply of materials needed for the operation of completed projects; to this day "perspective balances" are periodically going awry throughout the Soviet bloc.

In effect, these crises of disproportionality may well be the principal causes of fluctuations in Soviet growth rates. Zaleski made them his second central topic and arrived at a thesis that sounds very persuasive, even though it appears in his book more as an intelligent afterthought than a rigorously demonstrated analytic conclusion. He writes:

> In the Soviet experience of 1928-1932, the gap between the targets and the means employed was such that additional investments were unable to fill it. . . . During that period, the Soviet planner tended to ignore the material limits. As a consequence, there was an upsurge of new constructions the result of which was not an increase of production but an extension of the construction cycle. . . . Thus, at a certain moment, Soviet planners reach a situation where additional investments provoke a decline in output. (p. 298)

This interpretation is strongly supported by Jasny's material, as well as by the analysis of M. Kaser.[1] For a final evaluation of Zaleski's work we shall have to wait for his second volume, which will cover the second full-blown growth crisis in the USSR—that of 1937-40, which Jasny calls the "Purge Era."

There have been heretofore two explanations of this Purge-Era stagnation: one in terms of an extra-economic shock—the Great Purge (Jasny's thesis); the other blaming the diversion of production toward growth-sterilizing articles, *i.e.,* armaments. Warren Nutter, however, as well as Jasny's figures, cast doubt on the second theory. They point not only to evidence of late timing in the prewar Soviet armament effort, but also to the fact that stagnation in the output of basic materials, like steel, would have kept back production of finished articles, be they military hardware or industrial equipment. It could be objected, to be sure, that a shift to military hardware may have robbed the primary-material branches of some equipment that would otherwise have sustained their growth, but this would be a relevant consideration only if a significant shift in that direction had really taken place, which does not appear to have been the case at the crucial time. In this reviewer's opinion, the disproportionality factor elaborated by Zaleski is relevant for the Purge Era as well.

However, there may have been still another retarding factor at work, *i.e.,* underreplacement of worn-out equipment in old plants. It has already been mentioned that Soviet plant managers have often seen themselves short-changed in this respect. As Campbell explains, their "allowances" in new equipment for replacement purposes had been calculated on the basis of very low accounting depreciation rates—a corollary of the undervaluation of capital stock—and the availability of new machinery and equipment was systematically biased in favor of new projects. It is reasonable to expect that after many years of such practice a significant cumulative effect on the rate of output would result.[2]

A GOOD MANY years ago Peter Wiles argued in a provocative article entitled "Growth versus Choice" that growth was the redeeming feature of a system neglectful of balanced development.[3] However, reflecting on the material of the volumes reviewed here, one is bound to resurrect the old doubts about the growth efficiency

[1] *Soviet Studies* (London), Vol. XIV, October 1962, p. 121.

[2] There is more than a strong suspicion that similar cycles of over-investment in new, and under-replacement in old, plants have been under way in the Soviet Union, as well as in other East European countries, since the early 1950's. It makes one wonder about the learning ability of Communist planners.

[3] *The Economic Journal,* Vol. LXVI, June 1956, pp. 244-55.

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of Soviet-type systems. Doesn't poor, unbalanced allocation of resources result eventually in the sapping of the economy's ability to maintain a fast and even pace? The periodic overexpansion in new investment projects, followed by the abandonment of some and under-utilization of others, seems to substantiate the frequent warning about output indices that reflect only "resources used up" and not necessarily the creation of serviceable wealth. The famous "leading-link" strategy of development, applied in a system where there is no market mechanism to pull in the complementary links, has led only to bottlenecks and disproportions. These then delay even further the adoption of rational criteria for organic growth. "Whenever earlier planning decisions have created disproportions which can only be corrected by stoppage measures," writes Montias, ". . . economic calculation must be held in abeyance" (p. 170). One thing can be stated with certainty: with more attention to balance, the given rates of growth could have been achieved with fewer sacrifices and development would have been less afflicted by emergency situations.

As for the growth achievements themselves, it is still an open question to what extent "planning-for-growth" was actually helped along by production factors brought in free, or cheap, from the outside. Both Nutter and Jasny make some tentative estimates of the contribution of reparations, American lend-lease shipments and German prisoners of war, and the order of magnitude of this help is impressive. Besides, Soviet growth rates, even though recomputed by Western index-number engineers from basic statistical data, mean something different from seemingly analogous measures for Western countries. Nutter, in his chapter on international comparisons of growth rates and absolute output levels, provides excellent pointers for meaningful comparisons. These have been all too often ignored in favor of an empty play with the arithmetic of alternative growth rates presumably indicating the time at which the Soviet Union would catch up with the United States.

AMONG THE BOOKS under review Nicholas Spulber's volume stands apart by its avowed purpose and range of topics. It is a competent, highly disciplined and tightly packed survey of the working principles, institutional structure and problems of the Soviet system. Spulber makes a point of selecting and presenting those portions of Marxist economics which are most relevant to the understanding of the Soviet economists' private language. Equally novel, as far as textbook surveys go, is Spulber's systematic account of Soviet money and income floors, banking, and government finance. The author put a severe limit on historical references, and this has lent the book a somewhat disembodied air, but the volume is a highly useful reference book for anyone already acquainted with the historical facts.

As for quality of scholarship, the seven books should not, in all fairness, be compared, but only comparison can bring out the differences in their particular qualities. The characteristics of Spulber's volume have just been noted. Naum Jasny, who is without peer in his mastery of the various dimensions of the Soviet economy, is apt to use a set of rather crude analytical tools when it comes to interpretation; we find him, for instance, speaking of "deterioration in labor productivity" during the "All-out Drive" (1929-32), when the actual phenomenon—decline in output per man—amounted merely to the introduction of more labor-using production processes (p. 105). Lavigne excels in the clarity and neatness of verbal presentations, but her feel for the signficance of the concrete fact is not too sure. The American academic approach, with its combination of high-level abstraction and patient excavation and interpretation of data, complemented if possible by field trips, is well represented by Campbell and Montias. Nutter's is a solid and well-appendixed handicraft work, as benefits a study published under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Zaleski's volume has the mark of supreme assiduity written all over it—which will make it an invaluable pool of data —but it fails to some extent in binding together facts and general conclusions.

Western economists have been following with suspense and broadminded professional involvement the recent Soviet-bloc discussions of reforms in planning, pricing, and production incentives. Will the planners who matter put Nemchinov's, Malyshev's and Liberman's proposals to practical tests? Montias' account of the way the Poles took a promising running start, which then bogged down, is not very encouraging for the prospects of decentralization of economic decision-making elsewhere. On the other hand, the question of how best to advance toward efficient centralized planning—whether by direct physical allocation or indirect manipulation by prices—is largely a matter of form. The real problem—besides the planners' need to clarify their own scale of preferences—is how to obtain the necessary information about the relative scarcities of production factors and the technical alternatives of combining them in production. But if planners ever had all these necessary prerequisites of efficient planning they might just as well continue using the method of "material balances." To adopt Montias' felicitous phrase, using prices would then be like putting salt on

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a bird's tail in order to catch it: if you can get that close, you don't need salt. "In essence," writes Montias,

> unless the planners dispose of all the complex information needed to set efficient outputs, they must have rational prices to guide them—or to guide producers; but these prices, in the absence of markets, cannot be determined without reference to efficient outputs. This dilemma lies at the core of the problem of economic calculation in a centrally planned economy. (p. 46)

This is also where Campbell's assessment of the weaknesses of Soviet accounting is relevant. It is rather futile to talk of price reforms in the presence of an accounting system that is designed to facilitate central control but is utterly unsuited for rational estimation of true production costs.

Genuine decentralization would mean compromising with the operation of market forces; the government would retreat from attempts at universal guidance of the production process toward the position of a buyer of final products. Is it likely that the Soviet Union will set out on such a course in the near future? In view of the implications involved, the answer would appear to be negative. At present, the government generally demands more from the economy than it can comfortably deliver. Should it surrender, even partially, its direct and comprehensive controls over the economy, it would be offering the production managers a degree of freedom that would allow them to adjust to the actual capacities and true cost levels of their productive resources. By relaxing the "command economy," the state would thus lose the principal instrument of pressure it exerts not only upon the resources, but also upon the people who produce them and use them.

Can the totalitarian state afford to lose control over social relations and allow the emergence of autonomous social and economic forces? If these questions appear to answer themselves, then the conclusion follows: all the inefficiencies of centralized planning may be a cost that the system must bear for the sake of its political survival. These social and political implications may be decisive for the fate of the recent proposals for economic reform in the Soviet Union. They tend to be overlooked by those economists who see the issue only in terms of a search for a purely economic optimum.

Glimpses Through the Chinese Wall

The Wilting of the Hundred Flower: The Chinese Intelligentsia under Mao, by Mu Fu-sheng (Pseud.). New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963.
Contradictions: China in Ferment. Hong Kong, China Viewpoints, (no date).
The Peasant and the Communes, by Henry J. Lethbridge. Hong Kong, Dragonfly Books, 1963.
Ta Ta, Tan Tan: The Inside Story of Communist China, by Valentin Chu. New York, W. W. Norton Co., 1963.
Dateline—Peking, by Frederick Nossal. Toronto, Longmans, 1962.

Reviewed by Richard L. Walker

IN LATE 1959, when the full extent of the damage wrought in mainland China by the "Great Leap Forward" experiment became manifest, the Chinese Communist government clamped a tight embargo on the export of all but a few publications. Even the comrades in "fraternal countries" found sources of information about China cut off. For three years the Mao regime has curtailed the number of visitors from abroad and virtually eliminated the possibilities of meaningful exchanges with the outside world. If the Soviets under Stalin rang down an "iron curtain," the Chinese Communists under Mao have erected a "great iron wall."

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It is difficult, even for those in the Soviet Union, to get much of an idea of what is going on in China today. Communists in many areas of the world frankly admit that they are perplexed about China. The same is probably true, to a considerable extent, of the Chinese people themselves. No meaningful national statistics have been published for years (of course, some may question whether official Communist statistics have ever been meaningful in a scholarly sense). The National People's Congress has met only once in three years, and then only in secret session. Practically all information at the national level is being kept a state secret today, and reports concerning individual enterprises or activities are not sufficiently numerous to permit any generalized conclusions.

Given these restrictions on information about Communist China, it is not surprising that there should be a wide divergence in interpretations of conditions in that troubled land. Assessments of China have tended to swing like a pendulum from one extreme to another. During the first year of the Great Leap (1958-59), for example, even some of the most confirmed critics of the Mao regime began to talk in terms of an "economic miracle" in China. The self-confidence engendered in the Peking leadership by the sight of countless millions bending to its commands inevitably communicated itself —thanks to the official monopoly on communications— to the outside world as well as to the Chinese themselves. With the hunger and chaos of the year 1961, however, the mood became almost the reverse. Some reporters abruptly changed from the view that the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic could accomplish practically anything to the view that they were capable of practically nothing. The lesson taught by this is that in evaluating books about Communist China, it is necessary not only to correct for the predispositions of particular writers, but also to make due allowance for the prevailing mood which influenced them. This injunction certainly applies to the works under review.

These five books indicate clearly that although Mao and his colleagues consider themselves the embodiment of a great new proletarian force in history, they have found themselves again and again to be utterly dependent upon two groups that are as significant and as old as Chinese civilization itself—the peasants and the intellectuals. In many respects the volumes under review can be conveniently discussed in terms of what they disclose of Chinese Communist ineptitude in handling these two groups; taken in their entirety, of course, they reveal much more about the "new" China. Themes that emerge to some degree in all five works include: (1) the arbitrary nature of the Communist regime, (2) the power and privileges of the party, (3) the revolutionary changes wrought in the traditional pattern of Chinese life, (4) the effectiveness of Chinese Communist control techniques, (5) the absurdities inherent in the attempt to apply Marxist dogma in the land of Confucius, and (6) the extent to which the Chinese Communist leadership is caught up in the whirlwind of its own slogans.

MU FU-SHENG'S VOLUME is surely one of the most thoughtful appraisals of Communist rule in China yet published. Its constant tone of philosophical detachment and measured understatement assures that its indictment of the Mao regime will not be dismissed as one based on personal pique or prejudice. The author is an engineer who, after twelve years in Britain and the United States, returned to his homeland in 1957 to contribute his services to the reconstruction of China. In less than two years he left the country in sorrow and distress. However, he was an eye-witness to the dramatic "rectification movement" of 1957 and the initial stages of the 1958 Great Leap Forward with its backyard steel furnaces and people's communes. Because of these experiences, his work reflects belief in the ability of the Communists to sustain their despotic control, an appraisal that was shared by many abroad at that time. He is even convinced, for instance, of the long-range efficacy of the Communist approach to economic problems.

Though an engineer by training, Mu is capable of profound philosophical insights and has given close attention to his own civilization as well as to Western culture. He is equally at home with Hsün-tzu and Nietsche, Lao-tsu and Milton. His view is that of the intellectual, and he is primarily concerned with the problems of the Chinese intelligentsia under Mao. He devotes the first third of his work to a historical and cultural survey of China in relation to the impact of the West, noting that once Western power had shattered the assumed infallibility of the Confucian system, there were few guides for the Chinese intellectuals to follow. They sought in vain for some organizing principle that would enable them to meet the challenge from the West without "losing cherished cultural values and revered moral standards." Writes the author (p. 113):

The Chinese Communists like to tell the Chinese people that communism was the only possible solution for China's problem—which, like all speculative statements in history, can never be decisively proved—but it was, so far as effective government was concerned, certainly the first solution offered. The failure of the previous reforms gave the Communists some likelihood of being the "only solution," and the fatal consequences of further experiment

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inclined many people to accept communism as if it were the "only solution." Like the people in the sinking ship, those who went over to the Communist side during the recent civil war had no time to think what the "solution" would cost China. Working government and industrialization had been too long denied for the people to be circumspect. In the meantime, labor camps, fixed elections, engineered trials, destruction of men with real spirit, coercion, intimidation, mass violence, children informing on parents, and friends spying on friends are the price to pay for national strength. The very high price makes one wonder if strength could be had for less.

Discussing the cultural atmosphere in which the Chinese Communists have operated, Mu points out that the rigors of Chinese life over the centuries gave rise to attitudes and patterns of behavior that others might find strange. Perhaps the Chinese intellectuals, because they had been so long accustomed to the sight of human suffering and death, were initially not as ready to condemn Communist violence as outsiders might have expected. Mu sees the veteran middle-level cadres as the decisive force in the Communist control structure in China. The veteran Communist, he observes, "is a grim soldier, totally devoid of humor. Humor is born of an overabundant confidence and carefree mischief, neither of which a Communist has. . ." (p. 134)

The final section of Mu's volume is a profound essay entitled "An Attempt at Self-examination," in which he analyzes the meaning of the Communist despotism in his native land in broad philosophical and moral terms. The author shows how basically alien Marxism is to China, and what sort of intellectual dishonesty is necessary for its application. "Once Marxism is seen as part of the intellectual tide started in the Renaissance," he says, "it becomes, for the Chinese, all the more difficult to accept, because the Renaissance was an event in European history, not in the Chinese, and the ideas it produced, especialy those about history and man's future, cannot be illustrated from Chinese history." (p. 256) Obviously Mu understands why the current regime cannot allow an honest intellectual approach to Chinese history.

The author's indictment of Maoist totalitarian rule is as devastating as it is measured in tone. "The Communist regime," he states, "is no overall solution to China's problem; if it were, culture would occupy a place beside economics." (p. 258) Speaking from his own experience in attempting to adjust to the intellectual dishonesty of life under the Chinese Communists, Mu writes: "It is the totalitarian, not the authoritarian aspect of Chinese communism that repels the intellectuals and torments the whole people." (p. 268) And again, "There is hardly any traditional moral precept which has not been violated somewhere by the Communist methods. . . . The most basic disease in the Communist moral sense is . . . the lack of respect for other people's dignity." (p. 282)

This sensitive intellectual feels, however, that the Chinese Communist regime will last and even that it still retains considerable support from the intellectuals because of its accomplishments in certain areas. "The crux of the matter," he writes, "is that though in the Communist programme industrialization and mass education, which coincide with the interests of China, are merely incidental to Marxist aims, yet the Chinese intellectuals, in the depth of their hearts, support the Government for these objectives and these alone." (pp. 285-6) Nevertheless, Mu's own compelling story leaves little doubt that the price the Chinese have paid in terms of the sacrifice of human values is too high.

There are, to be sure, some minor points in this valuable book to which exception can be taken. For example, Mu is quite wrong in asserting that Marx "said nothing about China." (p. 256) Again, in the light of criticisms that were being voiced by recognized experts within China even during the period of his stay, the author hardly seems justified in his statement that "the Communists have shown that *with their method of pushing people around,* organization and planning do far more good to the large industries than the money-incentives that socialization kills." (p. 195)

MANY OF THE CRITICISMS which Mu must have overlooked are to be found in the very useful volume published by China Viewpoints, assembling official Chinese Communist materials regarding the "rectification campaign" of 1957. New China News Agency dispatches as well as excerpts from the central party organ *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily) are arranged chronologically to show the full weight and scope of the campaign. In concentrating on the voluminous outburst of anti-Communist criticism that occurred in China in May and June of 1957, outside observers frequently overlooked the fact that this was part of a larger, planned rectification campaign by which the Communists intended to bring the intellectuals into line. There can be no question as to the authenticity of the documents contained in this collection. All from Chinese Communist sources, they nevertheless constitute as damning an indictment of the regime as can be imagined, indicating beyond all doubt that Mao had lost the support of the Chinese intelligentsia. The collection provides a handy reference for those who wish to know what sort of criticisms the intellectuals levelled against

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Communist rule during this period. Though lacking the scholarly setting of Roderick MacFarquhar's similar study, *The Hundred Flowers*, it is equally valuable.

Contradictions starts out with the text of the Communist Party directive of April 27, 1957, which launched the "rectification campaign." The documents that follow are divided into the four general stages of the campaign. The first was the "blooming and contending" stage, from April 30 to June 8. This was the period when leading personalities of the non-Communist "democratic parties," professors, and students denounced the Party and its leaders with a vehemence that took the Communists by surprise. The second group of documents charts the beginning of the party's counterattack against its critics, from June 8 to 18, and the third section deals with the transformation of the campaign into a "struggle against the rightists" between June 18 and 30. The final section documents the intensification of this struggle as the intellectuals were forced to make confessions in abject self-abasement and the regime introduced new punitive regulations, including the State Council's decree of August 4 on Labor Custody, a euphemism for forced labor. This small volume gives only too eloquent a picture of the anguish of the Chinese intellectuals today. It also shows that they are under few illusions about the shortcomings of the Communist regime in many areas where others have conceded them success, particularly the economic field.

MR. HENRY J. LETHBRIDGE'S *The Peasants and the Communes* was influenced by an entirely different period and atmosphere. The author, a lecturer in sociology at the University of Hong Kong, has produced a first-rate summary and analysis of the peasant policies of the Chinese Communists, stressing the disastrous results of the people's communes and the Great Leap Forward. Whereas Mu Fu-sheng concedes substantial economic achievements under the Maoist despotism, Lethbridge, writing in the wake of the mass flight of peasant refugees into Hong Kong in 1962 and the clear revelation of blunders committed by the top Chinese leadership, questions many of these supposed successes. Emphasizing the stupidities occasioned by the Communists' belief in their own infallibility, he writes: "It is safe to say that without this acceptance of and belief in the infallibility of Marxist science, the CCP would have been more cautious and realistic in the carrying out of agrarian policies, and more likely to spot evidence suggesting revision of these policies much earlier than in fact occurred." (p. 114)

Lethbridge, like Mu, writes with quiet and scholarly restraint. Following a brief survey of the condition of the Chinese peasantry, he describes Communist agrarian policy prior to the 1949 seizure of power and then traces the development of agricultural controls and collectivization up to the launching of the commune movement in 1958. Three chapters are devoted to the communes—their introduction, their social control aspects, and their failure. The author supplements his treatment with a comparative summarization of the more successful approaches to the problems of agricultural reform and production in India, Taiwan, and Japan, all of which serve to point up the inadequacy of the Communist approach. He also compares Soviet and Chinese collectivization policies, noting that they have much in common, including failure.

One of Lethbridge's major conclusions is that "the Soviet model for agriculture can hardly be applied to an Asian country." (p. 182) As for the people's communes, he writes: "First, the communes have failed as an instrument to introduce a Communist society in rural China. Second, they have failed to increase production, and thus have been unable to make available larger surpluses for industrialization as they were intended to do." (p. 107) Although the threat of famine finally forced a drastic retreat from the policies of 1958, the Peking regime, following a somewhat improved 1962 harvest thanks to that retreat, now appears to be once again tightening its controls in the countryside. This bears out Mr. Lethbridge's prophetic final warning that "paradoxically, one good harvest could have disastrous consequences for the peasant." (p. 184)

VALENTIN CHU AGREES with Mr. Lethbridge that the conditions of near-starvation in mainland China during 1960-61 were brought on by the follies of Chinese Communist agricultural policy rather than by mother nature. He observes (p. 61):

Plowing too deeply, sowing too closely, planting too early, using the wrong crops or wrong seeds, employing too much or too little or inadequate ferilizer, and not allowing certain fields to lie fallow—these reasons alone, even if there were not natural calamities, dealt the harvests a severe blow.

But just as some of the earlier books about China mirrored the optimistic exuberance of the Peking regime in the Great Leap period, so Chu's book—based on years of reporting from Hong Kong, supplemented by a close following of Chinese developments in the author's present capacity as a staff member of *Time* and *Life* magazines—reflects in extreme measure the more recent atmosphere of negativism concerning Com-

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munist China. The general thesis of *Ta Ta, Tan Tan* (Fight, Fight; Talk, Talk) is that despite the vaunted resilience of Maoist strategy as implied by the title, the Chinese Communist regime is but a paper dragon.

Chu concentrates on the negative aspects of Mao's rule almost to the point of excluding any of its accomplishments. In many instances he is quite right in accusing the Communists of flagrant blunders on their road to "instant paradise," and he does a deft job of demolishing the myths surrounding statistics emanating from the Chinese Communist capital. But much of the effectiveness of his critique is undercut by the tone of brash flippancy that runs through the whole book. Though many of the phrases are humorously turned, the slang become almost overbearing at times.

Chu clearly believes that the Communists no longer have the support of the Chinese people, particularly the intellectuals. One interesting and valuable aspect of his volume is the stress it places on Taoist tradition, which in the author's view arms the Chinese with methods of evading and offering passive resistance to Communist control. This is a factor which Mu Fu-sheng may not have taken adequately into account. Chu points, for instance, to the subtle irony resorted to by Chinese intellectuals in order to poke fun at dogmatic party cadres. "One has to know the language," he remarks, "to realize that the deadliest insults in Chinese are always couched in exquisitely polite words." (p. 199)

The major portion of *Ta Ta, Tan Tan* deals with the economic blunders of the Chinese Communist leadership, particularly during the period of the Great Leap. Quoting from the Communist press to show that "China's water conservancy has done more harm than good," the author goes on to say (p. 68):

The foolish squandering of resources and manpower on big haphazard projects before 1958, and the wanton canal-digging since then, deteriorated the water and soil in China's richest farming regions. It is no coincidence that the worst droughts of the past several years have been found in the very provinces where millions dug canals from 1957-1959.

Mr. Chu's case against the formerly prevalent myth of the ever-successful and all-powerful Chinese Communist threat in the East does indeed have much validity, and there is ample reason for believing with him that the Mao regime now faces an increasing threat of "invisible sabotage by peasants and workers." Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to underestimate the power of Communist totalitarian control and what it can accomplish, however high the cost in human values.

Chu devotes two chapters to poking fun at the "guided tourists" and pointing out how little they can see or learn of actual conditions in Communist China. Only a Chinese, he feels, is equipped, linguistically and culturally, to understand the shades of meaning that are so important in arriving at an accurate assessment. On this point the author is in accord with Mu Fu-sheng, who writes in the preface of his book: "Would any man feel assured by a report, say, on Great Britain, written by a Chinese unable to read or speak English, travelling with guides through the country in two weeks?"

YET, IN SPITE OF its general validity, the two Chinese authors' contention that the foreigner can learn little in Communist China also has its occasional exceptions, as illustrated by *Dateline—Peking,* the work of a competent Canadian journalist who was resident correspondent for the Toronto *Globe and Mail* in the Chinese capital for eight months starting in September 1959. Frederick Nossal was not fooled by the guided tour or by what Chu refers to as "the ruse of the vacant city." An inquiring foreign reporter frequently asks questions which do not occur to a Chinese, and he can also provide an added dimension of understanding that no Chinese can ever give: that is, he can report the manner in which the Chinese Communists handle foreigners, particularly journalists. Nossal's volume is an enlightening account of the frustrations that any foreigner seeking information in the Communist capital experiences—handouts at odd times, unavailable officials, closed buildings, and isolation. He speaks of the "invisible wall" that shuts off Mao's subjects from foreigners and from one another; yet, as a Westerner, he is eminently able to sense the rigidity and tension of "the Communist way of life that has no time for human joy."

Thus, while the Chinese Communists' formidable controls over information have made precise knowledge of developments in China well-nigh impossible to obtain, the five books under review nevertheless do provide a clear outline of the tragedy which has befallen a great civilization. They all highlight the danger inherent in the increasing isolation of the Mao regime from the realities of the outside world and from its own people, particularly the intellectuals. As Nossal points out, "Where Mao . . . has failed is in his inability to appreciate, from his isolation within China, that the nuclear age has accelerated not only aircraft and rockets —but also political theory and global strategy." (p. 142) Perhaps the chief danger lies not so much in Western inability to learn what is happening in China, as in the dogmatic determination of the Chinese Communists to isolate themselves from all who will not kowtow to their leader and his version of truth.

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Eclipse of the Polish October

POLAND'S GOMULKA REGIME has never held a public anniversary celebration of the bloodless revolt that brought it into being in October 1956. Communists recognize only one October Revolution, the seizure of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks in October 1917. Shortly after his own elevation to power, therefore, Gomulka abandoned the popular term "Polish October," and began using instead the term "Eighth Plenum" when referring to the events of 1956.

The Eighth Plenum was the historic meeting of the Central Committee of the United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR) held in Warsaw during those turbulent autumn days. Red Army divisions led by Marshal Ivan Konev, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, were converging on the Polish capital. When it became clear, however, that those forces would face the resistance of the entire Polish people united behind Gomulka, Moscow agreed to the demands put forth by the Eighth Plenum. They were: abolition of police rule, an end to forced collectivization of agriculture, reaffirmation of the right of peasants to own land, and a truce with the Roman Catholic Church. But more than anything else, the Poles then sought a restoration of freedom of expression, which was to bring about a veritable renaissance in every field of creative endeavor in Poland.

Today, as the seventh anniversary of the Polish October approaches, the Gomulka regime is rapidly curtailing the freedoms that had earned for Poland the reputation of being the most liberal country in the Soviet bloc. During the bloodless October revolt, Gomulka symbolized the unity of the Polish people and became a national hero. But to anticipate economic miracles from him was unrealistic. The unfulfilled promises of more consumer goods have fostered growing bitterness among the people. In a vicious circle of cause and effect, the productivity of labor has declined to a point bordering on sabotage, and the country's economic stagnation has been deepening.

As a result, Gomulka is now confronted with criticism from both extremes of the Communist Party. The liberals attribute economic failures to half-measures in moving along the "Polish road to socialism," which Gomulka himself had proclaimed. The diehard dogmatists of the Natolin Group[1] accuse him of drifting away from a consistent Communist economic policy based on centralized planning and strict government controls. Moreover, the weakening of Gomulka's popular support caused by the widespread dissatisfaction over living conditions has encouraged the diehards to demand more and more stringent measures to repress discontent.

When he returned to power, Gomulka was gentle in his treatment of his adversaries. He did not liquidate the enemies who had caused his downfall in 1949; he merely purged them from key positions in the party and the government apparatus, exiling some to unimportant diplomatic posts in other Communist countries, which were jokingly called Poland's equivalent of Siberia. At that time, his generosity was generally regarded as an expression of self-confidence, obviously based on the enthusiastic support given him by the overwhelming majority of the Polish people. Even then, however, there were observers who warned that the old Communist Gomulka was putting the Stalinists "on ice" in the expectation that some day he would need them. They proved to be correct.

THE FIRST TO RETURN, from a minor position in the Polish Embassy in Prague, was the notorious General Kazimierz Witaszewski, a leader of the Natolin Group, who in the fall of 1959 was entrusted with an important post in the party's Central Committee. He was followed by other members of his faction, some of whom were installed in key positions in the Ministries of Interior and Justice. The effect of these appointments was quickly felt in the fields of education and culture. The Catholic

[1] Natolin, a suburb of Warsaw where the pro-Moscow faction held its meetings before and during the October days of 1956.

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Church soon felt exposed to new pressures. In violation of the agreement concluded between Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski just prior to the parliamentary elections of January 1957, religious instruction in public schools was curtailed. The lay activities of the Church, too, have been increasingly curbed.[2]

Then a drive was launched against the flourishing discussion clubs, particularly the Krzywe Kolo (Crooked Circle) in Warsaw, which had become a popular place for meetings and lively exchanges of ideas by the most promising of the country's young intellectuals. It was finally closed in February 1962 after its leaders, headed by the distinguished philosopher and president of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), Professor Tadeusz Kotarbinski, had awarded a prize to the young "revisionist" philosopher and writer, Professor Leszek Kolakowski. Kolakowski received the award for his play "Entrances and Exits," a satire on the police state. The play was banned by the censor after four performances.

A climax to this series of events was reached in the Holland affair, which came immediately after the closing of Kolakowski's play and shocked the entire country. Henryk Holland, a noted writer and sociologist who had once been the editor of Warsaw's most popular daily, *Zycie Warszawy*, died while in the hands of the police. He was officially reported a suicide.

Holland had been seized suddenly in December 1961. His arrest was not reported in the press. There then followed the arrest of Stanislaw Brodzki, co-editor of the popular pictorial weekly *Swiat*, and one of the most influential journalists in Poland. Brodzki had been president in 1956 of the Warsaw Journalists' Association, which played a leading role in the revolt against Moscow. It was known that his detention, which was brief, had some connection with the case of Holland, who was accused of military espionage. The true cause of Holland's arrest is supposed to have been his close contacts with foreign newspapermen.

A few days after he was seized, on December 26, 1961, a brief item in *Trybuna ludu* reported that Henryk Holland had committed suicide. He was said to have jumped from a window of his seventh-floor apartment, to which the police had brought him from prison for a search of his personal papers.

Holland's funeral turned into an impressive demonstration against the growing power of the security apparatus. Hundreds of students, university professors and writers were present. Among them there even were members of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, whom Gomulka is believed to have called on the carpet afterwards.

[2] It should be noted, however, that religious freedom in the narrow sense of the term continues to exist. It is enjoyed not only by the Catholics, who represent more than 90 percent of the population, but also by the small religious minorities, including the Jews.

About the same time, another heavy blow struck the Gomulka regime in the case of Andrzej Stawar, a veteran Communist and a Marxist theoretician, who died in the summer of 1961 while on a visit to France. His ashes were brought back to Poland and interred after a state funeral attended by all the prominent leaders of the regime. The eulogies stressed that the Polish Communist movement had suffered a grievous loss and that Stawar's work of Marxist literary criticism would always occupy an honored place in modern Polish literature.

Some weeks later, the Polish émigré publishing house in Paris, Kultura, brought out a volume entitled *The Last Works of Andrzej Stawar*. It turned out to be a strong condemnation of Communist regimes and their police methods—the confessions of a Communist disillusioned with the outcome of the lofty ideals to which he had dedicated his life. What is more, in his concluding chapter Stawar prophetically discussed the deepening rift between the Soviet Union and Red China and predicted that the ideological differences between Moscow and Peking concerning peaceful coexistence with the West would reveal the animosity of the Chinese towards the entire white race.[3]

As a result of the Stawar incident, the freedom of writers to travel abroad was severely restricted, and heavy prison sentences were meted out to local distributors of the Paris *Kultura*. These and other stiffening security measures reflected the regime's anger at the intellectuals. Significantly, a predominant role in their enforcement was played by a group known in Poland today as the "Partisans," who had by then occupied important positions in the growing police apparatus.

LIKE GOMULKA and unlike the majority of Communist activists who fled to the Soviet Union and then returned as leaders of the postwar Polish Communist regime, most of the Partisans had spent the war years in Nazi-occupied Poland. They fought in units of the leftist underground, the Armja Ludowa (People's Army), and took part in the 1944 Warsaw uprising that was condemned by Moscow as a "nationalist plot." Many of the leaders of the Armja Ludowa were later imprisoned and tortured by the security police. The October 1956 revolt brought about a rehabilitation of the Warsaw uprising. As a result, veterans of the Armja Ludowa were installed in party and government jobs and gradually promoted, until today they occupy key positions in the Gomulka regime. Ironically, they are advocates of the hard line and have a definite distaste for the liberal "eggheads" who in 1956 had opened to them the road to political power. The most influential of them are General Grzegorz Korczynski, the head of army intelligence; Mieczyslaw Moczar, chief of the office of investigation in the Ministry

[3] *Pisma ostatnie Andrzeja Stawara,* (Last writings of Andrzej Stawar) Paris, Institut Literacki, 1961, p. 258.

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of Interior, and Ryszard Dobieszak, chief of the "citizens' militia."

Currently, the Partisans are on the offensive within the party, aiming to break the still strong influence of the liberals headed by Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki, and Professor Oscar Lange, vice-president of the State Council and a man of considerable international prestige. All three are former leaders of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and have a large following among Poland's intellectuals. Also belonging among the liberals are Politburo members and former Central Committee Secretaries Edward Ochab and Jerzy Morawski, as well as Roman Zambrowski, whose resignation from the Politburo was forced at the meeting of the Central Committee last July.

Zambrowski's elimination was merely another step in the Partisans' drive for complete control of the party apparatus. Since 1956 he had been in charge of the party cadres—*i.e., membership control*—and in that function he purged many Natolin diehards who now are returning to positions of influence. At the same July plenum the Partisans also helped elect Arthur Starewicz, who has been the mastermind of the new hard line in the field of culture, to the powerful post of Secretary of the Central Committee. Their successful effort at the Plenum to have the next party congress postponed until 1964 is clear evidence of their faith in the ascendancy of their members within the party. Under these circumstances, Gomulka is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between the party's liberal and Partisan factions.

Socialism is a Fragile Blossom

Many of our creative artists do not understand the situation our country is in. They do not understand the essence of the ideological and social struggle that is going on in the contemporary world, and they give in to the pressure of bourgeois ideology. Without in the least disregarding the danger of dogmatism and its consequences on our cultural front, it must, however, be stated that in our present conditions, the main danger on this front is revisionism. The correct passion for revising the false notions and evaluations of the previous period was accompanied in some creative milieus by a rejection of Marxism altogether, a sort of ideological and moral nihilism, sometimes veiled by the threadbare cloak of existentialism.

In some literary works of this type, these marginal social elements, these signs of cynicism, demoralization, and degeneration are presented as the result of the conditions prevailing in our country. We are not against criticism of adverse phenomena in our life. On the contrary, we encourage such criticism. But we are against destructive criticism, against malicious, venomous criticism. We do not and will not allow the propagation of ideas hostile to socialism, ideas that are harmful from the point of view of our educational work.

—From the report by Wladislaw Gomulka to the Thirteenth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. PAP, July 5, 1963.

A RECENT EVENT that strikingly revealed the change in the Gomulka regime was the closing of Warsaw's two influential literary weeklies, *Nowa kultura* and *Przeglad kulturalny*. In the first week of June 1963, both publications announced that they would cease to exist and would be replaced by a new weekly, *Kultura*, which was to "serve the cause of the many-faceted development of socialist culture, stressing the achievements and perspectives of the cultural revolution in Poland." This was a hint that the new weekly magazine would champion the cause of "Socialist Realism," concentrating on the cultural achievements of the regime.

The announcement was published in both magazines simultaneously. In *Nowa kultura* it appeared on the front page, giving the impression of a final victory after a long, behind-the-scenes struggle. *Przeglad kulturalny*, however, printed the announcement in a corner of the second page, while on the front page, over the name of the magazine, was a short, dramatic headline: "The Last." In their closing notice, the editors bade farewell to their readers by expressing gratitude for their "evidences of encouragement" during the eleven years of the magazine's existence. This slight difference in the manner in which *Przeglad kulturalny* reported its own demise dramatized the struggle the writers had put up for their platform.

However, the last word in the battle was granted to *Nowa kultura*, which on June 9, before the appearance of the successor magazine, published one more issue. It carried a front-page editorial summing up the thirteen years of Communist rule in Poland that had passed since *Nowa kultura* made its first appearance. The piece, a fine example of twisted party dialectics, announced:

When we compare the time of the first issue of *Nowa kultura* with the time of this final issue, we see a tremendous difference. Poland has become an industrial nation, a country of people whose great strides in education demand from the creators of cultural values much more than thirteen years ago . . . *Nowa kultura* is already fading into the history of cultural life in People's Poland. There is a need for a modern periodical that reflects the new trends of a more dynamic cultural life, a periodical that should help mold a socialist cultural model on a massive scale. The new *Kultura* that will appear next week will be such a magazine.

The very first issue of *Kultura* reflected the emptiness of the socialist "cultural model" heralded in its predecessor's final editorial. The very name of the new journal underlines the cynicism of Gomulka's propaganda ap-

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paratus. It was chosen to capitalize on the popularity of the émigré monthly, *Kultura*, which is published in Paris and has a considerable underground circulation in Poland.

THE HISTORY OF the two liquidated magazines vividly reflects the strange metamorphoses and convulsions the Communist regime in Poland has undergone in the nineteen years since it was born in Lublin. *Nowa kultura* first came out in 1949 when the grip of police rule was becoming stronger and the liberal, anti-Stalinist forces headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka were gradually being eliminated. As the censorship became more severe, writers assumed an attitude of passive resistance, withdrawing from participation in cultural activities sponsored by the regime. The publication of the weekly *Nowa kultura*, with its circulation severely restricted by paper rationing, was a concession to the intellectual elite, since columns of the daily press were closed to them.

Two years later, when Stalinist terror in Poland was at its height and Gomulka and his comrades were in jail, *Przeglad kulturalny* made its appearance. Around this weekly assembled writers of the older generation, the humanists. Thus, paradoxically, in a period of the most rigid censorship and the harshest police rule, there were two literary weeklies in which Poland's intellectually creative forces enjoyed the freedom to remain "disengaged." Later on, during the years 1955-59, *Nowa kultura* and *Przeglad kulturalny* opened their pages to such courageous opinions and such a rich variety of artistic shadings that it seemed unbelievable that they could have been published in a Communist state. A shattering event was the publication by *Nowa kultura* in August 1955 of Adam Wazyk's bitter "Poem for Adults"—the opening salvo in the campaign for freedom that culminated in the events of October 1956. The same independent spirit was shown again when both weeklies printed truthful, detailed, and well-documented reports of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, describing its brutal suppression by the Soviet army with no inhibitions.

Shortly after the establishment of *Nowa kultura*, *Po prostu*, a modest periodical put out by university students, made its appearance. It quickly became the most popular militant weekly in the country, reaching a record circulation of more than 150,000. In October 1956, *Po prostu* was the organ of the "revisionist" intellectuals led by Leszek Kolakowski, and after Gomulka's victory it soon began asking for radical economic reforms and unrestricted freedoms—a sort of second phase of the October revolution. In Poland's geopolitical situation, this was a farfetched demand.

On the first anniversary of the Polish October—which was not officially celebrated—*Po prostu* was closed down. The action brought a storm of protest from the country's university students and violent clashes between young people and the police in Warsaw. It signalled also the regime's introduction of a new strong-arm policy. Step by step, changes of content and tone were introduced in *Nowa kultura* and *Przeglad kulturalny;* instead of continuing to devote themselves to a critical analysis of Poland's difficult problems—particularly the growing economic chaos and the demoralization of youth—the two magazines became filled with reminiscences about the prewar past, studies of Polish classics and essays on abstract philosophic questions. This was a form of escapism and also of protest by the writers against the party's effort to harness them to its propaganda wagon.

What is more, the heavy hand of the censor made itself felt again, especially in *Nowa kultura*, which had become the rallying point of the rebellious writers after the closing of *Po prostu*. In January 1958, the journal angered the party's cultural commissars by giving its annual prize for poetry to Alexander Wat,[4] whose writings and personal experiences had become a mirror of the general mood of disillusionment with Moscow. His poetry had been hailed by *Nowa kultura* as a "revelation" expressive of the innermost sentiments of his whole tormented generation, and the party struck back with a purge of the editorial staff.

Many of *Nowa kultura's* liberal writers then moved to *Przeglad kulturalny* and managed for a time to preserve a measure of independence. Between the lines, one could still read in their articles critical remarks about the stiffening cultural line of the Polish Communist Party. Also characteristic was their friendly attitude toward the intellectual ferment in the Soviet Union, which was featured prominently and with evident satisfaction.

WITH THE SHUTTING down last June of both *Nowa kultura* and *Przeglad kulturalny*, the party has closed an era of outstanding Polish achievements in many fields of creative endeavor—in literature, art, theater and the cinema—achievements that won recognition and praise in the Western world. It is precisely this that irritated the anti-intellectual forces in the Gomulka regime. The Polish films that won prizes at international festivals, the paintings by Polish artists that were exhibited in Western art galleries, the books by Polish authors that were translated into foreign languages, all either completely ignored the "socialist reality" of contemporary Poland or depicted it in its naturally drab, gray colors.

But in closing the two magazines, the party seems to have overplayed its hand. The writers responded with an

[4] During the Pilsudski era, Wat had been one of the founders of Polish Futurism and then a leader in the pro-Communist "proletarian" literary movement. In 1940 he was arrested by the authorities in Russian-occupied Lwow and deported to a slave labor camp in Kazakhstan. He remained there for six years before he could return to Poland. Of Jewish origin, Wat came back a devout Catholic and began writing short stories and poems fraught with an atmosphere of apocalyptic catastrophe. See his *Wiersze* (Poems), Krakow, Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1957.

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unproclaimed but open "strike" against the new *Kultura*, and the first few issues of the magazines make it quite clear that without its freedom-minded intellectuals Poland will be a cultural desert. The editors, most of whom are party-line publicists, have struggled nightly to fill the columns of their periodical, but thus far, after eleven issues, they can offer nothing but boredom.

Involved in the "strike" are not just writers who were never identified with the Communist regime, but also pro-Communists who have made sincere efforts to stress the positive aspects of today's Poland, but who at the same time insist on their right to freedom of expression. The existence of the "strike" is confirmed by *Kultura* itself in an article by one of the editors, Roman Bratny.[5] Under the sarcastic headline "An Appeal to the Opportunists," Bratny bitterly attacks the writers who are "stalling." He hints that some of them had promised to cooperate with the magazine but are now awaiting further developments. "They think," Bratny says, "that it is better to be silent. Once before there was a time, after 1956, when our creative writers proudly looked back on their silence during the Stalinist years as a triumph."

Despite its harsh tone, Bratny's article is in effect a plea to the writers, who seem to be in a fairly strong bargaining position. He invites them to "throw into the garbage can" the attitude of "we" and "they"—an attitude which, he claims, creates a split between the "engaged party writers and the disengaged intellectuals"—and brands as "idiotic" their outcry, "For Christ's sake, it is all coming back!" Thus Bratny openly admits that there is fear in Poland, especially among intellectuals, that the old restrictions and police methods of the Stalin era may be returning.

Yet, it would be too much to assume that the country is going back to the days of all-out police rule. Thus far the recent stiffening of police measures seems to express only the regime's anger with those intellectuals who are refusing to accept the party's propaganda line.

[5] Roman Bratny, "Odezwa do oportunistow," *Kultura* (Warsaw), No. 4, July 7, 1963.

It is true, however, that Poles are becoming disillusioned with Gomulka as they see the power of the security organs growing, even without the direct pressure from Moscow that existed before the Polish October. Their disillusionment becomes stronger when they compare recent developments in Poland with events in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Rumania. In these countries, it is the intellectuals who are on the offensive, winning more freedom of expression. They are especially envious of the progress in Czechoslovakia, the very last stronghold of Stalinism in the Soviet bloc, where the writers (especially in Slovakia) have rejected the primitive formula of "Socialist Realism" and gone so far as to adopt the "decadent bourgeois" Franz Kafka as their symbol of free creative expression.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, the Polish regime finds itself in difficulty on several fronts—with the liberal intellectuals, with the Catholic Church, with the underpaid industrial workers who bear the heaviest burdens in the socialist economy, and with the peasants who are determined to keep their present privileged position. In dealing with these difficulties, the regime has adopted measures obviously in contrast to the development towards liberalization in other East European states. These measures should not, however, be construed as a return to the stagnation and dogmatism of old. The forces that brought about the Polish October are still alive, and the deeply-felt desire of the Polish people, particularly of its intellectuals and the large body of university students, for freedom of expression and contacts with the West cannot be easily suppressed. The current political deterioration, therefore, represents an eclipse, but not—as far as one can see—a disintegration, of the Polish October.

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